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Abstract 
 
This thesis focuses on the notion of play in the theory and practice of art in the 
20
th
 and 21
st
 centuries. I approach play both as an „internal‟ element of the concept of 
art (following the philosophical tradition) and as the „external‟ model for the creative 
process (as applied by modern and postmodern artists). The main purpose is to produce 
an interpretation of play that would span various, often contradictory, features of this 
concept and would serve to reinterpret the notion of artistic representation, traditionally 
linked with the vocabulary and approaches coming from the domain of work 
(production, mastery, preconceived outcomes, fixity, and the nature/culture dichotomy). 
My thesis defends representation, however, „supplemented‟ with the notion of play.  
In my project of highlighting the role of play in the discourse of art and 
aesthetics, I draw on Jacques Derrida‟s reading of Kant and Plato. Derrida‟s analysis of 
the „logic of supplementarity‟ in Western thought and terms such as parergon, 
pharmakon and „undecidable‟, help me to argue that the ambivalence of play and the 
movement „in between‟ the opposites allow us to understand play as a condition of 
artistic representation. I also use Mihaly Spariosu‟s distinction between the 
interpretations of play as „rational‟ or „prerational‟ to inscribe play into the argument 
between representation and non-representation in the theory and practice of art.  
In terms of practice, I link the emergence of the „strategy‟ of play with the 
rhetorics of primitivism in modern avant-gardes from Dada to Fluxus. I analyse play as 
a tool of transgression and an „attractive supplement‟ of the creative process – a way to 
activate the public and change the traditional proper function (ergon) of art. I trace the 
assimilation of play in recent participatory („relational‟, „dialogic‟) art intended to go 
„beyond representation‟. I argue that play has become a commonly used „tactic‟ and an 
undercurrent of today‟s artistic and social network. In the final discussion I reinterpret 
the notions of work (ergon, essence) and play (parergon, supplement) in the light of the 
20
th
 century artistic revolution. Using vocabulary and approaches coming from the 
domain of play (and specifically Role-Playing Game) I attempt to overcome the 
prejudice against the notion of representation. 
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0BIntroduction 
 
At the symposium accompanying the Altermodern exhibition at Tate Britain 
(Tate Triennial 2009), curated by Nicolas Bourriaud, part of the programme was an 
artists‟ panel, with British artist Katie Paterson among the participants. At the show she 
presented the work All the dead stars, a map documenting the locations of thousands of 
supernovas from data supplied by astronomers and supernova hunters. During the 
conversation, Paterson recounted her work on this project and said that initially she had 
no idea whether there were five or five billion supernovas documented. She knew 
nothing about astronomy. She just wanted to pursue the idea that seemed interesting (to 
construct a map defunct in its essence), engage with an international network of 
scientists and dead star hunters, and enter a field so different from her own. By 
completing her work and her research, before she moved to the next project, she 
became a kind of a temporary expert in this field and an active participant in the 
supernova network. As we can read at the Tate website: “Treating the cosmos as her 
playground, her works span vast distances, making connections between disparate 
points and timescales.” PF1FP  
 
 
1. Katie Paterson with her work All the Dead Stars, 2009 
                                                            
P
1
P http://www.tate.org.uk/britain/exhibitions/altermodern/participants.shtm#e21, visited: 02.06.2009 
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As I will argue in my thesis, terms like „play‟, „playground‟, „playful‟ have 
become a part of the common vocabulary in recent art. „Play‟ means orientation on the 
process, experimenting, stepping into different „realities‟, treating viewers as playmates, 
changing identities and so on. It is, in most cases, seen as better than the old-fashioned, 
deadly serious art making – it seems to be more „natural‟ and liberated from the notions 
of production, mastery and authority. In this thesis I want to investigate where this idea 
and this development has come from and assess its usefulness in analysing and 
explaining art. 
 
The choice of the research topic 
The initial impulse to choose the notion of play as a subject for this research was 
of an intuitive nature. It seemed to me that play has become an important aspect or 
modus operandi of contemporary artistic projects. My own background as an artist is a 
traditional one. The 5-year MA course in painting and printmaking that I completed in 
Poland was mainly concentrated on developing manual and technical skills, and dealing 
with primarily visual, not conceptual problems. From the perspective of a maker of 
aesthetic objects, the contemporary multimedia or ephemeral, process-oriented, 
interactive or participatory practices appeared to me as liberated from rules and 
conventions manifestations of play. However, the word „play‟ in the context of art 
seemed to be loaded with prejudice. The notion of the „artist as a playing child‟ was for 
me a synonym for irresponsibility, detachment from real life problems and 
superficiality. On the other hand, I was attracted to the concept of play and the 
associations it evoked, as: pretence, make-believe, mask, carnival, alternative reality, 
micro-world or safe experiment. The most basic intention behind this research was 
therefore to investigate how the notion of play can be approached in the context of art 
when we go beyond the stereotype or the popular interpretations of play. I was 
interested whether play is an important structural element of the concept of art, or 
whether it merely belongs with clichés and marginal phrases, strengthening 
stereotypical and ill-informed views on avant-garde artistic experiments. If it is more 
than just a cliché, how has it contributed to or taken part in the development of 
contemporary art? How has it been interpreted and used? 
Although play and game are recurring metaphors and rhetoric tools in critical or 
philosophical writing on art, I have not come across any publications that combine the 
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cross-disciplinary analysis of the concept of play and its philosophical implications with 
the examination of the actual uses of play in the artistic practice. Play hardly ever 
figures in the lexicons of „key concepts‟ of art. Despite its acknowledged links with 
creativity, it seems to be a neglected and marginalised notion in the discourse of art and 
aesthetics.PF
2
FP My project attempts to fill this gap, at least as an introduction to further 
studies, and to analyse play as crucial to the changes in art and culture in the last 
century, and especially in the development of participatory art.  
 
Methodology  
I see my own engagement with the „strategy of play‟ as to some extent inscribed 
in the situation of writing these words. A visual artist in the traditional sense – a 
printmaker, painter and book illustrator, I departed to investigate the theory and practice 
of recent process-oriented art. I entered a new role. My motivation is to explore an 
unknown land, to experience a situation different from the one of my „primary‟ 
identification, to meet people from this different „reality‟ and try to produce a „piece‟ of 
theory this time – a documentation of my creative process. I approach the concept of 
play without a routine and without preconceived methods. I can combine different 
perspectives and allow myself to wander and get lost; to explore various paths, not 
necessarily leading to major conclusions.  
Nonetheless, the PhD research, especially the period of writing up, is primarily 
work.PF
3
FP I have to fulfil certain requirements, produce a body of knowledge, a text, and 
manage the data generated during the playful and chaotic exploration. As an artist, I 
supplement theoretical knowledge, the skills research proper and the ethics of academic 
writing with the „aesthetic‟ approach to this text, the use of metaphors and associations, 
and the intention to produce the interpretation of the concept of play in art, rather than 
the ultimate theory of „art as play‟. Even though I eventually end up with a complex 
                                                            
P
2
P The books in English devoted to the concept of play, which address certain aspects of the operation of 
play in art and aesthetics are: Mihaly Spariosu‟s Dionysus Reborn: Play and the Aesthetic Dimension in 
Modern Philosophical and Scientific Discourse (Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1989) 
discussing theoretical approach to play in modern philosophical and scientific theories; and recently 
published Mary Flanagan‟s Critical Play: Radical Game Design (The MIT Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, London, 2009) emerging from computer game studies, and analysing different forms of 
play (e.g. board games, language games, etc.) as models for artistic practices in the 20 Pth P and 21PstP centuries. 
The purpose of this book is to propose the alternative model of game design, based on the avant-garde 
artists‟ experiments with play. 
P
3
P As I will argue in this thesis, the notions of work and play merge in any creative activity. 
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theoretical construction – a conceptual map – that describes the operation of play in art 
and its various uses, I am fully aware that it is possible to erect another structure with 
the same „bricks‟, and to make different connections between the lands of play.  
 
My thesis focuses on the notion of play as it appears in the theory of art and in 
art practice in the 20 P
th
P and 21 P
st
P centuries. I approach play both as an „internal‟ element 
of artistic activity or the concept of art (following the philosophical tradition), and as 
the „external‟ model for the creative process (as applied in modern and postmodern art). 
There exist various, often contradictory, perspectives on play as a biological, cultural or 
social phenomenon, as well as theoretical positions locating play within the aesthetics. 
Play, as an activity familiar to everybody, is often used as a point of reference or a 
metaphor, without the awareness of its complex conceptual connotations. Due to its 
ambivalent nature, it also easily becomes subject to various rhetorics. In my thesis, after 
Mihai Spariosu PF
4
FP, I distinguish between the interpretations of play as either rational 
(play as a manifestation of subjective control) or prerational (play as a manifestations of 
the „natural forces‟ dominating the subject). An important task of this thesis is to arrive 
at the approach to play that would be useful as a research tool in the analysis of artistic 
practices, and would avoid the ideological or aesthetic reductions of this concept to a 
set of desirable features. I will therefore combine philosophical, sociological and art-
historical perspectives to provide the multilayered image of play and its interpretation in 
the context of art. 
This redefined notion of play will serve as a point of reference in the 
examination of „why‟ and „how‟ modern artists applied the concept and the model of 
play – what were the rhetorics, promises and myths behind their „playful‟ experiments. 
I will then use this analysis to demonstrate the continuation (and differences) between 
the applications of play in 20 P
th
P century art and the recent participatory and process-
oriented projects. I also intend to highlight the position of play as a rhetoric tool in the 
discourse of artistic representation. I will analyse the rational/prerational distinction in 
the context of the argument between representation and non-representation in the theory 
and practice of art.  
                                                            
P
4
P Spariosu M., Dionysus Reborn: Play and the Aesthetic Dimension in Modern Philosophical and 
Scientific Discourse,  Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1989 
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The purpose of my thesis is, therefore, to produce an interpretation of play that 
would go beyond the one-sided metaphysical or ideological reductions (e.g. beyond the 
rational/prerational dichotomy), and would serve to reinterpret the notion of 
representation, traditionally linked with the vocabulary and approaches coming from 
the domain of work, which include: production, subjective control, mastery, 
preconceived outcomes, fixity and order, and the nature/culture dichotomy. My thesis 
defends representation, however, „supplemented‟ with the notion of play.  
The above issues can be summarised in the following research questions:  
 
Research Questions 
• How can the notion of play be contextualized within the notion of art? 
• How has „play‟ been interpreted, used and developed in art theory and practice in the 
course of the 20
th
 and 21P
st
P century?  
• What were the narratives behind the „strategy of play‟ applied by modern avant-
gardes?   
• How has the „strategy of play‟ developed in recent process-oriented and participatory 
art? Can it be used to redefine the contemporary notion of artistic representation? 
 
In my project of highlighting the role of play in the discourse of art and 
aesthetics, I draw on writings by Jacques Derrida. In order to challenge the traditionally 
„marginal‟ position of play I refer to his analysis of the „logic of supplementarity‟ in 
Western thought. His terms, such as pharmakon and „undecidable‟, help me to discuss 
the ambivalence of play and the movement „in between‟ the opposites, as its crucial 
characteristics. I also discuss this philosopher‟s deconstruction of the „metaphysics of 
presence‟, which I consider relevant to address the role of play in the argument between 
representation and non-representation (writing and speech; copy and origin; mediation 
and experience; art and non-art).  
 
Structure  
In chapter 1 (What is play?) I introduce various modern theories of play coming 
from human and natural science, mainly focusing on the approaches to play as a 
cultural phenomenon. These theories help me to construct a working definition of play 
as an experiential and metacommunicative frame – an ambivalent concept emerging in 
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the tension between reality and fiction, experience and representation, familiar and 
unfamiliar, safe and risky, oneself and the other, repetition and experiment, rules and 
freedom and so on. After Brian Sutton-Smith and Mihai Spariosu, I point out that the 
notion of play is subject to various rhetorics, “historically derived persuasive 
discourses”PF5FP that advance one side of play‟s characteristics at the expense of the other. I 
discuss Spariosu‟s distinction between “prerational” and “rational” approaches to play. PF6FP 
The former exposes play as a manifestation of unmediated power, surpassing its 
players, vital, untamed and immersive. The latter points out the communicative and 
representational aspects of play. I then discuss the relationship of play with its 
„opposite‟ concepts like „reality‟, „work‟ and „game‟ as structured by these two 
rhetorics. 
In the second chapter (The play of art) I analyse the conceptual perspectives on 
play in the context of art theory. Using Immanuel Kant‟s and Hans-Georg Gadamer‟s 
positions, I discuss the consequences of interpreting play as either „rational‟ or 
„prerational‟ in aesthetics and link this interpretation with the underlying notion of 
representation. I argue that the rational view uses play to support the traditional concept 
of representation (assuming the primacy of the subject over the artistic process/play), 
while the prerational one locates play as a mode of being of the work of art, dominating 
the participants/players (which entails the promise of non-representation in art). To go 
beyond the one-sided interpretations of play, I discuss the Kantian notion of the sublime 
as a liminal experience, and use Bakhtin‟s and Gadamer‟s analogies between art and 
communal celebrations (carnival, festival) to expose the prerational and rational, 
experiential and symbolic, self-conscious and immersive character of play. They also 
help me to highlight the weak points of the traditional notion of representation, as well 
as the impossibility of going beyond representation in the context of art. 
The purpose of the third chapter (The play and work of art) is to establish the 
perspective on play, in the context of art, which would go beyond the rational/ 
prerational dichotomy and would recognise the ambivalence of play on various levels. I 
discuss the traditional position of play within the concept of art and attempt to redefine 
                                                            
P
5
P Sutton Smith B., „Conclusion: The Persuasive Rhetorics of Play‟, in: The Future of Play Theory. A 
Multidisciplinary Inquiry into the Contribution of Brian Sutton-Smith, Pellegrini A. D. (Ed.), State 
University of New York Press, 1995, p. 278 
P
6
P Spariosu M., Dionysus Reborn: Play and the Aesthetic Dimension in Modern Philosophical and 
Scientific Discourse,  Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1989, p. 12 
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it. In my view, the long-established notion of representation is based on the idea of 
work as ergon, with its implications of stability, fixity, hierarchy, mastery and control. 
The role of play in this framework is marginal (parergon) as a distraction from the 
„proper function‟. Drawing on the Derridean concept of the „logic of supplementarity‟ I 
argue that play-parergon as a supplement cannot be treated as simply marginal – it 
rather belongs to the notion of art and structures it, together with work-ergon. I suggest 
the view of art as a necessity of conceptual and performative synergy (working/playing 
together) of these two seemingly opposite ingredients. I further discuss the 
characteristics of play with the chain of Derridean metaphors: parergon, passé-partout, 
passport, pharmakon, and pharmakos. I argue that the „undecidability‟ of play (its 
ability to operate in between the detached or conflicting elements), can be seen as a 
condition for the creation of metaphors, seeing „something as something else‟; thus it is 
also a condition for representation. In order to contextualize the connections of play 
with the notion of representation, I discuss the roots of the prejudice against 
representation in Western thought. Although, in my view, play must be seen as a trigger 
for representation, it has been often interpreted as a non-representational tool in art.  
In chapter 4 (Strategy of play: modern remedy for representation) I discuss the 
revolutionary agenda of modern avant-gardes to overcome the dominant values in art 
and society, including the ergon-like notion of artistic representation. The artists 
reached for approaches and modes of creation coming from the spheres of „Otherness‟ 
such as amateur and „primitive‟ art, childhood, the unconscious, chance, or mental 
disorder. I argue that the discovery of (prerational) play as an artistic “strategy” in the 
20P
th
P century has to be inscribed within the modern artists‟ „primitivist‟ fascinations. I 
refer to primitivism as a popular creative trend at the beginning of the last century that 
inspired experiments with methods not belonging to the traditional toolbox/toybox of 
the trained, professional artist. I analyse the narratives of primitivism (such as „myth of 
origin‟ and „myth of presence‟) as catalysts for both the growing interest in play (as 
external or marginal to the traditional Western concept of art), and the search for non-
art or non-representation – play being interpreted as the non-representational tool. I also 
refer to the modernist interpretations of play as either safe and innocent, or subversive – 
both creative and destructive.  
In chapter 5 (From cabaret to the „little laboratory‟: 20th century avant-garde‟s 
experiments with play) I discuss selected historical examples of the application of play 
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as a creative strategy in modern movements from Dada to Fluxus. Their representatives 
were searching for inspiration „outside‟ the well-established art frames, employing 
forms and methods from various playgrounds of human life: cabaret, festival, 
excursion, parlour and language games, masquerades, play with chance, playful 
scientific experiments and children‟s play. Their agenda (especially in the first avant-
gardes) was revolutionary. Play served as a weapon against the bourgeoisie, but also 
gradually as an unpredictable creative tool, and as a way to escape the boundaries of 
conventional art-making. I specifically devote my attention to the process of the 
activation of the viewers to transform them into the artist‟s „playmates‟, and to arrive at 
the collective non-art „experience‟ instead of the traditionally interpreted representation. 
In this respect, I mainly analyse Allan Kaprow‟s ideas (inspired by John Dewey‟s book 
Art as Experience) concerning children‟s play as a model for the Happening – an 
unscripted, participatory art form.  
Chapter 6 (Role-playing games of participatory art) serves to describe the recent 
examples of participatory or interactive projects that assimilated modern „play 
strategies‟ to become frequently used tools of the „professional artist‟. In most cases, 
play can no longer be interpreted as a “strategy” – it has rather become a “tactic”, to use 
de Certeau‟s terms PF7FP, or even, to some degree, it has been acknowledged as a structural 
element of contemporary works. The tactic of play is devoid of the notions of power, 
and revolutionary ambitions; it acts locally “to transform the situation into the 
favourable one”.PF8FP To describe the operation of the „tactic of play‟, I use the metaphor of 
the Role-Playing Game, a specific play-form of collaborative and interactive 
storytelling. I apply terms coming from the domain of the game („game characters‟, 
„game world‟, „game master‟ and „game session‟) to analyse postmodern process-
oriented participatory projects, named by the critics and art theorists as “relational”, 
“dialogical” or “conversational”. The purpose of this analysis is to prove the shift of the 
position of play in recent art, from marginal or instrumental to the more significant and 
widely accepted one.  
The final chapter (Play as context) is intended as a speculative discussion on the 
potential position of play within the contemporary discourse of art and art practice. I 
                                                            
P
7
P De Certeau M., „“Making Do”: Uses and Tactics‟, chapter in: The Practice of Everyday Life, Vol.1, 
University of California Press, London, 1988 
P
8
P Ibidem, p. 38 
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redefine the notions of work and play – ergon and parergon („proper function‟ and 
„dangerous supplement‟) in the light of the 20 Pth P century artistic revolution. I also 
propose the concept of the game-session as a metaphor for representation – synergy of 
work and play, ergon and parergon – in the context of recent participatory art. 
 
The use of terms  
I will introduce my interpretation of the terms which might cause confusion 
when they appear in the text for the first time. These terms include „play‟, „game‟, 
„work‟, „modern art‟, „primitivism‟, „strategy‟ and „tactic‟. However, here, I would like 
to briefly discuss the approach to the terms „modern‟ and „postmodern‟ in the context of 
art, and specify my use of the notion of „representation‟. 
 
- modern/postmodern art 
This thesis refers mainly to the art in Europe and the United States (Western art) 
created in the 20 P
th
P and 21 P
st
P century. I refer to the art movements, roughly up to the 
1970s, as „modern‟. I consider art of modernism as a series of movements, from the mid 
nineteenth century until the 1970s, aimed at reforming the previous status quo through 
the experimentation and progress, and according to the belief in some central value. I 
expand on the use of this term in chapter 4.   
 
I apply the term „postmodern‟ to the theory and practice of art roughly from the 
1970s to date, although I am aware that it is a problematic one. According to Zygmunt 
Bauman, “postmodernity means many different things to many different people.” PF9FP It 
can refer to the dissolution of differences between “painting and sculpture, styles and 
genres, gallery and the street” or to the models of life that look “suspiciously like a TV 
serial and a docudrama” with no clear distinction between reality and fiction. It can also 
mean the ongoing change, fluidity of moods and states that never become solid. “It 
means the exhilarating freedom to pursue anything and the mind-boggling uncertainty 
as to what is worth pursuing and in the name of what one should pursue it.” PF10FP However, 
as Bauman has it, postmodernity is first of all a state of mind in which we abandon 
effort to build solid structures (universal and homogenous), or to pursue clearly isolated 
beliefs. Postmodernity is therefore characterised by: “institutional pluralism, variety, 
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contingency and ambivalence”. PF11FP Anthony Giddens, however, points out the difference 
between „postmodernity‟ and „postmodernism‟. The latter, he writes, “is best kept to 
refer to styles or movements within literature, painting, the plastic arts, and 
architecture”, which function as “aesthetic reflection upon the nature of modernity” PF12FP. 
According to Giddens, modernity, enigmatic and complex, is difficult to overcome as 
an epoch in social life. As he writes: “We are currently living in the period of high 
modernity. What lies beyond? Can we attach any definite meaning to the concept of 
post-modernity?”PF13FP In my thesis I do not apply „postmodern‟ to a certain style of the 
late modernism (hybrid, ambiguous, perverse and ironical), but I use it in a broader 
sense, as a term spanning various contemporary phenomena, as in Bauman‟s account. I 
interpret postmodern art as the one that is no longer revolutionary, that does not 
position itself in relation to certain values as central and essential. It rather allows 
plurality of outlooks and gradual evolution in many different directions. However, the 
relation between modern and postmodern art is an ambiguous one. On the one hand it is 
based on discontinuation and the postmodern emancipation from modern myths and 
„centrisms‟. On the other hand postmodern art continues and reworks modern themes, 
strategies and inventions. 
 
- representation 
In Latin, repraesentare – to represent – means “to make present or manifest or 
to make present again”; “to present/embody/manifest an abstract idea/thought 
through/in a concrete object or even sometimes to substitute one object for another.” PF14FP 
In general, as Hanna Pitkin puts it, representation means “making present in some sense 
of something which is nevertheless not present literally or in fact.” PF15FP Art history has 
defined representation as substitution (German Vorstellung – „representation‟, in the 
sense of symbolic activity) or imitation as „living representation‟ (Darstellung – in the 
sense of theatrical „presentation‟). PF16FP In the first mode the image acts as replacement – 
compensation for the absence of the „original‟. The second, theatrical mode is the one 
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of repetition and the artwork evokes “the illusion of the tangible, physical presence” of 
the represented object. PF
17
FP Thus, as Craig Owens writes, “art historians have always 
located representation in terms of the poles of absence and presence which, as Derrida 
has shown, constitute the fundamental conceptual opposition upon which Western 
metaphysics is based”. PF18 
Although organically connected with art, and, in fact, with any act of human 
communication, representation has been subject to critique since the ancient times. 
The critique of art as representation goes back to Plato, and in this tradition art is 
treated as: inferior to nature if it imitates nature at less than the level of perfect 
replication; but if it attains that level, or even if it should improve on its model, it is still 
not equal to it, for it is subsequent, and thus not superior but perhaps dangerous (it can 
be taken for it). PF19FP  
The first objection refers to representation as a mere imitation of nature, removed from 
truth and origin, the second one to the authorial interpretation of nature that can be 
dangerous because it may be perceived „as if‟ it is truth, while being only a „subjective‟ 
vision. The representation is therefore never transparent, even if identical – never the 
same with the origin, and inevitably it contains a threat of manipulation (ideological, 
political, ethical, etc.). 
However, the categorically announced crisis or closure of representation in the 
discourse on art and culture can be identified with the postmodern turn – the 
poststructural, postcolonial and feminist critique of the dominant structures of the 
generation and dissemination of power, knowledge and identity. Representation in the 
Western world, within this discourse, has been interpreted as governed by the 
traditional set of rules, limiting conventions and well-established hierarchy of values, 
and the authorial subjective voice of the privileged group (Western, white, male), that 
imposes the dominant worldview. As Derrida puts it in his paper Sending: On 
Representation (1982): “Today there is a great deal of thought against representation. In 
a more or less rigorous or articulate way, this judgement is easily arrived at: 
representation is bad.”PF20FP According to Amelia Jones, the characteristic feature of “the 
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radical postmodern art” is “its putatively inherent resistance to the perceived 
authoritarianism, exclusionism, and masculinism of modernism” PF21FP – the notions 
inscribed into the traditional concept of representation.  
This thesis defends representation but also offers the reinterpretation of this 
concept with the use of the notion of play. I approach „representation‟ not just as a 
product of imitation or re-creation of real things, but broadly as „something as 
something else‟, which can be a product or a process, object, activity, mode of being, 
doing or thinking. This idea of representation can be conceptualized as a model for 
things to be or become, and the one pointing out certain gap in reality that needs to be 
filled. However, for me, representation is more associated with proliferation, production 
of alternative solutions, „realities‟, „worlds‟, „situations‟, „things‟ and „identities‟ in 
order to transgress reality and its laws, but not necessarily to negate or change it. 
Representation involves interpretation and the impulse of „making sense‟ (or non-sense) 
or „imposing order‟ (or disorder), even if it is only a temporary and ephemeral gesture. 
In postmodern thought representation is therefore criticised as “a mode of thinking and 
a relationship to the world that involves a will to fixity and mastery” PF22FP and this outlook 
motivates pursuits of activities that would not be representational, but „immersive‟, 
„experiential‟, „sensual‟, “non-preservable and fluid” PF23FP. As I will argue, this role has 
been ascribed to play – interpreted as an activity that can lead artists and the 
participants of their games beyond representation. 
 
 The analysis of play, in any context, is to a large degree an attempt against 
play‟s charm and attractiveness. I inevitably act as a spoil-sport by unveiling the 
rhetorics of different uses of play in modern and postmodern art. Nonetheless, I think it 
is a rewarding process and an exciting journey, although not necessary playful. But is 
play simply fun? 
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2. Alice trying to play croquet with flamingo and hedgehog, illustration by John Tenniel, 1886
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Chapter 1 
What is play? 
 
Introduction 
„Play‟ is a concept belonging to many fields of theoretical discourse from 
biology to theology, aesthetics and politics, among others, and also a name of an 
activity, easily recognised in its various manifestations, but impossible to pin down in a 
decisive definition. The tacit understanding of what play is may be stereotypical or 
influenced by one of the competing historical views on play. Although, to some extent, 
play is what we decide it to be, I will introduce the most seminal interpretations of this 
concept to provide the theoretical background for this study. 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the well established modern approaches 
to play, coming from the different disciplines of natural and human sciences. However, 
the scope of play-related areas of study is far too broad to be addressed here. I will 
inevitably miss many important nuances coming from the pedagogy, psychology and 
biology. I will only very briefly refer to these fields, which nonetheless make use of and 
contribute significantly to the play theory. Due to the character of this thesis, I will 
mainly focus on the approaches to play as a cultural phenomenon. I will analyse the 
most relevant theories to construct a „glossary‟ of names, terms and perspectives  I will 
refer to, while creating my own approach to the concept of play in the context of art, 
and while discussing various interpretations and uses of play in modern and postmodern 
art. Drawing on the theories by Johan Huizinga and Gregory Bateson I will introduce 
play‟s connections with the notion of representation. I will also point out the operation 
of certain narratives or „rhetorics‟ in Western thought that structure diverse approaches 
to play and the relationships between play and other concepts, such as reality, game and 
work.  
 
Children‟s play 
 I will defer slightly the general description of play and start with a brief 
overview of the perspectives regarding play in childhood. Children‟s play is the most 
immediate image that comes to mind when we think of play. It is the activity of play as 
15 
 
we all know it. It is a familiar, if distant world of make-believe, physical competition, 
or play with chance. Our tacit knowledge of what play is comes from this experience. 
Childhood with its play occupations can be seen as 
the tunnel we all pass through, those early years of wandering toward the light as we 
dream ourselves up. It forms us; it makes us who we are. And once we've left the 
tunnel, we begin to forget, lose what we knew and felt back there and peer longingly 
behind us into its deep, plush darkness. PF1FP   
 
 
   Copyright image 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Pieter Breugel, Children‟s Games (detail), 1560 
 
The experience of play as we know it from childhood and everyday observation evokes 
the series of key phrases describing play as: joyful, non-serious, sometimes mysterious 
or irrational and opposed to the sphere of purposeful adult‟s activities. However, play 
can be also regarded as a functional cognitive tool – a way to make sense of the world.  
Children explore multiple worlds and perspectives as they move in and out of their 
play. As astronauts and space travellers children puzzle over the future; as dinosaurs 
and princesses they unearth the past. As weather reporters and restaurant workers they 
make sense of reality; as monsters and gremlins they make sense of the unreal. PF2 
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In scientific discourse the interpretations of the functions of play vary according 
to the applied perspective. The earliest modern theories of play, focused mainly on 
animal and children‟s play, were influenced by Darwin‟s theory of evolution and they 
treated play as a decisive factor in animal and human development. Herbert Spencer 
(The Principles of Psychology, 1855) formulated a surplus-energy theory of play, in 
which he describes it as an activity resulting from the release of energy not utilized in 
the struggle for survival. Play is then a substitute for serious activities, performed in 
their absence. Spencer‟s views were criticised by Karl Groos, as not applicable to all 
play. Instead, he proposed to see play as a practice of skills (The Play of Animal, 1896; 
The Play of Man, 1899). According to him, children follow their instinct to rehearse 
adult activities, so play must be seen as a „training‟, a „pre-exercise‟ for life. 
20P
th
P century theories of play in the fields of education and psychology continued 
to analyse play as a positive evolutionary factor. According to Jean Piaget PF
3
FP, play is an 
important aspect of learning. It helps to integrate new experiences into motor and 
cognitive skills available at each age, and to strengthen the structures a child has 
already learnt. “Piaget‟s theory gives play a clear biological function as active repetition 
and experiment which „mentally digest‟ novel situations and experiences.” PF4FP However, 
this locates play as an important but secondary aspect in the cognitive growth – it helps 
to consolidate skills by repetition, but does not contribute to the acquisition of these 
skills. Play is then distinguished from intelligence, and does not have a cognitive value 
itself. It is seen by Piaget as a predominantly infantile stage of development.PF
5
FP  
According to the sociocultural theory of children‟s play of Lev Vygotsky, 
child‟s development cannot be analyzed only as a steady growth of intellectual 
functions. “It seems that every advance from one stage to another is connected with an 
abrupt change in motives and incentives to act.” PF6FP According to Vygotsky, play 
originates as a symbolic wish-fulfillment and is invented at the point when 
“unrealizable tendencies appear in development.” PF7FP Play serves as the illusory 
realization of dreams and aspirations within an imaginary setting. A child can learn “to 
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guide his behavior not only by immediate perception of objects or by the situation 
immediately affecting him but also by the meaning of this situation.” PF8FP This helps 
children to separate thought from the object and immediate experience, and in 
consequence, develop consciousness, abstract thinking and imagination. 
 
Psychoanalytic theorists such as Anna and Sigmund Freud, Erik Erikson and 
Donald Winnicott considered play as the most important way in which children deal 
with unconscious emotions and express, indirectly or symbolically, suppressed feelings 
and fears. According to this view the main function of play is catharsis. Repetitive play 
helps children to master the situation and learn how to deal with stress in a safe context. 
Children in play create their own versions of past events and scenarios for the future, to 
satisfy their emotional needs. A child “uses objects and situations from real world of his 
own in which he can repeat pleasant experiences at will, and can order and alter events 
in the way that pleases him best.”PF9FP Play, according to Sigmund Freud, is the 
compensatory activity, but also the one linked with violence, as allowing the child to 
take “revenge” on reality in the situation of play. PF10FP Erickson and Winnicott, however, 
regarded play as a basically positive and creative activity, whose „dark‟ sides (instincts, 
bodily excitement) can be controlled through rules and adult supervision.  
The Position Statement Play Essential for all children (2002) by the Association 
for Childhood Education International summarises the most important functions 
attributed to children‟s play, regarding it as a “constructive behaviour”, essential for 
healthy growth and development. 
Psychoanalysts believe that play is necessary for mastering emotional traumas or 
disturbances; psychosocialists believe it is necessary for ego mastery and learning to 
live with everyday experiences; constructivists believe it is necessary for cognitive 
growth; maturationists believe it is necessary for competence building and for 
socializing functions in all cultures of the world; and neuroscientists believe it is 
necessary for emotional and physical health, motivation, and love of learning. PF11FP   
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Play rhetorics  
Theories of children‟s play embed the analysis of play within the study of 
human development, and interpret play according to the interests and traditions of this 
field. The same can be said about any discourse that refers to play from other 
perspectives, including art and aesthetics. What is more, according to American play 
scholar Brian Sutton-Smith, our approach to play is always linked with the rhetoric we 
use to contextualize it. He identifies four main “play histories”, or as he puts it, 
“historically derived persuasive discourses” that frame play studies across the 
disciplines: play as progress (development, learning) play as power (competition, 
challenge, conflict), play as fantasy (imagination, freedom, creativity), and play as self 
(self-actualization, optimal life experience). PF
12
FP In this study, I will try to move across the 
dominant „stories‟ of play, and to expose their narratives rather than to follow them. I 
agree with Sutton-Smith when he writes that, typically, play “arrives in already existing 
collective packages, where the passions and the procedures are well prescribed.” PF13FP Play 
appears as a medication we can take to evoke certain effects and enhance or 
anaesthetise our experience of life. These „packages‟ include specific interpretations of 
the concept of play which belong to various traditions of thought. It is important to 
become sensitive about where the certain interpretation or use comes from, how it is 
inscribed in a broader context, and what effects are „prescribed‟ by the „producer‟ of the 
given narrative. In other words, there are no transparent or universal applications – they 
all serve specific needs – they are different representations of play. It is especially vital 
to keep this in mind while discussing social and cultural manifestations of play and their 
premises.  
 Mihai Spariosu, in his study Dionysus Reborn (1989), on the operation of the 
concept of play in modern philosophy and science, argues that different approaches to 
play in Western thought come from two competing and opposite poles – „rational‟ and 
„prerational‟. His whole analysis is inscribed in the rhetorics of power; he sees play 
concepts as subordinated to a “power principle”PF14FP. As he writes: 
prerational thought generally conceives of play as a manifestation of power in its 
“natural”, unashamed, unmediated form, ranging from the sheer delight of emotional 
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release to raw and arbitrary violence. Power can be experienced both as ecstatic, 
exuberant, and violent play and as a pleasurable welling up and gushing forth of strong 
emotion. Rational thought, in contrast, generally separates play from both unmediated 
or “innocent” power and raw violence. Indeed, it sees play as a form of mediation 
between what it now represses as the “irrational” ... and controlling Reason .... PF15FP  
According to Spariosu, the prerational narrative characterizes play as vital, untamed, 
and chaotic; it is a chance play related to the archaic theories of cosmos as a power 
game of gods. It is also strongly connected with bodily powers – the players immerse 
themselves in play, in the direct sensual experience. In „prerational‟ play, participants 
are both players and playthings – they are not in a total control of their actions. The 
„rational‟ notion of play separates play from “unmediated power”PF16FP; it is therefore 
nonviolent and productive, although it remains competitive. This is play praised as a 
beneficial exercise for the youth supporting healthy growth and development. The 
rational thought subordinates play to rules and conventions, limits the chance element 
and exposes communicative and representational aspects of play. 
 The classification of games proposed by Roger Caillois (Man, Play and Games, 
1958) can be inscribed within Spariosu‟s distinction to make it explicit. Caillois divides 
play forms according to the dominant element: competition (agôn), chance (alea), 
simulation (mimicry) and vertigo (ilnix).PF
17
FP Examples of the play of chance and vertigo, 
as experiential and non-rational activities beyond the subjective control, are most often 
used to support the prerational interpretation of play. Competition play and simulation 
(make-believe) maintain the rational image of play, as controlled by the subject.  
 The above opposing discourses, identified by Spariosu, correspond with the 
most common rhetorics of play that keep reappearing in the history of Western thought. 
However, none of them is to be seen as an ultimate matrix for play‟s „real‟ nature, 
simply because this „real‟ or „true‟ nature, as „either/or‟, does not exist. It is a matter of 
constant negotiation or struggle between various perspectives, which subscribe into 
„prerational‟ or ‟rational‟ interpretation of play. I think that Spariosu‟s approach 
provides a very useful research tool, although inevitably simplified. Nonetheless, it is 
possible to look at different theories and uses of play as following or being more prone 
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to one or other view. In most cases, however, these two narratives coexist together in 
various, often paradoxical, configurations, and they also structure the historical 
interpretations of the relationship between play and its opposite concepts: work, reality, 
seriousness or game. I will discuss these relationships later in the chapter. In my 
opinion the notion of play cannot be reduced to just one side and this „coexistence‟ of 
the opposite poles is the condition for play‟s existence. I will expand on this issue in 
this chapter and chapters 2 and 3. Now, I will proceed to the descriptions of play from 
the perspective of cultural theory. 
 
Homo Ludens („Man the Player‟) 
Johan Huizinga in his influential study of play (Homo Ludens, 1938) questions 
biological and developmental approaches to play (i.e. “discharge of vital energy”, 
“imitative instinct”, “need for relaxation”, “abreaction”, “wish-fulfilment”, etc.PF18FP) as 
inevitably fragmentary and partial. As he writes, “It would be perfectly possible to 
accept nearly all the explanations without getting into any real confusion of thought – 
and without coming much nearer to a real understanding of the play-concept.”PF19FP He 
criticizes the basic assumption behind these theories: that “play must serve something 
which is not play”.PF20FP According to him, the search for the biological „function‟ reduces 
play to an instinct, and marginalizes its role in human life. Intensity, absorption and fun 
of play activities “find no explanation in biological analysis”. PF21FP In fact they cannot find 
explanation there, because, as he writes, play should be rather approached as a 
“function of culture proper”, “a social construction” and “one of the main bases of 
civilisation”. PF22FP Huizinga categorically opposes play as physiological and material; for 
him play is a „meaningful‟ activity, which implies a “non-materialistic” quality.PF23 
Importantly, however, he remarks that “although play is a non-material activity 
it has no moral function. The valuations of vice and virtue do not apply here.” PF24F P 
Huizinga locates play as separated from the “domain of the great categorical antitheses” 
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such as: wisdom and folly, truth and falsehood, good and evil.PF
25
FP Nonetheless, he 
focuses his analysis on “the higher forms of play” – social and cultural manifestations – 
as opposed to „primitive‟ or infantile forms of play as “pure playfulness”. PF26FP Due to the 
focus on the „rational‟ and symbolic forms of play, and the omission of irrational or 
instinctive impulses, Huizinga‟s characteristic of play has served as a point of departure 
for the majority of culture-oriented studies of play.    
He describes play as a voluntary activity, performed with no practical or 
material interest, just for fun and with pleasure. Play is disinterested; it is an activity 
pursued for its own sake. The quality of freedom and non-obligation distinguishes play 
from the “natural process” (reality). Although play seems inferior to „reality‟, according 
to Huizinga, it “may rise to the heights of beauty and sublimity that leave seriousness 
far beneath”. PF27FP Play, as he writes, “is something added there-to and spread out over it 
like a flowering, an ornament, a garment”. PF28FP Play is therefore necessarily „marginal‟, 
superfluous, and belongs to the spare time. It must be never regarded as a task – it is 
neither physical necessity, nor moral duty. One can cease playing at any time to switch 
to the real life obligations. To play means to step out of „ordinary‟ or „real‟ life – 
players are always aware of the border between real, „serious‟ activities and the world 
of play, the „only pretending‟ mode of behaviour. As Hector Rodriguez remarks 
The philosophical starting point of Huizinga's study is the observation that, where there 
is play, there is also "meaning". Playing makes sense to the player. Most games 
presuppose a player consciously aware of the game's objectives, equipment, and rules. 
Even the most primitive forms of play imply some form of intuitive understanding. PF29 
Interpreting play as a meaningful activity clearly separating fiction from reality and 
controlled by the players, situates Huizinga‟s theory on the side of „rational‟ 
interpretations of this concept.  
Huizinga also stresses that play is limited in time and space and it applies to a 
certain set of rules. These features constitute the world of play, or as Huizinga puts it a 
“magic circle” PF30FP of play demarcated from ordinary life – often located in “forbidden 
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spots, isolated, hedged round, hallowed, within which special rules obtain. All are 
temporary worlds within the ordinary world, dedicated to the performance of an act 
apart.”PF31FP   
The rules of the play or game have, according to Huizinga, a civilising and 
cultural function. They test the player‟s ability to resist violent impulses and they 
impose order within the world of play – “a temporary perfection” PF32FP – as distinct from 
the chaotic and imperfect ordinary world. In Huizinga‟s view this affinity between play 
and order situates play within the field of aesthetics. PF
33
FP The impulse to create an “orderly 
form” animates play and makes it an „enchanting and captivating‟ experience for the 
players.PF
34
FP As Huizinga writes, “Play has a tendency to be beautiful” and also “It is 
invested with the noblest qualities we are capable of perceiving in things: rhythm and 
harmony.” PF35 
 A person who ignores these rules (a „spoil-sport‟) destroys the illusion of the 
“magic circle”: 
By withdrawing from the game he reveals the relativity and fragility of the play-world 
in which he had temporarily shut himself with others. He robs play of its illusion – a 
pregnant word which means literally “in-play” (from inlusio, illudere or inludere). 
Therefore, he must be cast out, for he threatens the existence of the play-community.PF36 
This play-community, the group of players, becomes bonded together by the world of 
play, the shared code, „language‟ and rules they temporarily abide by, different from the 
ordinary or „real‟ ones. However, the formation of a closed group with the specific rules 
and conventions of behaviour, apart from the notion of togetherness entails the one of 
exclusion. This feature of play – its ability to bond and to antagonise – to initiate „real 
life‟ friendship or conflict – points to the seriousness of this seemingly non-serious 
human occupation. 
 
 As the main functions of the „higher forms of play‟, Huizinga specifies a 
“contest for something and representation of something” PF37FP („competition‟ and 
„simulation‟ play in Caillois‟s classification). The representation in play can have the 
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form of a simple “display” or in more advanced forms a “realization in appearance” – 
an imaginary stepping outside oneself and ordinary reality. PF
38
FP In ritual it becomes 
mystical and it is believed to cross the boundary between fiction and reality – to 
produce real life consequences.  
The word “represents”, however, does not cover the exact meaning of the act, at least in 
its looser modern connotation: for here “representation” is really identification, the 
mystic repetition or re-presentation of the event. ... The function of the rite, therefore, is 
far from being merely imitative; it causes the worshipers to participate in the sacred 
happening itself. As the Greeks would say, ”it is methetic rather than mimetic”. PF39 
Huizinga suggests that play, in the form of ritual celebrations, can cross the frame of 
fiction and evoke the „presence‟ of the sacred event (non-representation). The above 
quotation can serve as a „sign-post‟ to the performative functions of play utilized in the 
contemporary discourse on artistic representation. As I will discuss in chapter 7, 
methexis, a Greek term describing „the relation based on participation‟ in the 
transformative rites of passage, has been recently applied as a “non-representational 
principle” in the performative and materialist account of creative practice PF40FP. However, 
as I will argue throughout my thesis, both methexis and mimesis – direct performative 
experience and symbolic or imitative act, structure jointly the notions of play and 
representation.  
 
Drawing on Huizinga‟s analysis, Roger Caillois summarises play as:  
1. Free: not obligatory; 
2. Separate: restricted within limits of space and time; 
3. Uncertain: the course of which cannot be determined, and some latitude for 
innovations being left to the player‟s initiative; 
4. Unproductive: creating neither goods, nor wealth, nor new elements of any kind; 
5. Governed by rules: under conventions that suspend ordinary laws; 
6. Make-believe: accompanied by a special awareness of a second reality. PF41FP  
It is worth stressing that although Huizinga, in „rational‟ fashion, refers to “higher 
forms of play” as superior to biologically-determined, infantile playful impulses and 
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praises play for its ability to impose order and temporary perfection; he also uses the 
„prerational‟ rhetorics to describe certain aspects of play, i.e. he locates play beyond 
moral constraints and points out the methetic quality of the ritualistic „play‟. His 
account serves, therefore, as a good introduction to the discussion on the role of play in 
the context of artistic representation. 
 
Play as a frame 
 The connection between play and representation has been strengthened by 
Gregory Bateson, who approached play as a form of communication (A Theory of Play 
and Fantasy, 1955). He identified two types of levels of abstraction in human verbal 
communication: metalinguistic (about language) and metacommunicative (about the 
communication process and the relationships between the speakers, e.g. “My telling you 
where to find the cat was friendly”). PF42FP According to him, play can occur only when the 
participating individuals are capable of some degree of metacommunication, “of 
exchanging signals which would carry the message: „this is play”‟. PF43FP In general, 
Bateson considers play as an important aspect in the evolution of communication, 
because of the use of signals that have a double meaning – that denote play and the 
activity which in other circumstances is not play. In other words play is a form of 
representation; it consists of signals standing for something else (events, behaviours, 
identities). Bateson describes these communicative signals in play with Alfred 
Korzybski‟s map-territory metaphor: “A map may have a structure similar or dissimilar 
to the structure of the territory. A map is not the territory.” PF44FP In the context of play this 
can be paraphrased as: „Play consists of certain behaviours, gestures and situations 
which are similar or dissimilar to „real life‟ events. Play is not „real life‟.‟ However, 
according to Bateson, in some forms of immersive play, like gambling, and in play‟s 
derivative activities 
in the dim region where art, magic, and religion meet and overlap, human beings have 
evolved the “metaphor that is meant”, the flag which men will die to save, and the 
sacrament that is felt to be more than “an outward and visible sign given to us”. Here 
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we can recognize an attempt to deny the difference between map and territory, and to 
get back to the absolute innocence of communication by means of pure mood-signs. PF45 
Play, although it is always a form of representation – as a metacommunicative „frame‟ 
delineating otherwise „ordinary‟ activities – in certain circumstances can delude the 
players to ignore the frame, to confuse „map‟ with the „territory‟. Such approach 
annihilates play. However, paradoxically, to maintain the frame of fiction, the players 
must keep it transparent, and behave „as if‟ it does not exist.  According to Bateson, in 
play, „map‟ and „territory‟ must be both equated and discriminated; the players must be 
aware that “this is play” and at the same time act “as if” it is not. This feature makes 
play an ambiguous experience located in-between reality and fiction. Nonetheless, the 
„transparency‟ of the frame and the play‟s close connections with „reality‟ encourage 
the non-representational narratives treating play as an ordinary activity. 
Mihai Spariosu challenges Bateson‟s theory on the grounds of power relations. 
He asks: What if the players are not equals? What if it is only one participant who sees 
the activity as play? For Spariosu, play is not always intersubjective or always 
metaphorical and abstract: “it is far from being exclusively nonviolent and rational, as 
Bateson‟s theory presupposes.”PF46FP I think that Bateson‟s theory describes accurately the 
general operation of play; however, it does not prevent particular uses of play to be 
loaded with power relations. This issue will recur in chapters 6 and 7, in the discussion 
on the uses of play in recent participatory art. 
 
Play/Reality 
The above theories of play, of Huizinga and Bateson, operate with the clear 
distinction between reality and the world of play, territory and map – the first being 
objective and stable and the second subjective and arbitrary. An account challenging 
this perspective comes from the works of Hungarian-American psychology scholar 
Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi. In a traditional view, play is described as an experimental 
behaviour detached from real life goals and consequences, performed in a „safety 
mode‟. Reality, with its objectives, seems to be a static unquestionable point of 
reference, dominant over the whims and exercises of play. As Csikszentmihalyi notes, 
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this division locates play as marginal in human life – as primarily an occupation of 
children. 
And because children are dependent on adults for survival, the goals and activities they 
take seriously have acquired a second-class status relative to the doings of adults. 
Similarly adult play – from chess to rock climbing – is seen as a relatively frivolous 
enterprise, leading a parasitic existence made possible by earnest productive activities. 
We are constantly being reminded of the ant and the grasshopper. PF47 
Csikszentmihalyi questions the view of reality as an “invariant external structure”. 
According to him, „reality‟ is relative to the goals and rules created in the given culture. 
In other words „reality‟, to some extent, as play, is a matter of context.  
It is true, of course, that basic human needs and instincts do suggest a more or less 
universal set of goals, which in turn help to establish a structured reality in our 
consciousness. ... But this does not mean, as the dogma of adaptation would have it, 
that people always submit to the deterministic rules of the reality they have constructed. 
What play shows over and over again is the possibility of changing goals and therefore 
restructuring reality ....PF48FP  
Csikszentmihalyi‟s proposition aims at reframing our approach to „reality‟ to make it a 
more flexible concept open for negotiation and change. He argues that self-actualisation 
and „peak‟ experiences such as “flow” PF49FP (total immersion in the given activity), are 
possible not only in play, but also in other spheres of life.  
From Csikszentmihalyi‟s perspective, play is “a state of subjective experience” 
and can exist only when there is an “awareness of alternatives” concerning goals and 
rules. Although play operates always with two sets of goals and rules (of the given 
„reality‟ and of play), none of them should be “attributed a higher epistemological 
status”.PF50FP  They both can be treated (at least to some extent) as interdependent frames to 
be moved around and arranged in various configurations. It might be difficult to apply 
this perspective in life, but I think it is a valuable insight that it is possible to approach 
play and reality (e.g. work) as alternative frames without setting up a hierarchy 
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marginalizing play. This perspective will be also helpful in my attempt to go beyond the 
metaphysical dichotomies in the interpretation of play as an internal condition of the 
notion of art in chapter 3. 
 
Play/Game  
Play versus game is another dichotomy often employed in the examinations of 
the concept of play. Elliott Avedon and Brian Sutton-Smith in their book The Study of 
Games (1971) clearly distinguish games from general play activities. According to 
them, games “are repeatable because of their systematic pattern and their predictable 
outcomes. Play, on the other hand, is less systematic, and is open-ended with respect to 
outcomes.” Katie Salen and Eric Zimmerman in a more recent study refer to games as 
„systems‟ – contexts for player‟s interaction structured by rules. PF51FP These systems are 
“artificial” – they “maintain a boundary from so-called „real life‟ in both time and 
space”.PF52FP Most importantly, games have a “quantifiable goal or outcome” and they 
always “embody a contest of powers”.PF53FP  
These latter features seem to distinguish games from less formal play. In 
contrast to play, “games imply some opposition or antithesis between players.” PF54FP 
However, this division is not always functional. As Avedon and Sutton-Smith admit 
there exist forms of play/game that cannot be easily classified. 
For example, there is yet another group often called either pastimes or games such as 
ring-a-rose, nuts-in-May, which have similarities with dance, drama, and song. These 
are games in the sense that they are organised (rules) and have a fixed sequence of 
actions (plot) and a resolution (outcome). However, they are not usually competitive, 
they do not usually have winners, and in fact they are often so cooperative that they are 
organised by ritual (fixed sequence) rather than rules (contingent sequence). PF55 
Another form that is neither game nor play (in Avedon and Sutton-Smith‟s 
interpretation), beside the non-ritualized pastimes, is Role-Playing Game (RPG). This is 
a collective, collaborative type of „game‟, “which allows a number of players to assume 
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the roles of imaginary characters and operate with some degree of freedom in an 
imaginary environment”. PF56FP Unlike in „typical games‟, in Role-Playing Games (RPGs) 
there does not exist competition among players (as a goal of the game); they form a 
team, members of which have to support each other and collaborate. What is more, 
“rules and outcomes do not have the inevitability that they possess in most formal 
games, rather both features are negotiated, and rules are adjusted by the referee [game 
master] and his group.”PF57FP RPGs provide the players with the immersive experience of 
becoming someone else in the alternative reality. They are based on communication and 
make believe, but also they include the element of chance, since some moves and 
decisions are based on the dice throw. I use the example of RPGs because I will harness 
this form of game/play as a model to describe recent participatory artistic practices later 
in my thesis. This example also shows that the boundary between play and game 
activities is not as easy to establish as it may seem.  
Roger Caillois in his seminal book Man, Play and Games (1958) refers to the 
opposition between play and game as paidia and ludus elements of the play concept. 
According to him paidia is a primitive and basic impulse covering an immediate and 
disordered agitation, an impulsive and easy recreation, but readily carried to excess. It is 
a principle “common to diversion, turbulence, free improvisation and carefree gaiety“ PF58FP. 
Ludus is the structure of more developed forms of play – with rules and limits, being a 
root of culture, customs and institutions. PF
59
FP It requires skills, patience and effort, but it is 
nonetheless “completely unpractical”. In his analysis, Caillois stresses that all forms of 
play consist of these two ingredients in different proportions. There does not exist a 
„pure‟ ludus or a „pure‟ paidia form of play. Ludus disciplines paidia (“a reservoir of 
free movement”PF60FP) and paidia supplements ludus, which “seems incomplete, a kind of 
makeshift device intended to allay boredom”. PF61FP Consequently, it can be said that the 
„prerational‟ paidia (play) and „rational‟ ludus (game) are interconnected elements of 
one play concept or activity. This is why in my study I do not divide the concept of play 
into a play- or a game-type. I treat game as a particular use or manifestation of play. 
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Nevertheless, since this distinction exists in language and in everyday use, I will refer to 
some play forms as games.  
The ludus side of play – with its rules, preconceived goals, discipline and order 
can be also interpreted as the element of „work‟ embedded within the concept of play. 
As I will discuss, after Derrida, in chapter 3, the opposite concepts (e.g. work and play) 
tend to permeate and transform each other; they merge within the „third term‟ existing 
beyond the metaphysical dichotomies. 
 
Play/Work  
Play and work relationship follows the patterns similar to the play/reality and 
play/game dichotomies. They all can, after Spariosu, be attributed to the ongoing 
struggle between rational and prerational tendencies in Western thought.  
[P]rerational, aristocratic mentality will invariably favour play over work, regarding the 
latter as a severe limitation of power-freedom. On the other hand, a predominantly 
rational, middle class mentality will tend to favour work over play .... PF62 
However, the analysis of the relationship between the two concepts, as the one 
presented above, depends on the given reading of the notion of work (which usually 
entails the interpretation of play). Therefore, before I analyse this relationship, I need to 
briefly describe the term „work‟. According to Longman Dictionary of Contemporary 
English „work‟ has a range of related meanings and can be used to designate:   
- a job you are paid to do; 
- a place where you do your job, which is not your home; 
- the duties and activities that are part of your job; 
- something that you produce as a result of doing your job or doing an activity; 
- the act of doing something that needs to be done; 
- study or research, especially for a particular purpose; 
- something such as a book, play, painting, or a piece of music produced by a writer, 
painter, or musician. PF63FP   
The above explanations define work as an obligation, duty or occupation which is 
useful and purposeful, or a product of this activity. Like „play‟, „work‟ seems 
transparent, because it is so frequently used. Nonetheless, it also has been a subject to 
certain historical and ideological interpretations. I will briefly introduce some of the 
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most influential „stories‟ of work and the work-related terms, because they also inform 
the approach to the „work‟ of art.  
In the Judeo-Christian tradition, work has been perceived as a punishment for 
the sin of the first humans. "By the sweat of your brow you will eat your food until you 
return to the ground” PF64FP God said to Adam and Eve when he was expelling them from 
the Garden of Eden. Work was thus regarded as necessary for survival, but without a 
value in itself. The similar approach was manifested in the Greek world, where all 
manual labour was delegated to slaves. A free man could only “pursue warfare, large-
scale commerce, and the arts, especially architecture or sculpture”. PF65FP In the Middle 
Ages in Europe, work was still viewed as an obligation one cannot escape (as ordered 
by God), and as a way “to avoid idleness which would lead to sin”. PF66FP  
A new perspective on work was brought about by the Reformation. The modern 
approach, placing a positive moral value on work, was, to a large degree, shaped by the 
Protestant work ethicPF
67
FP developed by Luther and Calvin. Luther acknowledged the 
Catholic medieval position that “God assigns everyone his place, and one serves God 
by staying in his place and not seeking to rise in the social hierarchy.”PF68FP Calvin, on the 
contrary, encouraged work in a chosen occupation if this provided an opportunity to 
maximalize profit. However, they both treated spiritual and secular occupations as equal 
and proclaimed all work to be sacred. According to the „doctrine of calling‟, all work is 
the service to God on earth. PF
69
FP In effect, work ceased to be seen as a penance. It had 
become positive and creative, as a contribution to the social order and as one‟s self-
fulfilment as a Christian. Moreover, in Calvin, according to his theory of predestination, 
the moral, ascetic and hard working life did not guarantee salvation. Work was 
therefore an end in itself, as an exercise in faith. PF
70
FP Roger Hill summarises the influence 
of the Protestant work ethic in the West as follows: 
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As time passed, attitudes and beliefs which supported hard work became secularized, 
and were woven into the norms of Western culture (Lipset, 1990; Rodgers, 1978; Rose, 
1985; Super, 1982). Weber (1904, 1905) especially emphasized the popular writings of 
Benjamin Franklin as an example of how, by the eighteenth century, diligence in work, 
scrupulous use of time, and deferment of pleasure had become a part of the popular 
philosophy of work in the Western world. PF71 
 
The notion of „work‟ can appear in various contexts: social, political, 
economical, cultural and anthropological, and there also exist other phrases close to 
„work‟ that are embedded in particular discourses. These are: labour, production and 
making, among others. The notion of labour is primarily associated with the writings of 
Karl Marx. According to him, “Labour is, in the first place, a process in which both 
man and Nature participate, and in which man of his own accord starts, regulates, and 
controls the material re-actions between himself and Nature.” PF72FP Labour is then a process 
rooted in nature, but enabling a man to control nature and his or her own place in the 
world. Marx criticises the capitalist division and alienation of labour and its orientation 
on profit as alien to human nature and limiting its potential. He also negates any 
religious connotations of work. He wants to make labour a rewarding and fulfilling 
activity in itself. In The German Ideology (1932) Marx and Engels propose a 
differentiation of tasks to prevent the routine and frustration in work.  
[I]n communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can 
become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production 
and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt 
in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner, 
just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, herdsman or critic. PF73 
Marxist utopia seems to bring work/labour and play closer together, in making labour a 
flexible, socially-oriented and a self-rewarding activity (a „self-activity‟ or a „non-
alienated labour‟) PF74FP.  However, as Herbert Applebaum argues: “Marx saw the joy to be 
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derived from work as not mere pleasure but an earnest type of joy linked with 
fulfilment of the project or purpose.”PF75FP  
 
„Production‟, another word linked with the activity of work, emerges from the 
sphere of economics. Within this field it “refers to the transformation of natural 
resources or already manufactured items through their being combined with labour and 
capital. Production is therefore always the transformation of something that already 
exists.”PF76FP The mode of „productivity‟, as the material or conceptual generation or 
transformation of „things‟ (objects, situations, institutions, etc.), is generally connected 
with the notion of work. As Chris Rojek argues (Decentring Leisure, 1995), the 
requirement for productivity, brought about by industrialization and capitalism, has 
affected also non-work activities; it “polluted leisure with a constant time-
consciousness and guilt about activity which was not directly productive”.PF77 
In cultural studies „production‟ is associated with the „production of meaning‟ 
through the use of language, images, sounds, objects and gestures, inscribed in certain 
rhetorics. The cultural „production‟ is then being linked with political economy and the 
distribution of power. “Consequently, cultural studies have been concerned with who 
owns and controls cultural production, its distribution mechanisms, and the 
consequence of these patterns of ownership and control for contours of the cultural 
landscape.”PF78 
 
The phrase that is most often confronted with homo ludens is homo faber (Latin 
for "Man the Smith" or "Man the Maker"). This term was introduced in modern thought 
by Henri BergsonPF
79
FP and developed in the work of Hannah Arendt, among others. In her 
book The Human Condition (1958) Arendt distinguishes between three modes of vita 
activa: labour, work and action. PF
80
FP In contrast to Marxist tradition, labour corresponds to 
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the “biological process of the human body” PF81FP and it is for her the most basic, 
„animalistic‟ effort to sustain life. It does create nothing permanent, and it is an ongoing 
struggle to maintain human physical existence. Work is the fabrication of „things‟ 
distinct from the products of nature. Action occurs in the sphere of human relations, 
“without the intermediary of things or matter” PF82FP. Man at „work‟, homo faber, according 
to Arendt, “is the builder of walls (both physical and cultural) which divide the human 
realm from that of nature and provide a stable context (a “common world”) of spaces 
and institutions within which human life can unfold.” PF83FP As Arendt has it, homo faber is 
a “creator of human artifice” and a “destroyer of nature”.PF84FP He/she treats the world 
instrumentally and is confident in his/her tools. Work as a productive activity, with 
means and ends directly connected, is the source of satisfaction and self-confidence for 
homo faber.PF
85
FP In the highest capacity homo faber becomes an artist. He or she then goes 
beyond the ordinary utilitarian approach – “in the case of art works, reification is more 
than mere transformation; it is transfiguration”.PF86FP According to Arendt, the “revolution 
of modernity” has changed the characteristics of „man the maker‟ and deprived him of 
“permanent measures that precede and outlast the fabrication process”. PF87FP He or she 
becomes primarily involved in the processes of „production‟ as a “toolmaker”, with the 
radically redefined category of „usefulness‟. 
Now what helps stimulate productivity and lessen pain and effort is useful. In other 
words, the ultimate standard of measurement is not utility and usage at all, but 
“happiness”, that is, the amount of pain and pleasure experienced in the production or 
the consumption of things. PF88FP  
„Making‟ is, therefore, not necessarily material. It is a goal oriented activity, a means, to 
construct an object, a situation, or an institution. From the contemporary post-industrial 
perspective, homo faber is rarely a maker as a craftsman. He or she becomes rather a 
provider of services or a „producer‟, someone who transforms already existing „things‟, 
both in the material and symbolic spheres. The 21 P
st
P century homo faber is still devoted 
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to work as a goal-oriented productive activity, but also as an opportunity for personal 
growth and satisfaction – a measure of one‟s happiness.  
In terms of homo faber‟s opposition to homo ludens, the former follows the 
rules, codes and conventions of a given reality, with actions planned in advance to reach 
objective goals. He or she belongs to the „real‟ world, shaping it actively with 
appropriate „tools‟. If homo faber allows oneself leisure time it is also properly 
structured. Homo ludens, on the other hand, is the one who devotes his life to dreams, 
fun, joy and recreation. He/she lives beyond the social structure, „wasting‟ time and 
money or being a parasite on the work of the others; he/she can get lost in the oblivion 
of play. “In the moral universe prescribed by the homo faber model of existence, homo 
ludens appears either as an object of pity („the workless‟) or as an object of allure 
(„leisure class‟).”PF89FP From the perspective of work and productive activities, “play is an 
occasion for pure waste”, as Roger Caillois writes – “waste of time, energy, ingenuity, 
skill and often of money”. PF90 
The above description, of the two opposite modes of existence, is obviously 
„rational‟, and inspired by the Protestant work ethic, nonetheless influencing the 
relationship between the concepts of work and play even in today‟s post-industrial 
culture and society. Although, as Applebaum writes, from the beginning of the 20th 
century there has occurred a gradual shift in values, from work to leisure, play and 
consumerism
91
FP, work still dominates play as a necessary and central field of human 
activities. Play is inevitably marginal, although it provides a promise of temporary 
freedom or escape from work‟s routine. In effect, play is perceived as both „sin‟ and 
„salvation‟. Nonetheless, as Spariosu has it, the modern project to bring play back to the 
centre of social life remains unavoidably „rational‟.  
Modern play theorists will often be torn between these conflicting valuations of play, 
attempting both to reaffirm its primacy over work on the grounds of its “freedom” and 
to separate it from its violent, agonistic, prerational context. PF92 
However, as I will argue in chapter 4, modern artists employed play as an attractive 
alternative to the work-oriented artistic production due to play‟s „prerational‟ features: 
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irrationality, spontaneity and lack of subjective control and predefined goals, among 
others. 
 According to Chris Rojek, one of the modern attempts to prioritize play – 
Huizinga‟s theory that culture is sub specie ludi PF93FP (that play precedes culture), has 
indeed challenged the work-subordinated valuation of play. 
Huizinga‟s discussion of homo ludens is diametrically opposed to the model of homo 
faber that emerges in the work of Habermas (1971, 1973) and Doyal and Gough (1984). 
Drawing on the ideas of Weber (1976), these latter writers present play as a human 
capacity which has been subordinated by the needs for survival, work and order. 
Reason is portrayed as subduing the irrational content of life; and play is presented as 
confined to the margins of society. PF94 
However, Rojek questions the rhetorics of the „overturned‟ hierarchy promoting play, 
and challenges the contemporary view on leisure as „freedom‟, „choice‟ and „life-
satisfaction‟. According to him non-work activities are inscribed within the net of 
social, political and economical interrelations, so the freedom of leisure must be seen as 
utopia: 
In much of our leisure experience we are unsure whether we are satisfied or not; and the 
freedom and choice that we have is obviously contingent upon place, time and, above 
all, actions of others. Rather like the concept of utopia, leisure seems to be one place on 
the map of the human world where we are constantly trying to land, but which 
perpetually evades our reach. PF95FP   
Although play/leisure has become a highly desirable reward for everyday effort, and to 
a large degree a purpose of work (which can be seen as a reversal of the old 
dichotomy), in Rojek‟s view it operates as a myth in contemporary world, a dream that 
can be never fulfilled, because the freedom is always precisely dosed. He argues that 
the problem arises from “the age-old conflict between agency and structure. In pursuing 
our various projects of freedom we realize that our concept of freedom is itself socially 
constructed and therefore carries with it particular constraints and limits.”PF96 
 The image of and expectations towards work and play existing in the given 
culture are always connected with the characteristics of this culture. As I have already 
mentioned, performance and representation of work and play differ according to place 
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and time, and the dominant outlook. According to Rojek, “under capitalism and 
modernity strong tendencies existed to associate leisure with „real experience‟, release, 
escape and freedom.” PF97FP I think it is an apt diagnosis98FP and it shows the ambivalent 
character of play – stretched between fantasy, fiction and a „real experience‟; liberation 
from old conventions and the necessity to establish (new) rules; between freedom and 
frames. 
 The most important conclusion for me is that play cannot be analysed separately 
from other spheres of social life. The closest relationship bonds play with its „opposite‟ 
concept – work. Even the view on play as an escape from work and „real‟ life, exposes 
the primary, irreducible connection. However, both perspectives on work and play, the 
one advancing the primacy of work over play and the other praising play as central 
aspect of humanity, belong to certain ideologies and reduce one side to be marginal or 
even dangerous. In chapter 2 and 3 I will return to the play/work dichotomy in the 
context of the theory of art.  
 
Play as a paradox 
 As I wrote in the introduction to this chapter, and as the above theories of play 
show, it is impossible to give a precise and satisfactory definition of play that would not 
fall into the trap of certain narratives and ideologies. One of the possible solutions to 
this problem is to approach play using Wittgenstein‟s idea of “open concept” as 
constituted by “family resemblances” PF99FP. It is also justified to simply treat play as an 
ambivalent concept. The contradictions inevitably break into any attempt to define play: 
“[play] is supposed to be disengaged from reality in a variety of ways, while at the same 
time it is credited with a great number of useful real-life functions”; it is ”at the same 
time in and out of reality”. PF100FP Norman Denzin in the essay The Paradoxes of Play 
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(1982) summarises the main characteristics of play, also pointing to its contradictory 
nature:  
Play is a recurring interactional form whose content and substance must be established 
on every occasion of its occurrence. Recognizable and familiar, evidenced in divergent 
cultural, ethnic, racial, age-sex graded communities, play is ineffable, always novel and 
unique; never the same, yet somehow always the same. PF101 
Denzin, after Bateson, approaches play as a frame for action. Within this frame, as he 
writes, “persons find themselves playing.” According to him the shift from noun to 
verb, reveals flexible and mobile character of play and locates it primarily as a social 
process. This process is deeply embedded in „reality‟: “the world of play is not – as 
Caillois, Huizinga and others would have it – distinct from and apart from everyday 
taken-for-granted reality. It occurs in the immediately experienced here-and-now.”PF102FP 
However, importantly, at the same time this process promises the possibility of being 
somewhere else, being someone else, and to some degree fulfils this promise. This close 
relationship of the players with the directly experienced „reality‟ is the starting point for 
creative interpretation and the processes of representation which occur in play. Play can 
be approached as both experience and representation. 
 Denzin also stresses that play contains elements of doubt, risk, threat and 
uncertainty. “What play threatens is the player‟s body and the player‟s felt definition of 
self in the moment.” PF103FP Play must be therefore seen as stretched between safety and 
danger. It suspends or modifies rules of the given „reality‟, so potentially creates a 
„safety zone‟, but also establishes an alternative, which challenges the routine (the usual 
identifications and patterns of behaviour). The tension between familiar and unfamiliar, 
safe and risky, oneself and the other, repetition and experiment, reality and fiction, 
constitute the unique position of play. As Denzin summarises:  
There is more to play than the recognition of a paradox of logical types; play transcends 
communicative and metacommunicative contradictions. It is, as I have suggested, a 
historically based, emotionally laden, physically embodied, relationally specific form of 
social interaction that turns on threat, histrionics, ritual, doubt and uncertainty. PF104 
Play cannot be therefore defined as either „rational‟ (communicative, subjective, 
controllable) or „prerational‟ (violent, excessive, sensual); as either ludus or paidia; as 
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either didactic tool supporting development or liberation from all constraints. As I will 
argue in the following chapters, its existence relies on the ambivalence – on the 
movement „in between‟ the opposites. 
 
Conclusion  
 Due to the character of this thesis in the above overview of play theories I 
focused on the perspectives developed mainly within human and cultural studies. As a 
general description of play I introduced the one by Johan Huizinga, which still serves as 
a point of reference in the contemporary play research in various disciplines. Play, after 
Huizinga, can be summarised as a voluntary activity, performed for its own sake, 
limited in time and space, bounded with specific rules and inner structure, which must 
be respected by the players to maintain illusion of the “magic circle” of play. It 
promotes the development of play-communities, the groups of players initiated into the 
rules of the given play-world. While it is not serious and it is performed outside the real 
life obligations and norms, it is inevitably „marginal‟, although an absorbing and 
emotionally engaging experience. However, as Huizinga argues, play must be seen as 
fundamental source of culture and civilisation.  
Huizinga‟s theory of the “magic circle” as well as Bateson‟s approach to play as 
a metacommunicative frame, link this concept with the one of representation. Both 
theorists argue that there is always a clear boundary between „reality‟ and the world of 
play, which must be seen as a separate realm, with its rules, codes and conventions. The 
rules of play impose order and meaning, or even an aesthetic harmony, into the 
ordinary, chaotic flow of events. Huizinga and Bateson highlight the aspect of the 
players‟ agency – in order to play they must be aware of and respect the „frame of 
fiction‟ but at the same time behave „as if‟ it was non-existent. However, the 
performative character of play may delude players to confuse play with reality and it 
may also encourage the view of play as methexis rather than mimesis. 
Although the general „definition‟ of play describes it as pursued for its own sake 
(autotelic) and detached from „real life‟ goals and rules, various scientific discourses 
analyse play as functional: in learning and creative activities, as an emotional 
compensation or symbolic wish-fulfilment, as a release of excessive energy or as a 
civilising agent in social life. According to Brian-Sutton Smith, the variety of play 
theories can be categorised within four main rhetorics: of progress, power, fantasy, and 
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of the self. However, Mihai Spariosu, looking from the perspective of power relations, 
developed a more basic and functional classification. According to him, in the history 
of Western thought there can be identified two opposite poles of thinking that shape the 
formation of concepts. He describes these two „mentalities‟ as „prerational‟ and 
„rational‟. „Prerational‟ approach to play situates it as instinctive, chaotic and 
spontaneous behaviour inscribed within the archaic notion of a „cosmic game‟. Play 
dominates players; it becomes a primary force that rules the universe, and it must be 
regarded beyond good and evil. The „rational‟ play is always tamed by rules and 
conventions – it is productive and serves human development and communication. The 
choice of the given perspective on play depends on time, place, ideology, field of 
research and so on. In most cases the struggle between these two narratives temporarily 
concludes as a form of a paradoxical compromise, which nonetheless opts for a certain 
hierarchy.   
  In my view this basic dichotomy structures all relations play enters into with 
other concepts (work, reality, seriousness, knowledge, truth, etc.). In the case of work, 
the „rational‟ perspective locates it as dominant over play – as an essential and central 
domain of human‟s life. The „prerational‟ view, in turn, advances play as being the 
most desirable, due to its creative powers and its promise of freedom from the regime 
and routine of work. As Spariosu remarks, the modern attempt to prioritize play 
remains inscribed within the „rational‟ rhetoric, the one separating play from its „dark‟ 
sides – violence, instinct, chaos and chance. However, as I will demonstrate in the 
following chapters, it was the „prerational play‟ which became an attractive model for 
artistic activities in the modern avant-garde revolution of the „primitivist‟ heritage.   
 Although play has been often used and theorised according to the specific needs 
as „prerational‟ or „rational‟, as paidia or ludus, with predefined places in the hierarchy, 
I think it is best to approach it as a concept based on contradictions. Keeping this in 
mind, I can formulate the initial, working „definition‟ of play, summarising the above 
theories, which I will further elaborate on in chapter 3. For now, I can describe play as a 
metacommunicative frame, marking off the given activity „as play‟ from the otherwise 
ordinary actions, gestures and signals. However, as an “experiential stream of 
behaviour”PF105FP, to some extent, play transgresses the frame of representation, or, as I will 
discuss in the next chapter, can be seen as liminal concept. Play emerges in constant 
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tension between „reality‟ and fiction, being „here and now‟ and being somewhere else, 
as someone else. In short, I consider play as rooted in the immediate experience or 
sensation symbolic form of social interaction of a highly paradoxical nature, or as Brian 
Sutton-Smith puts it as “a most labile behaviour system”, ”a meta-active power of body 
and mind”. PF106 
 In the next chapter I will discuss the rational/prerational dichotomy of the 
concept of play as inscribed within the discourse of art and aesthetics.  
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Chapter 2 
The play of art 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter I introduced various modern perspectives on play 
developed within the human and natural sciences. Drawing on these theories I 
constructed a working approach to play as a disinterested, experiential and 
metacommunicative frame and as a process, in which activities, gestures and objects do 
not only shape an experience „as self‟ but also become „something else‟. I stressed the 
ambivalent character of play as stretched between opposite poles on many different 
levels: between reality and fiction, experience and representation, rules and freedom, 
safety and danger, and so on. After Mihai Spariosu, I also referred to two competing 
(and complementary) modes of Western thought – prerational and rational – that have 
structured historical interpretations of play and its relationships with other concepts 
such as reality, game and work.  According to the chosen rhetoric, play has been 
interpreted as dominant or marginal in human life and culture: as an ultimate freedom 
from work and „reality‟ or as a dangerous distraction. 
 Play, due to its ambiguous nature, is a flexible and easily adaptable concept that 
can serve as a double- or a multi-edged sword. The main purpose of this chapter is to 
examine the consequences of interpreting play as either „rational‟ or „prerational‟ in 
aesthetics, using the examples of Kant‟s and Gadamer‟s theories. I will argue that there 
is a connection between this interpretation and the underlying notion of representation – 
the rational position uses play to support the traditional concept of representation, while 
the prerational one most often sees the „play of art‟ as a domain where subjectivity and 
authorial control „dissolve‟. When one applies the prerational perspective to artistic 
practice, play becomes a tool to evoke „experience‟ instead of „representation‟, to reveal 
„being‟ instead of representing it. In chapters 4, 5 and 6, I will discuss such non-
representational use of play in modern and postmodern art.  
In order to argue with the non-representational notion of play and to highlight 
play‟s ambivalent or multi-layered character, I will also discuss the concepts and 
models which refer to the experiential, performative and immersive character of the 
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aesthetic activity. I will examine the Kantian notion of the sublime as liminal 
experience, and suggest that its play-like mechanism can be seen as an internal 
condition of art in general. Bakhtin‟s and Gadamer‟s analogies between art and 
communal celebrations (carnival, festival) can, in turn, serve as good starting points to 
acknowledge the prerational and rational, experiential and symbolic character of play as 
an external model for the artistic activity. I will argue therefore that the act of 
representation which emerges from play occurs through embodiment and performance.  
 In the present chapter will also briefly refer to the dichotomy work/play in 
the context of art, which will be further developed in the next chapter. As I will argue 
there, the traditional notion of representation is strongly influenced by the rational 
concept of work, which since Plato and Aristotle evokes connotations with „proper‟ 
function, hierarchy and order. In the present chapter I will discuss the impact of Kant, 
who introduced play as a condition of „fine art‟. In my view his aesthetic theory marks a 
turning-point, from work- to play-oriented approaches. However, its „rationality‟ and 
subject-oriented character, and its contribution to the process of alienation of art, made 
Kant‟s theory a convention to be challenged in modern and postmodern art. As I will 
argue in the following chapters, the „prerational‟ notion of play has become a tool for 
the avant-garde artists, to negate the conventional „rational‟ post-Kantian concept of 
representation.  
 
„Rational‟ play of art 
The notion of play as a „rational‟ activity, as I argued in the previous chapter, 
separates play from the “unmediated power” PF1FP and the processes of life. This separation 
occurs due to the mediation of reason, language and cultural conventions. From this 
perspective, play is treated primarily as a process of communication initiated by the 
players who consciously suspend the ordinary rules and apply the alternative ones, 
which do not cause „real life‟ consequences and practical outcomes. The domain of play 
becomes a “magic circle”, distinct from „reality‟. Importantly, from the rational point of 
view, players are in control of their play. Play is disinterested and it lacks objective 
purposes, but it is, nonetheless, functional. It supports education and development; it 
acts as a safe training, vicarious activity, catharsis, and so on. 
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I will discuss the rational perspective on play in art in reference to Kant‟s 
theory, because this philosopher introduced the concept of („rational‟) play as an 
important element in modern aesthetics, and most importantly, because his account has 
served as a point of reference for both „rational‟ and „prerational‟ approaches, in art 
theory and practice, ever since. Kant uses the notion of play in two senses: as an actual 
activity, which he treats as disinterested and unproductive (a model for „fine art‟), and 
as a philosophical concept – a „free play‟ of cognitive faculties in the aesthetic 
judgement and the artistic „genius‟. It is the latter that he makes a central point of his 
aesthetic theory, stating that “the delight which determines the judgement of taste is 
independent of all interest”.PF2FP  
In the Critique of Judgement (1790), Kant exposes the basic features of „art as 
play‟ by distinguishing between fine art and craft. The former, as he writes, “could only 
prove final (be a success) as play, i.e. an occupation which is agreeable on its own 
account”.PF3FP Handicraft, on the other hand, is ”labour, i.e. a business, which on its own 
account is disagreeable (drudgery), and is only attractive by means of what it results in 
(e.g. the pay), and which is consequently capable of being a compulsory imposition.” PF4FP 
Although Kant praises free arts over crafts due to the element of disinterestedness, he 
nonetheless argues that the „play‟ of art must be subordinated to some rules, a 
“mechanism, without which the soul, which in art must be free, and which alone gives 
life to the work, would be bodyless and evanescent” PF5FP. He also expresses a reservation 
that it is misleading to regard free art as devoid of all restraint. The absence of restraint 
would convert art “from labour into mere play”, into “agreeable”, instead of “fine” art. 
As he writes, “aesthetic art, as art which is beautiful, is one having for its standard the 
reflective judgement and not organic sensation”. PF6FP These remarks reveal the ongoing 
struggle in Kant – between the affirmation of freedom in art and the need to subordinate 
it to the laws of reason. The latter tendency predominates – Kant applies the concept of 
play as limited and rational to avoid the risk of nonsense and excessive freedom of 
imagination.  
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On a philosophical level, Kant appoints „free play‟ as an attribute of the 
aesthetic judgement and artistic genius. He defines „genius‟ as “the talent (natural 
endowment) which gives the rule to art” or more precisely: “the innate mental aptitude 
(ingenium) through which nature gives the rule to art.”PF7FP The operation of genius is not 
predetermined in advance – it does not follow any known rules – it must be always 
original. Although genius seems to be „power‟ originating outside the subject and 
transgressing one‟s limitations, it is also tamed by rational control. The works of art 
produced thanks to genius must be exemplary and they must serve as a standard for 
imitation by others. They also must conform to the critical judgement of taste, which 
“introduces a clearness and order into the plenitude of thought”. PF8FP Kant excludes the 
“original nonsense” from his notion of fine art. Through taste, the 
artist controls his work and, after many, and often laborious attempts to satisfy taste, 
finds form which commends itself to him. Hence this form is not, as it were, a matter of 
inspiration, or a free swing of mental powers, but rather of a slow and even painful 
process of improvement …. PF9 
Kant describes artistic process as a negotiation between genius and taste; the initial 
playful moment of freedom must be pursued by the laborious procedure of refinement 
and struggle with form. It can be said that the natural, „prerational‟ artistic instinct must 
be followed by the „rational‟ search for harmony within the limits of taste. The same 
rule governs the functioning of the internal powers constituting genius: imagination and 
understanding. They „play‟ with each other – not producing any concepts – but staying 
within the limits of the rational mind. Imagination enjoys “freedom from all guidance of 
rules” but it must become synchronized with ”the understanding‟s conformity to law”. PF10FP 
Although both „playful‟ (genius and imagination) and „reason-guided‟ (taste and 
understanding) aspects of the creative process are listed by Kant as requirements for 
fine art, he makes it clear that the latter two must be seen as dominant: “For in lawless 
freedom imagination, with all its wealth, produces nothing but nonsense”. PF11 
In my view, as I wrote in the introduction to this chapter, the rational image of 
play supports the conventional approach to representation (and vice versa). The crucial 
factor appears to be the idea of the controlling mechanism of the laws of reason – an 
                                                            
P
7
P Kant I., Critique of Judgement, p. 168 
P
8
P Ibidem, p. 183 
P
9
P Ibidem, p. 174  
P
10
P Ibidem, p. 180  
P
11
P Ibidem, p. 183   
45 
 
unavoidable limit that prevents the irrational wandering of thought and art for art‟s sake 
as a private nonsense. In Kant, in the act of aesthetic judgement, reason‟s productive 
activity is suspended but, nonetheless, its laws are binding. The most important 
characteristic of „rational‟ play, in terms of the notion of representation is, therefore, its 
connection with the rational, self-aware subject. Artists and viewers structure their 
aesthetic experience or activity according to the laws of reason. However, importantly, 
even though subjective, the „rational‟ play of art is „universally communicable‟ and also 
„exemplary‟. Such an approach to subjective control is closely linked with the notion of 
mastery – as imposing order and dictating rules for others to follow. The act of 
representation, interpreted this way, becomes perceived as a manifestation of authorial 
power – as applying one‟s perspective as universal or even as the only valid one. This 
locates the artistic activity as a somehow privileged or elitist occupation. Artists (being 
given the natural talent by nature) are those who are capable to represent (interpret) the 
world to non-artists. This position of power provokes the critique against artistic 
representation as a „will to fixity and mastery‟ PF12FP. 
It is also worth stressing that the concept of play in Kant seems to be very 
„work-like‟. It lacks work‟s direct orientation on goals and it is not „productive‟ of 
concepts (which makes the aesthetic judgement distinct from the cognitive one), but 
Kant stresses that play cannot be interpreted as unlimited and „free swing of mental 
powers‟. According to him, the operation of genius is a „laborious‟, „slow‟ and even 
„painful‟ process. The absence of rational control would convert art „from labour into 
mere play‟, into „agreeable‟, instead of „fine‟ art. Art cannot be simply pleasurable to be 
regarded as „fine art‟, it has to be laborious; it has to be work-like. In my view, this 
vocabulary of work (including also „control‟, „mechanism‟, „guidance of rules‟, 
„process of improvement‟, „conformity to law‟, etc.), is characteristic of the traditional 
approach to representation. Work or work-like play seem to act as points of reference 
for the traditional notion of representation due to their connotations of rationality, 
hierarchy, order, rules and limits. Despite its rational character, Kant‟s contribution can 
be seen as a „play-turn‟ in terms of a general approach to the role of art and its place in 
the Western society, as well as the responses it evoked in 20 P
th
P century art. 
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Kant‟s writings introduced the approach to aesthetic judgement and in 
consequence to both the creative act and its reception, as occurring in the „play mode‟ – 
as if reason was in „idle gear‟, keeping watch but released from its usual functions. 
Although carefully restricted to avoid excess and nonsense (and being therefore 
rational), play is a crucial characteristic of aesthetic judgement in Kant. Cognitive 
faculties of imagination and understanding are active, „as if‟ they follow usual rules – 
but they „play‟ with each other not being productive of any binding concepts or rational 
outcomes. The whole process is basically disinterested; it does not follow any practical 
purpose, unlike in cognitive judgement. In effect the „play of aesthetic judgement‟ (and 
consequently „play of art‟) becomes alienated from the goal-oriented „reality‟.  
The popular notion of „art for art‟s sake‟ PF13FP, and therefore somehow a playful 
occupation, has its roots in Kantian aesthetics. “In the nineteenth century, ideas of the 
autonomy of the aesthetic judgements soon became linked to the idea of the autonomy 
of art itself.” PF14FP Traditionally, up to this point, the position of art was grounded in the 
ancient Greek word techne – meaning “craft” or “skill” and connoting physical labour 
and technical expertise at the service of the values and meanings dictated by society. 
Although, since the Renaissance art had been widely accepted as belonging to the 
„liberal arts‟, together with philosophy and theology, artists were still  producing works 
on demand. “The idea of artistic labour as a personal quest for perfection in particular 
objects without immediate thought of buyers or clients did not arrive until the 
nineteenth century.” PF15FP Art gained its freedom and, at least in theory, was no longer 
subordinated to the dictatorship of the ruling classes, Church and politics. Artists 
became masters of their own work, „geniuses‟, seeing the creative act as close to God‟s 
Creation in Genesis, bringing independent entities into being. PF
16
FP From the perspective of 
other members of the community, however, the emancipation of art and its „creative‟ 
ambition was widely considered to be a whim, irresponsible and deviating from the 
„proper‟ function of art. Artists, struggling for independence and living on the margins 
of the conventional middle-class life, were often regarded as society‟s children, 
vagabonds or parasites. 
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Although Kant limited the freedom of play by the matrix of the laws of reason, 
his aesthetics has inevitably encouraged the process of art‟s liberation from all sorts of 
constraints. Play proved to be difficult to restrict and apply instrumentally. 
Unintentionally, Kant initiated what can be called „the aesthetics of autonomy‟ PF17FP – the 
view of art as necessarily immune to any concerns other than the aesthetic or art-
specific, so in effect detached from the given reality. This view resulted in the approach 
to artistic production as “divorced from the totality of social activities”, which are rather 
“confronted abstractly” in the work of art. PF18FP According to Rosalind Krauss, this 
perspective contributed to the “shift that Walter Benjamin in his essays of the thirties 
called the historical transition from cult-value to exhibition-value”PF19FP, and the 
development of the formalist approach to art. The operation of („rational‟) play had 
liberated art, to a large extent, from the traditional service to aristocracy and religion, 
but made it a “free-floating commodity on the bourgeois market of objects and luxury 
goods.” PF20FP  
In chapters 4, 5 and 6, I will discuss the art movements and projects that 
opposed the views of artwork, both as an aesthetic artefact isolated from its 
environment and a commodity. According to Peter Bürger, the European avant-garde 
movements negated “art as an institution that is unassociated with the life praxis of 
men” PF21FP. However, as he writes, 
Now, it is not the aim of the avant-gardistes to integrate art into this praxis. On the 
contrary, they assent to the aestheticists‟ rejection of the world and its means-ends 
rationality. What distinguishes them from the latter is the attempt to organise a new life 
praxis from a basis in art. PF22 
I will argue that modern and postmodern artists and art theorists reached for play as a 
creative tool to bring art back to life and make it a model for social interaction. They 
reached for „prerational‟ play, because the notions of work (as techne, labour, 
                                                            
P
17
P Summarised in: „The social history of art: models and concepts‟, in: Art since 1900: Modernism, 
Antimodernism, Postmodernism, Foster H., Krauss R., Bois Y-A.,Buchloh B., Thames and Hudson, 
London, 2004, pp. 22-25, further quotations refer to this edition 
P
18
P Bürger P., Theory of the Avant-Garde, 1984, trans. M. Shaw, University of Minnesota Press, 
Minneapolis, 2004, p. 42 
P
19
P Krauss R., „The social history of art: models and concepts‟, pp. 24-25 See: Benjamin W., „The Author 
as Producer‟, trans. E. Jephcott,  and „The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction„, trans. H. 
Zohn, in: Modern Art and Modernism. A Critical Anthology, Frascina F., Harrison Ch. (Eds.), Paul 
Chapman Publishing, 1988 
P
20
P Ibidem, p. 25   
P
21
P Bürger P., Theory of the Avant-Garde, p. 49 
P
22
P Ibidem 
48 
 
production) and „rational‟, work-like play were inscribed within the traditional rhetorics 
of artistic representation they wanted to contest. The desirable direction of pursuits – 
integration of art and life, non-art or non-representation – exposed play, primarily, as a 
domain of immediate experience and sensation beyond the rational control.   
 
„Prerational‟ play of art 
 I argued in chapter 1 that according to prerational outlook play is a vital, 
untamed and chaotic manifestation of power, life, or being. Play surpasses its 
participants; they are dominated by its dynamics, immersed in the direct sensual 
experience. This state of „losing oneself in play‟ can be best exemplified by the 
situation of vertigo as in Caillois‟s classification, or the experience of „flow‟ described 
by Csikszentmihalyi. Players no longer use their rational control – they let things go. 
Their „will to mastery‟ dissolves in the experience of „decentring‟ – becoming one with 
the world, with play, with play-objects, etc. This view makes play an occasion to 
connect with life, with the flow of events, here and now, in the heat of the moment. 
Play becomes therefore a manifestation of the laws and powers guiding the subject, not 
the subjective representation in the traditional sense. 
 As I will demonstrate in the following chapters, the notion of play as prerational 
served as a model for the modern avant-garde projects aimed against the traditional 
representation. „Prerational‟ play became an attractive concept due to the widespread 
interest in „primitive‟ artPF23FP and Freud‟s psychoanalysis, among other sources of 
inspiration. However, it was mainly used to oppose the tradition of Enlightenment, 
reason, sense, logic, hierarchy, order and rules of the Western civilisation, the post-
Kantian rational „aesthetics of autonomy‟ and the dominant proper function of art as a 
self-conscious production of aesthetic objects. Dada and Surrealism, the movements 
that extensively used play, were intentionally anti-intellectual. As Hans Arp writes: 
“Philosophies have less value for Dada then an old abandoned toothbrush, and Dada 
abandons them to the great world leaders.” PF24FP „Philosophy‟ in art has become 
disreputable because it was perceived as a tool of manipulation and political demagogy 
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– an element of the materialist and rational civilisation, with the First World War as one 
of its upshots.  
I cannot, therefore, point out any philosophical theory that directly inspired 
interest in prerational play in the modern avant-gardes. As I wrote above, this interest 
was rather a reaction against the rational rhetorics in Western thought. However, the 
idea of prerational play in aesthetics can be discussed in reference to the position 
developed later by Hans-Georg Gadamer, who devoted much attention to this 
conceptPF
25
FP. Although his overall approach to aesthetics and the role of the artwork 
cannot be regarded as „prerational‟PF26FP, his writings can serve as a summary of the 
modern „prerational‟ interpretation of play.  
In Truth and Method (1960) Gadamer criticizes the Kantian tradition for its 
affirmation of subjectivity and the disinterestedness of aesthetic experience, due to 
which, in his view, art becomes detached from life and loses its place in the community. 
Gadamer tries to overcome the duality between „beautiful appearance‟ and „practical 
reality‟ initiated by the Kantian aesthetics and to re-establish art‟s claims to knowledge 
and truth. He acknowledges Kant‟s contribution to art‟s emancipation from scientific 
truth requirements, but criticizes him for the alienation and “subjectivization of 
aesthetics”.PF27FP “Thus we make every work of art, as it were, into a picture. By detaching 
all art from its connections with life and the particular conditions of our approach to it, 
we frame it like a picture and hang it up.” PF28 
To bring art back to its place in the life of community and to „reality‟ in general, 
Gadamer uses the concept of play. He interprets play in the opposite way to the 
„aesthetics of autonomy‟, in which play has been approached as an agent isolating art 
from reality (practical purpose, function, etc.) and any concerns different than the art 
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specific. In Gadamer, play is the manifestation of being of the world, and does not 
isolate its participants from „reality‟ and each other, but rather bonds them together in 
the collective experience. Gadamer‟s approach to the notion of play can be interpreted 
as prerational, because he stresses the “primacy of play over the consciousness of the 
player”PF29FP. Players become one with the world of play – their subjective experience is of 
secondary meaning. Gadamer‟s intention, as he writes, is to “free this concept of the 
subjective meaning that it has in Kant and Schiller and that dominates the whole of 
modern aesthetics and philosophy of man.” PF30FP He therefore refers to the notion of play as 
a mode of being of things, ways in which the world appears, indifferent to the human 
will to control. 
If we examine how the word "play" is used and concentrate on its so-called 
metaphorical senses, we find talk of the play of light, the play of the waves, the play of 
gears or parts of machinery, the interplay of limbs, the play of forces, the play of gnats, 
even a play on words. In each case what is intended is to-and-fro movement that is not 
tied to any goal that would bring it to an end. PF31 
Play, as an independent movement, becomes identified with Being. To support this 
thesis Gadamer quotes Huizinga‟s remark that: "The savage himself knows no 
conceptual distinction between being and playing; he knows nothing of identity, of 
image or symbol.” PF32FP Consequently, Gadamer argues that this „being‟ of play should be 
primarily understood as “being-played” (from the perspective of players). As he writes: 
“The attraction of a game, the fascination it exerts, consists precisely in the fact that the 
game masters the players.” PF33FP Play becomes a primordial state without goals and efforts. 
It allows for immersive repetition and letting things go, similar to the natural „play of 
the light‟ or „play of the waves‟. “The structure of play absorbs the player into itself, 
and thus frees him from the burden of taking the initiative, which constitutes the actual 
strain of existence.”PF34FP This concept of play comes close to the Eastern philosophical 
positions, such as Zen Buddhism, which inspired post-war American artists to 
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experiment with the play of chance and indeterminacy. I will discuss this tradition of 
„prerational‟ play with reference to John Cage‟s work, in chapter 6. 
How does this image of play fit into the aesthetic theory? First of all, “play is 
neither the orientation nor even the state of mind of the creator or of those enjoying the 
work of art, nor the freedom of a subjectivity engaged in play, but the mode of being of 
the work of art itself.”PF35FP According to Gadamer, artistic play occurs “in-between”; it is 
neither inscribed exclusively within the activities of the players nor the spectators. 
Mode of being of the work of art is, from this perspective, independent of the 
consciousness of the artist and spectators, just like play is independent of the players – 
it has its own essence. The work of art “is not an object that stands over against a 
subject for itself.” Instead it “has its true being in the fact that it becomes an experience 
that changes the person who experiences it.” PF36FP Jean Grondin aptly summarises these 
implications of Gadamer‟s perspective:  
the experience of art ... is not relating to isolated object, which one could objectify. The 
play of art does not lie in the artwork that stands in front of us, but lies in the fact that 
one is touched by a proposition, an address, an experience, which so captures us that we 
can only play along. PF37FP  
  
However, according to Gadamer, in art, play is no longer free-floating and 
ephemeral; it acquires a higher form – becomes “transformed into structure”:   
I call this change, in which human play comes to its true consummation in being art, 
transformation into structure. Only through this change does play achieve ideality, so 
that it can be intended and understood as play. … As such, the play – even the 
unforeseen elements of improvisation – is in principle repeatable and hence permanent. 
It has the character of a work, of an ergon and not only of energeia. In this sense I call it 
a structure (Gebilde). PF38FP  
From the above quotation we can see that, in Gadamer, art to be “lasting and true” PF39FP 
cannot be play anymore – it must become a higher form, namely, work. However, this 
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concept of work is produced out of the concept of play and it contains some of 
(Gadamer‟s) play characteristics. Play, crystallized into a work of art, transforms the 
world back into its “true being”.PF40FP Art „teaches‟ about the play of being but cannot itself 
be regarded as play (prerational, untamed, exuberant, and so on). Although it emerges 
from play, it becomes precisely the opposite of play – work – not a dynamic energeia, 
but a fixed ergon. It is therefore a tool to recognize the world‟s truth and essence.  
I mention this shift from play to play-like work in Gadamer‟s account, in order 
to show the conflict between the idea of the „prerational‟ play and the intentionality and 
meaningfulness of an artwork. To solve this conflict Gadamer finds it necessary to point 
out the ultimate transformation of play into a permanent structure.  
There cannot here be any gradual transition leading from one to the other, since the one 
is the denial of the other. Thus transformation into structure means that what existed 
previously exists no longer. But also that what now exists, what represents itself in the 
play of art, is the lasting and true. PF41FP  
In my view the „prerational‟ (as well as „rational‟) play constitutes the work of art (as a 
process) to the same extent as „work‟ (ergon) does. The fluidity, mutability and 
ephemerality, as characteristics of play are integral elements of the concept of art. I will 
discuss this issue at length in the next chapter, in reference to the concepts of ergon and 
parergon, and Derrida‟s pharmakon. 
 
 Nonetheless, the idea of play in Gadamer‟s theory must be seen as „prerational‟ 
– as a force artists and viewers can play along with and in which they can immerse 
themselves. It relieves participants from the burden of responsibility and limitations of 
their rational minds. It opens up new creative and liberating paths to explore. It leads to 
the elimination of the passive public – everyone becomes engaged in the creative act 
(which, for instance, was literally applied in Allan Kaprow‟s Happenings). The 
prerational notion of play, as a transforming experience surpassing its players – 
performative and interactive – seems to go beyond representation. Participants of play 
or the artistic act are not separated from „reality‟. They can recognize and experience 
the truth or essence of Being, but not in a strictly cognitive or methodical way. Play, 
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from this perspective, is not representational because it makes possible to experience 
things as they are, or come to be – it is a manifestation of „reality‟. 
 In my view, the promise of non-representation cannot be fulfilled in the artistic 
activity. However, the representational approach to art, as a production and 
consumption of the aesthetic object by the rational self-conscious subject, ignores the 
spheres of sensation, temporality, exchange, indeterminacy and so on. In this thesis I 
argue that play emerges from the immediate experience and it triggers representation. 
Moreover, the prerational and rational views on play, and its role in aesthetics, cannot 
be treated as competing oppositions. Play, as a movement „in between‟, allows for the 
states of rational, subjective control and the states of being lost, immersed in, and 
completely absorbed by the events and sensations. Players/participants play their game 
but at the same time they are played by this game. It is a two-way process. In order to 
argue this, I will now turn to the concepts and models that will help me to link „rational‟ 
and „prerational‟ positions.  
 
The sublime 
 The concept of the sublime (“grand” and “exalted”, from Latin sublimis) 
implicates the experience of something which overwhelms and astonishes because of its 
powerfulness or dimensions beyond human grasp. For Edmund Burke (A Philosophical 
Enquiry into the Sublime and Beautiful, 1757), this experience is built on the feelings of 
pain, fear and terror however it causes delight. As he writes: 
If the pain and terror are so modified as not to be actually noxious; if the pain is not 
carried to violence, and the terror is not conversant about the present destruction of the 
person … they are capable of producing delight; not pleasure, but a sort of delightful 
horror, a sort of tranquillity tinged with terror. PF42FP  
Burke‟s account of the sublime introduces its two important characteristics that I 
previously pointed out as those of play. Firstly, there occurs the subject‟s confrontation 
with danger and risk, but within the “safety zone” (as in Denzin‟s account) so the 
sublime, like play, provides the „as if‟ situation, a possibility to „exercise‟ one‟s 
reactions. Secondly, they are both ambivalent experiences, i.e. evoking at once fear and 
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delight. The notion of the sublime in aesthetics can therefore serve as an analogy for the 
concept of play (ambivalent and based on contradictions). 
The aesthetic theory of the sublime was further developed by Immanuel Kant. 
For Kant, it is not the object or situation itself that is to be called sublime (absolutely 
large)PF
43
FP, but “the disposition of the soul evoked by a particular representation engaging 
the attention of the reflective judgement” PF44FP. In other words, the specific, most often 
natural, phenomena are pretexts to evoke the experience of the sublime, which is 
always “only in the mind of the judging subject”.PF45FP The sublime implicates, therefore, 
the active engagement – “a mental movement combined with the estimate of the 
object”PF46FP. As James Kirwan puts it, “In Kant‟s account the subject must be active …, to 
create the sublime out of potentially overwhelming” PF47FP. This activity of the subject is 
very much rational – one has to present to oneself the „unpresentable‟, make sense of 
something that overpowers the senses; create a representation; a possibility of 
communication. According to Paul Crowther, “The sensory and imaginative excess can 
be comprehended as an idea. It revivifies our capacity for rational insight – our very 
ability to create and discover meaning.” PF48FP For Kant this implies the triumph of Reason.  
However, the moment of comprehension, of engagement of the power of reason 
in response to the intensive and excessive sensation, can, from the prerational 
perspective, be seen as a loss, not as a triumph. The situation of the sublime that 
happens to the subject is grounded in the immediate and immersive experience, which 
surpasses one‟s sensuous and rational control. It stimulates the „defence mechanism‟ 
(against the unknown, potentially dangerous, painful and so on) – the production of 
representation, the safety zone. In my view, it is at once a „prerational‟ and a „rational‟ 
situation – an immediate experience and a process of meaning-making – one possible 
only through the other. The experience is perceived as sublime (dangerous and 
delightful) thanks to the process of representation, and representation occurs because 
the phenomenon forms a suitable pretext.  
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The sublime emerges from fear, the negative and painful inability to conceive 
the given phenomenon in its totality, but in effect makes a subject deeply satisfied with 
his or her “ability to acknowledge and represent the object which overwhelms us as 
transcending us”.PF49FP The experience of the sublime, therefore, has in Kant the 
„transporting‟ dimension – as Paul Crowther puts it, “a rational containment of excess 
leads to a kind of transcending the mundane self.” PF50FP Thanks to the confrontation with 
the powerful, the limitless, or the excessive, one can affirm and confirm one‟s powers 
of reason, but also go beyond its usual operation.  
To some extent this process can be compared to the experience of play, and 
especially children‟s play, which helps to deal with and represent the disturbing or scary 
phenomena overwhelming the child. In play, everyone can reach beyond his or her 
usual activities and limitations; act as someone else and surprise oneself. Play provides 
its players with both the thrill of danger, risk or challenge and the comforting feeling of 
safety, of being inside the temporary brackets of fictions and a satisfaction coming from 
the activity of framing. One is then confronted with a certain situation which could be 
more difficult (possibly painful or traumatic) if it were „real‟. By being a „mere play‟ it 
gives one a chance to grow, to learn and to develop. It also evokes a constant emotional 
and intellectual movement between reality and fiction, here and there, self and the other 
and so on. On a philosophical level, as I will argue in the next chapter, play can be seen 
primarily as a movement in between the „opposites‟ (i.e. senses and reason, present and 
absent, experience and representation), as crossing the borders and appointing the 
limits.  
 
The issue of borders and limits belongs to the discourse on both play and the 
sublime. In Kant the sublime is characterised as unbounded and limitless, however, at 
the same time provoking the mind to set the limits and to arrive at the image of 
totality.PF
51
FP In consequence, the experience of the sublime can be seen as applying the 
cognitive frame by the subject, appointing limits on the limitless and the excessive. 
Similarly to play, the sublime is linked to the feeling of freedom, triggered in this case 
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by the natural phenomena engulfing the subject (ocean, sky, vast landscape, Milky 
Way, etc.) and the necessary limitation, the act of framing performed by reason.  
As Philip Shaw remarks, the etymology of the word sublime – sub- (below), 
limen (threshold, literally the top piece of the door), “suggests that there is no sense of 
the unbounded that does not make reference to the placing of a limit or threshold. Yet, 
by the same token, there is no limit which does not assume the existence of the 
unlimited.”PF52FP The sublime can be seen as a liminal and fluid state „in between‟ freedom 
and frames, and also occurring at the edges of the sensual and rational comprehension, 
pushing the subject to the limits of his or her imagination and testing his or her 
cognitive powers. Jacques Derrida refers to the liminal quality of the sublime as 
follows: “It is perhaps, between the presentable and the unpresentable, the passage from 
one to the other as much as the irreducibility of the one to the other.” PF53FP This remark 
belongs to Derrida‟s analysis of the sublime in the context of the notion of parergon in 
Kant‟s Critique of Judgement. Parergon (a frame, a drapery on a statue, a colonnade 
around the building) is also the figure of the border, irreducible neither to the inside nor 
to the outside. In the next chapter I will analyse in detail the Derridean notion of the 
parergon as a possible metaphor for the concept of play as an internal condition of art. 
Play as parergon remains irreducible to one or the other side of its opposing 
characteristics; it remains ambivalent and liminal – rational and prerational, safe and 
risky, internal and external, and so on. 
 
The notion of the sublime can be extended to the experience of „natural forces‟ 
surpassing the subject from within. The unconscious (as an activity of the human mind 
outside awareness), a concept developed by Sigmund Freud PF
54
FP, entered the aesthetic 
realm in modern art as a new, internal pretext for the experience of the sublime – the 
potentially dangerous and unpresentable force beyond the rational control. Various 
forms of „prerational‟ play, such as play of chance, language games, and automatic 
techniques became methods to get in touch with the unconscious material and make it 
substance of art (or anti-art).  
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In his essay Creative Writers and Day-Dreaming (1907), Freud analyses the 
connections between poetic creation and play in childhood, as driven by unfulfilled 
wishes (often of an unconscious nature).PF
55
FP The creative writer (artist) substitutes or 
extends childhood phantasies and dreams into his stories (artworks); he or she “does the 
same as the child at play” PF56FP. According to Freud, the pleasure derived from all these 
processes comes from the symbolic “fulfilment of wishes”, as a “correction of 
unsatisfying reality”.PF57FP Dreams at night also have the character of phantasies, but they 
often express wishes “of which we are ashamed; these we must conceal from ourselves, 
and they have consequently been repressed, pushed into the unconscious”. PF58FP Freud 
suggests that the creative work can be seen as a representation of (dealing with) wishes 
that are often hidden from the artist himself.  
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4. Salvador Dali, The Sublime Moment, 1938 
 
The conclusion for the creative process, proposed and explored by the members 
of the Surrealist group, was that the artist‟s conscious reasoning is not the only agent 
responsible for the creative outcomes. The notion of the unconscious opened the whole 
new and exciting sphere for artistic research. The Surrealists used the „prerational‟ play 
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to oppose the traditional representation and to overcome reason as the only, and perhaps 
limiting, creative power. With the use of certain techniques like automatic writing and 
playing games they tried to access the unconscious as the inner, primordial nature of 
man. Their creative activities were supposed to reveal and manifest the inner powers 
and not to represent them in the traditional way. These experiments initiated the view of 
children‟s play and artistic („primitive‟ or „prerational‟) creation as liminal activities 
operating in between the rational and non-rational spheres of the human mind. To some 
extent the artists were reversing the natural connection between the unconsciousness 
manifested in phantasies and the creative act, as described by Freud. This is why, 
although “Andre Breton and his associates were some of Freud‟s most sympathetic 
early readers, … he confessed himself to be bemused by their admiration and dismissed 
them as „complete fools (let us say 95 per cent, as with alcohol)‟”.PF59FP In his view, the 
unconsciousness was not liberatory and could not serve to produce conventions-free art, 
rather the one risking psychopathology. PF
60
FP “Nevertheless, by the early thirties the 
association of some modernist art with „primitives‟, children, and the insane was set, as 
was its affinity with psychoanalysis”. PF61 
The unconscious, as the modern sublime, adds another dimension to the issues 
of the subjective control and intentionality in the aesthetic experience. It seems that the 
notion of traditional representation, as imposing order into the chaotic limitless nature, 
becomes undermined from within. The participants of the creative act cannot fully 
control their activities and their meaning. There is always some margin of internal 
indeterminacy („prerational‟ play) involved. However, due to the intention, decision to 
initiate, or participate in the creative act, the „players‟ cannot experience the process as 
unmediated reality, either. In my view, play as an integral element of art triggers 
representation, but it also reveals the limits of both – representation and non-
representation – when treated as mutually exclusive alternatives.  
 
I will now proceed to the analysis of communal celebrations as models for the 
participatory and collective experience of art as play. The idea of festive play as 
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„embodied representation‟ is another way to overcome the rational and prerational 
rhetorics limiting the notion of play, as well as the dialectical opposition between 
representation and non-representation in the artistic process. I will also use this model 
of art/play activity to introduce other dichotomies belonging to the notion of play that 
will be further discussed in the context of participatory or process-oriented art. 
 
The communal play of art  
Before I move to carnival and festival, as models of „art as play‟, I need to 
briefly introduce the relations between play and ritual – as a matrix for these two types 
of communal celebration liberated in the course of history from the religious content (or 
the awareness of this content). PF
62
FP There still exists a strong nostalgic image of ritual as 
an ideal fusion of work, play and art within one collective activity as it takes place in 
pre-industrial cultures. Undoubtedly ritual and play are connected, at least due to the 
repetitiveness, relation to rules, conventions and the sphere of work, and the double 
meaning they impose on certain situations, behaviours, objects and gestures. However, 
there are also significant differences. According to Don Handleman the play frame is 
easy to establish, flexible and allows wide space for individual expression, while the 
ritual‟s frames are fixed, difficult to modify and grounded in the binding values of truth, 
morality and the social order.PF
63
FP As Handleman writes, “play doubts the social order 
while ritual integrates it”. PF64FP However, Victor Turner expresses a different view of the 
ritual‟s role – the ritualized role-playing enables “participants to experiment with 
alternative social relations or to invent new ones.” PF65FP We can think, for instance, about 
the ancient Dionysia in Athens. “Dionysus was a god who came from outside and 
temporarily suspended the activities of everyday life. His festival created a space 
                                                            
P
62
P Carnival and festival as the forms of communal play depart from myths or beliefs that originally 
brought them to life. As Giorgio Agamben writes, referring to C. Collodi‟s Pinocchio, “Playland is a 
country whose inhabitants are busy celebrating rituals, and manipulating objects and sacred words, whose 
sense and purpose they have, however, forgotten.” Agamben G.,‟In Playland: Reflections on History and 
Play‟, chapter in: Infancy and history: the destruction of experience, Verso, London, 1993, p. 70 
P
63
P Goldberg A., after Handleman D. (1977), in: „Play and Ritual in Haitan Voodoo Shows for tourists‟, 
chapter in: The Paradoxes of Play, Loy J. (Ed.), p. 43 
P
64
P Handleman D., (1977), quotation after: Schwartzman J., „Play: Epistemology and Change‟, chapter in: 
Play as Context, Taylor Cheska A. (Ed.), p. 42 
P
65
P „Rite of passage‟, Encyclopaedia Britannica online, at: 
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/504562/rite-of-passage/283998/Victor-Turner-and-anti-
structure, visited: 08.09.2009 
60 
 
outside the day-to-day reality of the polis”. PF66FP The celebrations included the custom of 
aischrologia “which allowed those of lesser status to jeer at those of greater” PF67FP and 
other occasions for role-reversal. 
It is also worth stressing here that both ritual and play, apart from the notions of 
community and participation, entail the possibility of exclusion. Integration of a social 
order (in ritual) and establishing one‟s identity (in play) can result in 
sacrificing/excluding those who are seen as outsiders. In the next chapter I will refer to 
this issue in the context of the notion of the passport, and the pharmakos – the 
scapegoat.  
 
The „art as carnival‟ model that refers to the above characteristic of ritual 
celebrations can be derived from the book Rabelais and His World (1941, published in 
1965) by Russian philosopher Mikhail Bakhtin. Bakhtin approaches carnival as a form 
of social interaction located on the borders of art and life (a desirable location from the 
perspective of the 20 P
th
P century avant-gardes). Carnival resembles spectacle or theatrical 
market show, but according to Bakhtin, it is not simply another art form:  
[T]he basic carnival nucleus of this culture is by no means a purely artistic form nor a 
spectacle and does not, generally speaking, belong to the sphere of art. It belongs to the 
borderline between art and life. In reality, it is life itself, but shaped according to a 
certain pattern of play. … Carnival is not a spectacle seen by the people; they live in it, 
and everyone participates because its very idea embraces all the people.PF68 
Carnival is art-like (representational) and it belongs to reality (non-representation) – 
reality shaped by the “pattern of play”. The experience and the performance happen 
through the bodily involvement, through the immersive participation in the activities 
encircled in the specific time and space frames. Participation in the carnival 
celebrations is not a matter of imitation; it involves the methetic „transformation‟ of 
bodies and minds (at least for the duration of the carnival). An important feature of 
carnival is that everybody participates in it and there is no division for performers and 
viewers. 
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Bakhtin describes the role of the carnival in community life as a temporary 
dissolution of social hierarchy and a deep experience of human bonds in the spirit of 
togetherness and freedom from the official order. Carnival, presented by Bakhtin, 
becomes a temporary (and officially sanctioned) subversion of the ruling hierarchy – 
culture/nature, sacred/profane, serious/non-serious, work/play. It is therefore an 
experience of oneself as the other and others in new circumstances. The relations 
become redefined and structured according to alternative playful and subversive rules. 
According to Bakhtin, these new “truly human relations” are not “only a fruit of 
imagination or abstract thought” but they are “experienced".PF69FP When play becomes a 
ruling principle, instead of work, in any social realm including art, there occurs a 
process of symbolic inversion, exposing and transforming the „central‟ concept – for 
example the „high‟, the „official‟, the „sacred‟, the „productive‟. Bakhtin coined the 
word „carnivalesque‟, to describe the literary mode (that can be also adapted to other art 
forms), which uses humour and chaos to undermine the dominant official style. As 
Michael D. Bristol points out the „carnivalesque‟ mood, and laughter in particular, are 
valuable resources and instruments “for any social group that lacks power but seeks to 
retain a strong feeling of solidarity” PF70FP. Play and laughter are therefore important 
elements of “critical consciousness” PF71FP that positions itself against the dominant power. 
In addition to its participatory character, carnival, as any form of exuberant and 
ritualistic (or ritual-inspired) communal celebration, links prerational and rational poles 
because, as a collective excessive experience it happens beyond the control of the 
individual participant, but allows for the autonomous, self-designed role-play. From yet 
another angle, it belongs to the cycles of nature/natural processes, as well as to their 
human representation.  
 
These features of carnival, in the context of art, can be even better exemplified 
by the position developed by Gadamer and his analogy between art and festival (Truth 
and Method, 1960; The Relevance of the Beautiful, 1986). According to him, both 
forms are governed by the operation of play. “Thus the artwork has a festive, as well as 
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symbolic and playful character, since the festival similarly takes us out of ordinary 
time, while also opening us up to the true possibility of community.”PF72FP The participants 
can lose themselves in the collective joy and experience of “a heightened self-fulfilling 
moment” PF73FP – transportation out of the everyday existence and identity into “a kind of 
universal communion” PF74FP. Festival is then the occasion for a personal transformation, 
but, as Gadamer writes, “it is meaningful only for those actually taking part” PF75FP. One 
cannot stay outside and benefit from the festive spirit. The enactment reveals the 
meaning of the festival and its powers only to those who experience it and lose 
themselves in it. What happens is the act of „embodied representation‟ – the 
performative engagement in the celebrations that constitutes the unique time-specific 
experience and representation of the forces surpassing the individual subject. 
 
Ritual, carnival or festival are the modes of collective experience that celebrate 
natural processes or phenomena, which are to some extent unpresentable (the events 
from the life of gods, stages in human life from birth to death, the laws ruling over the 
universe). They are not perceptible or „graspable‟ in their whole complexity (material, 
biological, spiritual, emotional) and also go beyond the individual experience. The 
participants can lose themselves in the crowd, in the recurring customs, in the joyful 
spirit of togetherness (even though there also exists a possibility of exclusion). At the 
same time their actions are inscribed in the collective attempt to make sense of the 
„universal‟ forces, inevitability of death and unpredictability of life, “the enduring in the 
perishing”PF76FP. I think that this experience can also be compared to the sublime. Again, 
this sublime, unlike in Kant, is not the effect of the rational thought evoked by the 
suitable phenomenon. In Gadamer, it is the object that dominates the subject; the play 
of being lets itself „be represented‟ by „the players‟; they have no other way than to 
„play along‟ the powers of being and to immerse themselves in the flow of events. 
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However, the players inevitably produce representation – they gather together around 
the fire, on the market square, in the playground or in the gallery and try to “draw the 
circle of guardian signs”PF77FP, create a safety zone, temporarily suspend the laws of reality, 
reverse roles, become the other, and so on. 
Consequently, the festival or carnival celebrations can be regarded as moments 
of dissolution of everyday opposites of self and other, work and play, reality and 
fiction. One can transgress the conventional rules and roles and become someone else – 
with the help of disguise, mask, formal dress or just a festive spirit. It is time to cross 
the barriers between the fixed everyday identity and the endless possibilities of role-
play – self and the other – because the rational control guarding the proper identity and 
self-conscious image gets loosened. Reality and fiction become merged in one 
multilayered experience „in between‟ – the transition that does not achieve any finality. 
The experiments with one‟s identity, with getting close to the others, might be risky in 
the ordinary situation. Festival provides the safety zone for all forms of excess. 
However, at the same time it remains bonded by the specific rules, customs and 
conventions. The festive mode fixes the given reality, exposes underlying forces and 
values, and simultaneously offers the possibility of the temporary transgression.  
Apart from the issues of transgression, freedom and frames, festival (or 
carnival) as a model for art can be also discussed as an occasion for the „heightened 
experience‟ – as a specific event that transforms the meaningless into the meaningful in 
a seemingly natural, unmediated way. In chapter 5, 6 and 7, I will discuss the instances 
of play in modern and postmodern art (i.e. in Dada events, Kaprow‟s Happenings, and 
recent „relational‟ projects) applied as a strategy or tactic to provide the 
viewers/participants with such an „experience‟ instead of the traditional representation. 
 
Conclusion 
 Concept of play is never a starting point in the artistic (practical or theoretical) 
activities. Paradoxically, it is never applied for its own sake. However, in my view, play 
has been used as a means to achieve a desirable effect in art or to prove one‟s aesthetic 
theory. As I wrote in the introduction, play, as a multilayered or even ambivalent 
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concept or phenomenon, is a very flexible rhetoric tool and it can serve various needs. 
In my analysis I followed Spariosu‟s distinction between rational and prerational play. 
These two poles of the concept of play proved to be supportive of two opposite models 
of the aesthetic experience.   
The rational model, discussed in reference to Kant‟s theory, assumes the 
primacy of the subject over the artistic process. The „free play‟ of cognitive faculties, 
although not purposive and not productive of concepts, remains restricted by the laws of 
reason. The „play of art‟ occurs as a relation between subject and object. This relation 
can be described as the one of control and mastery – as imposing order and form on the 
chaotic nature. The rational play is very work-like – it acts as an inner mechanism of art 
(supervised by reason) that allows for the harmonious collaboration and balance 
between imagination and understanding. It prevents excessive freedom of imagination 
that would lead to nonsense and would obstruct universal communication. The rational 
play in Kant „works‟ therefore as an agent constitutive of the traditional notion of 
representation, controlled by the subject. 
Kant‟s theory introduced play as a mode of being of aesthetic judgement, and in 
consequence, the view on art as an activity for its own sake – devoid of practical 
purpose and detached from goal-oriented reality. The idea of art as autonomous from 
the given reality (not a cult-object anymore but a „free-floating commodity‟) and as a 
manifestation of the subjective will to control became a matter of contestation in 
modern avant-garde movements. In the following chapters I will argue that the artists 
reached for the concept of play – specifically the „prerational‟ play – to bring art back to 
life as a meaningful experience and not as a traditionally interpreted „representation‟.  
To discuss the idea of „prerational‟ play in the context of art, I turned to 
Gadamer‟s Truth and Method. Gadamer describes at length the characteristics of play, 
which he analyses in reference to the natural phenomena. „Prerational‟ play is then 
compared to a natural movement back and forth – disinterested, repetitive, and not tied 
to any goals – just like play of the waves or play of light. In Gadamer, play is a 
metaphor for Being – an original experience/understanding in which things (beings) are 
revealed to the subject. Consequently, such play is also a mode of being of the work of 
art, so art can be seen as a manifestation of life, reality, being, and natural forces ruling 
over the world. Players or participants in the artistic act are not in total control of their 
experience – they are played by the game or by the artwork – they have no other choice 
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than to play along. This approach is much more process-oriented. The aesthetic 
experience occurs „in-between‟ artist and viewers – the artworks are not detached and 
fixed objects – they mediate the fluid and temporary being of things. In terms of the 
notion of representation, this approach to „play of art‟ entails the promise of non-
representational modes which go beyond the subjective control and allow for the 
unmediated experience in the situation of art. In my view, this is how the notion of play 
(as „prerational‟ play) was used by modern avant-gardes, and how it recurs in 
contemporary „relational‟ and process-oriented practices. 
The purpose of this thesis is to come up with an interpretation of play that would 
go beyond the dialectical opposition between the rational and prerational poles and 
would serve to reinterpret the notion of representation as the one animated by the 
operation of play. In this chapter I approached this task by pointing out the concepts and 
models that, in my view, undermine the one-sided approaches and expose the artistic 
act as both symbolic and experiential, self-conscious and immersive, and so on. I used 
them to show the weak points of the traditional notion of representation as well as the 
impossibility to go beyond representation in the experience of art. 
I discussed the notion of the sublime, which in Kant remains subjective and 
rational but shows the moment of confrontation between the subject and the 
overwhelming, „unpresentable‟ phenomenon. As a concept similar in some respect to 
play („as if‟ mode), the sublime can help to contextualize play as an internal agent in the 
concept of art, which transgresses the opposites between subject and object, 
fiction/reality, safety/danger, familiar/unfamiliar, etc. The sublime, like play, must be 
then seen as a liminal experience, testing cognitive powers and imagination, and 
transporting the subject into the spheres beyond their usual operation. In order to show 
the limitations of the rational position, I extended the notion of the sublime to the 
operation of the unconscious as described by Freud and creatively utilised by the 
Surrealist movement. The unconscious, as a play of natural powers surpassing the 
subjective control „from within‟, provides the inescapable margin of indeterminacy in 
the act of representation. However, due to the conscious decision to play/to participate 
in the artistic activity, one imposes the frames of representation, transforms the 
meaningless into the meaningful. The sublime is then both a powerful sensation of the 
„external‟ (unknown, unfamiliar) power of play that surpasses the players (natural 
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forces, chance, or unconsciousness) and the subjective attempt to frame, to make sense, 
to represent. 
The similar process can be identified within the communal celebrations – as 
models for art as „embodied representation‟. Ritual, carnival and festival become 
occasions to enact – directly experience – the „unpresentable‟ phenomena beyond the 
individual grasp. The spirit of „universal communion‟, as Gadamer writes, enables the 
subject to experience the „heightened self-fulfilling moments‟ and to become 
„transported‟ beyond the everyday limitations. In most cases, as I will argue in the 
following chapters, artists have been using „prerational‟ play, in order to arrive at these 
moments of „heightened experience‟ instead of representation. The communal 
celebration models also expose other processes that I interpret as belonging to the 
operation of play. These include establishing/transgressing rules, movement between 
one‟s usual and alternative identities, safety and danger, self-awareness and losing 
oneself in the flow of events, and feelings of togetherness and threat of exclusion.   
It is a matter of the chosen perspective (i.e. rational or prerational) whether we 
see „festival‟ (play/art) as a greater force playing over the participants (non-
representation) or the other way round – as an activity of conscious framing of the 
given (collective or individual) experience by the subject (representation). In my view 
both modes merge together; it is impossible to tell them apart, just as it is impossible to 
decide whether play belongs to the unmediated experience or representation as 
exclusive alternatives. Moreover, as I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, art as 
making or creation emerges from the notion of work. Hence, it cannot only be located 
on the side of a „special and festive time‟ as a domain of safe play-like excesses, 
demarcated from the everyday reality, goals and intentions. Gadamer‟s proposition that 
play becomes transformed into work (ergon) during the creative process is also not a 
solution, because it excludes the states of indeterminacy, uncertainty, fluidity from the 
notion of the artwork as „lasting and true‟.  
 
In the next chapter I will introduce my own perspective on play and its operation 
in the realm of art, based on Jacques Derrida‟s concepts of the supplement, the 
parergon and the „undecidable‟. I will establish the perspective that will combine the 
notions of work and play in the concept of art, and which will recognise the 
ambivalence of play on various levels. This reinterpreted notion will serve me as a 
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matrix to analyse the modern and postmodern uses of play and to propose the approach 
to representation that would take into account play as an internal element of art, and the 
general „play-turn‟ that occurred in 20 Pth P century culture and society. 
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Chapter 3 
The play and work of art 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter I analysed two strong and seemingly opposite concepts 
of play – rational and prerational – in the context of well-established aesthetic theories. 
I argued that the rational, work-like play supports the traditional approach to artistic 
representation as a subjective, authorial control, while the interpretation of play as 
prerational encourages attempts to go beyond representation. From this latter 
perspective, the artistic act (process and outcome) can become a „heightened‟ 
experience, instead of the framed and hung up „picture‟, detached from the 
”connections with life and the particular conditions of our approach to it”.PF1FP In order to 
suggest possible ways of overcoming this dichotomy, I discussed the notion of the 
sublime as well as communal celebration models of „art as play‟, as liminal experiences 
occurring on the margins of art and life, experience and representation, self-awareness 
and immersion. 
The purpose of the present chapter is to establish the philosophical perspective 
on play, seen as an internal ingredient of the concept of art; the perspective that would 
go beyond the rational/prerational classification. However, I will also take into account 
the notion of work because, in my view, the long-established approach to representation 
is shaped according to the principle of work as ergon, proper function, controllable 
mechanism (as in Kant‟s work-like „rational‟ play), with its implications of stability, 
fixity, hierarchy, mastery, etc. In order to determine the role and position of play in this 
traditional framework, I will refer to Jacques Derrida‟s examinations of the idea of 
supplement and the Kantian parergon. Using Derridean notions of the logic of 
supplementarity and „undecidability‟, I will propose a revised approach to the concept 
of play (as parergon, passé-partout, passport, pharmakon) and its relation to work 
(ergon) that would overcome metaphysical dichotomies, traditionally structuring the 
concepts of play and art. I will argue that the notion of play as „undecidable‟ must be 
seen as a constitutive element of art (together with work as ergon) and a trigger for 
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representation. I will also discuss the roots of prejudice against representation in 
Western thought, as described by Derrida with his speech/writing example. Instead of 
the conventional allergy between the opposite terms (work and play) I will suggest the 
relation of synergy which, in my view, can also help to change the negative attitude 
towards representation.   
Why do I choose Derrida‟s terms and line of thinking as a point of reference for 
my analysis? He uses the concept of play as a tool to overcome metaphysical 
dichotomies. The deconstructive project of decentring any system – including 
philosophy, politics and art, exposes play as a leading principle. By „play‟ Derrida 
means movement of any structure, like “give or tolerance ..., which works against ideas 
of self-sufficiency and absolute completion.” PF2FP As he puts it, “play is the disruption of 
presence”PF3FP. It is the possibility of presence and absence (experience and representation), 
„undecidability‟. Such an approach to play widens the characteristics of play presented 
so far and opens up new ways of exploration in the context of art. It also enables a 
much more flexible approach to the notion of representation than the traditional one. 
However, my proposition of the „play-oriented‟ view of artistic representation will be 
suspended until the last chapter.  
 
Work as ergon 
As I have already noted, in my view, the concept of representation in the 
traditional sense has been constructed with vocabulary coming from the sphere of work. 
However, it is the notion of work in a specific sense, not simply an empirical activity of 
labour or production, but an underlying principle that can be derived from the classical 
Western philosophy. The concept of work which I would like to apply here was 
introduced by Plato and Aristotle. It has a broad meaning and includes the general 
purpose of any object and the obligation of humans in the spheres of ethics, politics and 
social life. In Republic, Plato introduces a concept of a specific function possessed and 
performed by every object and a living being. 
„So again, could you cut off a vine-shoot with a carving-knife or a chisel or other tool?‟ 
„You could.‟  
But you would do the job best if you used a pruning-knife made for the purpose.‟ 
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„True.‟ 
„Shall we then call this its “function”?‟ 
„Yes, let us.‟ 
...  
„And has not everything which has a function its own particular excellence?‟ PF4 
The „function‟ (work, ergon) is therefore a specific characteristic and purpose of 
something, an action or activity that it performs better than anything else. The ergon of 
a pruning knife is to cut a vine-shoot well, and this is its proper function. The same rule 
applies to humans. As Nickolas Pappas explains in his book on Plato‟s Republic: “The 
word ergon by itself can be indeterminate. Literally “work” or “deed”, it applies to 
anything that requires work – my business, the fruits of my labour – or even very 
broadly, any act. But one‟s ergon often refers to the occupation that is proper to the 
person ....”PF5FP Plato further develops this principle of specialisation, of the single function 
in the idea of the division of labour in his ideal city. He presents the model in which 
every person performs only one job. This guarantees that the work is done well, which 
in turn is profitable both for the individual and the whole community. 
„So do we do better to exercise one skill or to try to practise several? 
„To stick to one.‟ He said. 
... 
„Quantity and quality are therefore more easily produced when a man specializes 
appropriately on a single job for which he is naturally fitted, and neglects all others.‟ 
„That‟s certainly true.‟ PF6FP  
The specialization is not seen as something forced by the social order, but rather as 
natural, facilitating the work, and improving its quality. However, it is important to 
stress that although Socrates often uses the word “natural”, his perspective should not 
be confused with a modern encouragement of self-development, pursued freely 
according to one‟s talents or whims. Performing a „proper function‟ in a society is not 
advised by Plato as a means for a personal self-actualization. “Plato wants nothing to do 
with a society that encourages experimentation in ways of life.” PF7FP This is rather a call to 
conform to one‟s destined path and to identify with the only one professional role in 
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society. This model, according to Plato, is crucial for the existence of the city, because 
people are not self-sufficient; they have to gather in communities to exchange services 
and goods. Performing one‟s ergon is therefore the means for well-being of the state, 
and also in consequence, the well-being of an individual. This rule was also applied in 
the medieval hierarchical society led by the Catholic Church, and remained 
unchallenged by Luther. In capitalist and post-industrial economic systems even today, 
every person belongs to the functional net in private and professional life. Although the 
rules are much more liberal and allow self-actualisation and change of direction, it is 
extremely difficult to function outside the system and to change profession freely.   
  
Aristotle, following Plato‟s conception of ergon, mainly develops its ethical 
implications. „Goodness‟, excellence, virtue (arête) of any object or living being depend 
on the extent to which they fulfil their destined function. In Aristotle, the notion of 
ergon, as all his philosophy, is structured by the idea of teleology (Greek – telos: end, 
purpose), which presupposes that all that exists has inherent purpose, or the definite 
goal to meet. For Aristotle this final goal of humans is „living well‟, in the state of 
happiness eudaimonia. Fulfilling one‟s „proper function‟ (ergon), which in case of 
humans is logos – rationality – is a means to the state of happiness. 
As [Aristotle] points out, one traditional conception of happiness identifies it with 
virtue. Aristotle's theory should be construed as a refinement of this position. He says, 
not that happiness is virtue, but that it is virtuous activity. Living well consists in doing 
something, not just being in a certain state or condition. It consists in those lifelong 
activities that actualize the virtues of the rational part of the soul. PF8 
Work is therefore a virtuous and rational activity, the means and the end to a good life. 
According to Aristotle man should devote his life to performing his proper function and 
should not get distracted or derailed by activities like play. Unlike in the Homeric or 
Heraclitean traditions, as Mechthild Nagel writes, “Aristotle affirms here 
unambiguously that play and seriousness are opposites. Paidia signifies trivial pursuit, 
cheap amusement ...; in fact to exert oneself and work for the sake of amusement 
[paidia] seems silly and utterly childish”. PF9FP   
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The Greek word ergon can have different translations including process of 
production, product, achievement, action, task, activity, and function. PF
10
FP In Plato and 
Aristotle the meaning of ergon is used to describe the unique, essential, proper, or the 
only goal, purpose, function of humans and things. This notion of ergon as „proper 
function‟ has been the base of the concept of work for centuries. „Proper‟ implicates 
„right and suitable‟ which carries an ultimate valuation: work – stable profession – is 
good. What is more, the word „proper‟, (from the Latin proprius) means „one‟s own, 
individual‟. Niall Lucy describes the traditional connotation of this word as follows: 
The classical instance of propriety is of course the proper name, which is thought to 
belong to individuals as one of the very marks of individuality. I don‟t answer to just 
any name – I answer to „my‟ name only. In this way my proper name seems to be 
essential to my sense of identity, despite the fact that my proper name is not strictly my 
exclusive property. PF11FP   
Ergon is therefore linked with the issues of identification and one‟s self-identity. Who 
we are is strongly informed by what we do and how we are „labelled‟. Ergon also 
restricts this identity, and our self-consciousness of it, within certain limits appointed by 
ourselves and by the others. 
 
In terms of art, ergon can be interpreted as a traditional identification of an artist 
as a maker, the highest form of homo faber, the producer of artistic representations of 
„things‟ (objects, situations, people, ideas, etc). Ergon connotes orientation towards 
preconceived goals, with the use of a profession‟s proper skills and tools. On a 
philosophical level, it is inscribed within the metaphysical dichotomies of Western 
thought. It connotes hierarchy, order, permanence, structure, determination and 
purposefulness as opposed to frivolity, chaos, temporariness, chance and lack of 
predefined goals. Ergon conforms to the moral rules as well as to the social 
conventions. It also implicates the existence of the rational, self-aware subject in control 
of his or her life, creative process and creative outcomes. The states of uncertainty, 
getting lost or „playing along‟ with the fluid and ephemeral processes of life, from the 
perspective of ergon, must be seen as dangerous and destructive, because they lead to 
excessive freedom and defer the achievement of goals or preclude it. Artistic ergon can 
                                                            
P
10
P http://www.blackwellreference.com/public/tocnode?id=g9781405106795_chunk_g97814051067956_ 
ss1-107, visited: 05.03.2008  
P
11
P Lucy N., A Derrida Dictionary, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 2004, p. 104 
73 
 
be also compared to the Kantian idea of genius – as a predisposition, which in both 
cases remains limited by the laws of reason and serves the highest value – good rational 
life, social order or aesthetic beauty. In case of ergon, however, the predisposition may 
often turn out to be an imposition – the obligation to act according to accepted values 
and conventions. Ergon, due to the above characteristics, as an element of internal (and 
external) control and a will to mastery, seems to be a leading principle in the traditional 
approach to artistic representation.  
 
I will now turn to the Kantian notion of parergon, in order to conceptualize the 
conventional role of the „play of art‟ as a supplement of the „central‟ and dominant 
notion of the „work of art‟ as ergon. The Derridean concept of the „logic of 
supplementarity‟ would, in turn, lead the way to overcome the hierarchical and 
dialectical relationship between ergon and parergon, work and play of art.  
 
“Dangerous supplement” PF12 
In the Western world, work and play constitute a binary opposition of two 
clearly separated realms, with the further possibilities of differentiation as 
active/passive, serious/non-serious, productive/unproductive, useful/useless, real/make-
believe, and so on. As discussed in previous chapters, the traditional („rational‟, 
Protestant, capitalist or post-industrial) relationship of these two terms is based on the 
dominance of work (also within the concept of play, i.e. ludus/paidia) and its authority 
as a central value. What is more, this relationship is clearly defined as „either/or‟. We 
either work or play. Play is the activity performed outside the working hours. 
According to Derrida, Western metaphysics has always been based on 
dichotomies: “speech/writing, life/death, father/son, master/servant, first/second, 
soul/body, inside/outside, good/evil, seriousness/play, day/night, etc” PF13FP. The dominant 
of the listed polarities has been automatically the first one, referring to “unity, identity, 
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immediacy and temporal and spatial presentness”PF14FP, and treated as pure, original, 
positive, necessary, essential and valuable. The second one, related to multiplicity, 
simulation, distance and absence, has been in turn regarded as negative, supplementary, 
excessive, less important, less valuable, and so on. This valuation, present in any 
theoretical discourse and everyday conversation, is very often subtle, intuitive or 
unintentional, but nonetheless it structures our metaphors, outlooks, attitudes and 
actions. 
To expose the traditional relationship between the opposite terms and the 
possibility of its deconstruction, Derrida employs the word “supplement”. The 
hierarchy is then visualised as a main body, essence, whole, versus an addition, extra, 
fragment or hors d‟oeuvre. For example in publishing, supplement comes after the main 
publication and is regarded as secondary, performing just a complementary role by 
updating or enhancing some aspects of the preceding text. Supplement comes to being 
only thanks to the existence of the first, original, and primary text and is incomplete 
when read as a separate entity. Derrida shows that this incompleteness belongs both, to 
the notion of the main text and its supplement. He analyses the nature of 
supplementation in his reading of Kant. PF
15
FP  
 
Kant, in his remark about the role of a picture‟s frame, a column, or a drapery 
on a statue, in Critique of Judgement, describes these elements as “ornaments [parerga], 
i.e. those things which do not belong to the complete representation of the object 
internally as elements but only externally as complements” PF16FP. Kant distinguishes the 
main body of the work (ergon) from the ornament enhancing and complementing its 
beauty – something external, supplementary – the parergon (in Greek: subordinate, 
beside the main subject). “The parergon, for Kant, becomes a category for relegating 
the marginal elements that complicate the categorical definition of a work. The 
parergon is the convenient limit to the ergon ...”.PF17FPAs Derrida states, “Kant makes clear, 
that which is not internal or intrinsic, as an integral part, to the total representation of 
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the object ... belongs to it only in an extrinsic way as a surplus, an addition, an adjunct, 
a supplement.”PF18FP   
Derrida, in his own analysis, does not follow the traditional questions: what is 
inside or what is outside the frame, and how is the inside different from the outside? He 
is rather concerned how the frame itself works. He examines the notion of parergon by 
posing the question whether it is possible to determine where the work of representation 
ends and parergon begins. Are they really separate, clearly different, „internal‟ and 
„external‟? If the work is completed why would it need an extra, a frame? Parergon 
implicates lack, something missing in the inside of the work. What constitutes parerga 
“is not simply their exteriority as a surplus, it is the internal structural link which rivets 
them to the lack in the interior of the ergon. And this lack would be constitutive of the 
very unity of the ergon.” PF19FP Parergon, as any supplement, is then essential to the 
constitution of the identity of the work of art, or any object or idea that is supplemented. 
This essentiality is also threatening, dangerous, because to some extent the supplement 
usurps the identity of the inside and exposes the fact that this identity is incomplete or 
non-existing at all without the supplement. The danger of the supplement lies in the fact 
that it destroys the stability even of the most basic concepts, reveals questions where we 
expected to find the answer, and bares the king (in fact already naked). It pushes us out 
of the safety of black and white into an unpredictable slide through the grey scale.   
In Derrida‟s reading, the hierarchy of ergon and parergon, and other pairs of 
binary oppositions, standing traditionally for the essence and surplus, becomes 
questioned and deconstructed. What was the centre, the ruling concept becomes 
dependent on the supplement, the mere addition, the hors d‟oeuvre. Furthermore, this 
logic opens up any structure that seemed to be completed. What is left, after the 
deconstruction of the traditional relationship of the two terms, is the third one, 
belonging neither to the inside nor to the outside in the old sense.   
In terms of work and play, in the Western traditional metaphysics, it is work that 
dominates play, and play performs a supplementary role, as a surplus energy, vicarious 
experience and so on. When we apply the logic of supplementarity we can no longer 
use the concepts of work and play as pure and separate. As all other binary oppositions 
they constitute each other, the lack of work evokes and defines the concept of play and 
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vice versa. Play is no longer a mere supplement but, like parergon, it has to be seen as 
belonging to the notion of work; essential to the constitution of its identity, being 
always present and absent, inside and outside, etc. Consequently, the „logic of 
supplementarity‟ enables the analysis of work (as ergon) and play within the concept of 
art, as interconnected and mutually dependant. After reading Derrida, art is neither 
„work‟ nor „play‟, but it exceeds the restricted meanings of these two terms. I will 
expand on this relationship later in this chapter. At this moment it is necessary to 
establish what I mean by „play‟ in this redefined framework. I will make use of the 
notion of parergon, however, again, from the Derridean perspective.    
 
Play as parergon 
When we conceptualize work as ergon, „proper function‟, perceived as 
belonging to or establishing „reality‟ (stable self-identification), the mechanism of 
binary oppositions immediately creates the negative form that can be filled by the 
concept of play. Single proper function is being contrasted with multiplicity of 
temporary activities, and single identity with double or multiple fluid identifications. 
Kant uses the term ergon in the sense: „work of art‟ and he juxtaposes it with parergon 
(ornament, frame, supplement). Although I approach the notion of ergon in a different 
way (as „proper function‟, task, activity), the relationship between Kantian artwork 
(ergon) and parergon as supplement can be compared to the connection between „work 
of art‟ as ergon (proper function) and „play of art‟ as parergon (playing with the proper 
function). This analogy can be traced in a twofold way. Firstly, parergon as ornament
20
FP 
connotes playful frivolity and excess, in relation to the functional and purposive ergon. 
Secondly, parergon as frame limits ergon and defines it identity (through the challenge, 
parody, experiment, subversion). However, as I mentioned in the previous chapter in 
the context of the sublime, “there is no limit which does not assume the existence of the 
unlimited.”PF21FP According to the logic of supplementarity, parergon as frame at once 
restricts ergon and works against its self-sufficiency, opens it for the intervention, 
makes it fluid. What is more, in Derrida, parergon is compared to passé-partout. This 
French word, used internationally in art supply stores means a cardboard frame that 
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works as a mounting for a picture, but also a key that secures entrance or exit 
everywhere. This double sense of passé-partout corresponds exactly with the 
characteristics of play which I want to highlight and explore here.    
In a sense, play acts as a conceptual frame for work, just as work frames the 
concept of play, and this rule applies to all binary oppositions, main bodies and 
supplements. However, more specifically, play acts as a frame bracketing „reality‟, as 
described in the first chapter. In fact play is a frame, it does not possess any content of 
its own. It changes the meaning of what it frames, because it makes it framed, isolated, 
bordered, extracted and doubled; labelled: this is play. Everything in play remains itself 
and becomes a representation of self or other. Passé-partout as a frame appoints a limit, 
a border. It fixes and locks inside or outside. However, by creating the double identity 
of what is framed, it also alludes to the second meaning – the master key, which allows 
the opening of all doors, enables mobility, change, and crossing the borders.    
Parergon, passé-partout and play all share the specific relation to borders. As 
Nicholas Royle writes about parergon in Derrida, parergon is – „the border or frame 
„being both beside the work (para+ergon) and part of the work‟.  
It is not simply a question of the border lines of the box or frame of a painting, say, but 
of borders of texts, institutions, and indeed nations and continents. ... „The crossing of 
borders‟, as Derrida notes in Aporias (1993), always assumes the „institution‟ of an 
„invisible line‟ (A11). „Customs, police, visa or passport, passenger identification‟, he 
declares, „all of that is established upon this institution‟. PF22FP  
Passé-partout in everyday life can be located in the institution of the passport, which 
allows the crossing of borders, but at the same time marks the frame of one‟s 
identification and obligation. The passport permits the individual to be inside and 
outside the „original‟ system; one can cross the borders physically, but emotionally, 
socially, politically, etc., one may not be able to get outside. To some extent one always 
remains „here‟ and „oneself‟, but passport allows experiencing „otherness‟ and being 
„there‟, as well. It also works the other way round – the experience of remaining within 
the borders is determined by the possibility of movement. When a person holds a 
passport, even if only on the bottom of the drawer, he or she can always potentially 
cross the border, get „outside‟, become somebody else, and begin the second life. The 
passport can then serve as a metaphor of possibility of movement, being inside and 
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outside, being one and the other at the same time. However, it also brings about the risk 
of the denial of access, if the passport is not the „right‟ one, not accepted due to political 
circumstances. Passé-partout and passport exemplify operations of play. It is play as 
stability and movement, change; being inside and outside, included and excluded, being 
present and absent. It is play that links the opposites.  
To analyse in more detail this specific characteristic of play, I turn again to 
Derrida and his text Plato‟s Pharmacy, rereading Pheadrus – Plato‟s dialogue on the 
mythical beginnings of writing. As I will discuss later in this chapter, the speech and 
writing opposition is described in Derrida as the root of all „centrisms‟ and hierarchical 
dichotomies in Western metaphysics. His reading of Plato‟s dialogue aims at 
overturning the traditional relationship between speech and writing, and exposes the 
role of writing (and any other kind of representation) as pharmakon and „undecidable‟. I 
will argue that the same role can be ascribed to play-parergon. 
 
Plato employs the Egyptian myth about the god Theuth – the inventor of 
writing, who presents his valuable invention to king Thamus. The king rejects this gift 
as dangerous and destructive for the society. According to him, it breaks the chain of 
masters and disciples, replaces “real” knowledge with just a “written trace”, and it is a 
pseudo-remedy against forgetting. Writing is presented as pharmakon, either cure or 
poison – a support for memory, but “substituting mere inscriptions, alien, arbitrary, 
lifeless signs – for the authentic living presence of spoken language.” PF23FP Plato uses the 
word pharmakon in two different meanings and it is the translation which decides what 
it stands for in a specific context. However, as Christopher Norris puts it: “two 
antithetical senses of this word are everywhere co-present in Plato‟s text, defeating all 
attempts to close one or another according to a context.” PF24FP Derrida argues that 
pharmakon cannot be „decided‟ (translated) as either cure or poison. Pharmakon is the 
example of what he names the „undecidable‟ – a term or concept that cannot be located 
on just one side of the binary opposition. In Plato, pharmakon is used in the context of 
„writing‟ and „hemlock‟ (the cause of Socrates death). According to Derrida, in both 
cases this word suggests undecidability, deconstruction of traditional dichotomies – in 
fact already present in Plato‟s text even if unnoticed by the philosopher himself, and 
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what is more, being contrary to his intention. PF
25
FP Writing-pharmakon acts therefore as a 
beneficial drug and a harmful philtre of forgetfulness; hemlock – as poison and a way 
toward salvation with cathartic power. PF
26
FP As Derrida writes: “The “essence” of the 
pharmakon lies in the way in which, having no stable essence, no “proper” 
characteristics, it is not, in any sense (metaphysical, physical, chemical, alchemical) of 
the word, a substance. The pharmakon has no ideal identity ....” PF27FP Pharmakon is neither 
positive nor negative, neither harmful nor beneficial. This lack of stable characteristics 
of the pharmakon, Derrida links with play (in his particular use of this term): 
If the pharmakon is “ambivalent”, it is because it constitutes the medium in which 
opposites are opposed, the movement and the play that links them among themselves, 
reverses them or makes one side cross over into the other (soul/body, good/evil, 
inside/outside, memory/forgetfulness, speech/writing, etc.). ... The pharmakon is the 
movement, the locus, and the play: (the production of) difference. PF28 
 
This is exactly the concept of play that I find appropriate to use in the context of art. 
Before I expand on this issue, I would like to look closer at the figure of the god Theuth 
who can be seen as embodiment of play. Derrida traces meticulously his multiple 
identities and bases his analysis on the assumption that the figure of Theuth was 
borrowed by Plato from Egyptian mythology where the analogous god can be found 
under the name Thoth – „moon deity with the head of an ibis, god of wisdom, learning, 
and the arts; scribe of the gods.‟ PF29FP Traditionally, Thoth resides on the side of moon, 
night, death, and writing, as opposed to sun, day, life and speech represented by his 
father Ammon-Ra. Derrida specifies his other functions as: doctor, pharmacist, 
magician, bookkeeper, god of writing, god of death PF
30
FP, and points out that Thoth plays 
contradictory roles in Egyptian mythology. For instance: the scribe, inventor of writing 
and tongue of Ra, translating his will into speech. 
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     5. Detail of the god Thoth, Book of the Dead of Hunefer,  
19th Dynasty 
 
 
... the figure of Thoth takes shape and takes its 
shape from the very thing it resists and substitutes for.  
But it thereby opposes itself, passes into its other, and 
this messenger-god is truly the god of the absolute 
passage between opposites. He is thus the father‟s 
other, the father and the subversive movement of 
replacement. ... He cannot be assigned a fixed spot in 
the play of differences. Sly, slippery and masked, an 
intriguer and a card, like Hermes, he is neither king nor 
jack, but rather a sort of joker, a wild card, one who 
puts play into play.PF31 
   Copyright image 
 
This description of Thoth can serve as a source of metaphors useful in my further 
analysis of play in modern and postmodern art. Thoth can be compared to the artist who 
applies play as a creative method – who slips between professional categories, tests 
various identities, provokes, transgresses the boundaries and initiates the play of art. 
However, more generally, the image of the joker illustrates the role of the element of 
play in any structure. „A wild card‟ can represent other cards in the deck and its identity 
is fluid, undecided between its own „non-identity‟ and the one it stands for. It is at once 
itself and the other. Additionally, in different games the joker plays different roles, can 
be neutral, beneficial or to be avoided; can be the highest trump, or be left outside the 
game. The joker can replace other cards but it does not belong to any suit. Like 
Thoth/Theuth, it is precisely inside and outside the system.   
Derrida attributes Thoth with a mask – a powerful symbol of performance, the 
temporary change of identity, mostly associated with carnival, ritual and theatre. The 
characteristics of mask repeat that of parergon, frame, passé-partout (in both 
meanings), and supplement. It belongs neither to the inside of its wearer nor to the 
external reality. It defines the new identity but it is only transitory, in the movement 
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between the „original‟, proper face, name, function, and the new adopted one. Mask 
locks its wearer inside the ephemeral frame, with the given code and rules of behaviour, 
but at the same time, by the fact of its own being, opens up endless possibilities of 
alternative „realities‟. It can be said that the particular (empirical) use of mask is 
limiting, but the transcendent mask, or the idea of mask, is the condition for movement, 
change, substitution – “the subversive movement of replacement” PF32FP. Masquerade or 
role-playing can be then viewed as similar concept to play, however more specific, 
being one of instances of play, and a good example of the dynamics of play. As Derrida 
writes, „Death, masks, makeup, all are part of the festival that subverts the order of the 
city, its smooth regulation by the dialectician and the science of being. PF
33
FP  
Here emerges yet another figure in the chain of pharmakon‟s embodiments: 
pharmakos – the scapegoat. Derrida supplements Plato‟s dialogue with this term, 
referring to the old rite of purification of the city from all evil, performed in Plato‟s 
time. Outcasts, degenerates, useless beings maintained at the public expense by 
Athenians in case of plague, drought, famine, and other disasters, through their death by 
burning, were „prescribed‟ as a remedy to the suffering city. PF34FP The pharmakos was 
therefore playing a double role – as an evil within the walls and a solution for its defeat, 
the dangerous supplement – able to corrupt the structure from within and to heal its 
weakness. Pharmakos is then another metaphor of play – the means of the positive and 
negative transformation, infection and curation, sin and salvation. It is also metaphor 
for play as the possibility of communal togetherness and exclusion. 
 
It can be observed, even from the above chain of play‟s identifications 
(supplement, parergon, passé-partout, passport, pharmakon, joker, mask and 
pharmakos), that it is difficult or in fact impossible to capture „the essence‟ of play. 
Like its symbolic figure – the god Thoth – play cannot be assigned a fixed spot, proper 
function, name, or purpose. The distinctive characteristic of play seems to be its 
„undecidability‟ – being: neither... nor..., but „in between‟ the opposite poles: here and 
there, real and make-believe, serious and non-serious, present and absent. Play being 
the locus and the movement (lock and key), deviation from the „proper function‟, one 
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stable „reality‟, meaning, purpose, reference, identity – nonetheless, uses it as a point of 
departure, the „inside‟ to be framed. Parergon as playing with ergon, remains 
connected with the stable and well-established principle in the given context, but also 
subverts and transgresses it.  
Play – as a movement between the detached or opposite elements, can then be 
seen as a condition for creation of metaphors, for the movement of thought (or hand) 
beyond the restricted paths. Play activates the possibility of seeing something „as 
something else‟ and what is more – the ability to act as if it is something else, and at the 
same time to be aware that it is not. In other words play enables the double or multiple 
identities or identifications, the double or multiple „realities‟ to be present and absent at 
the same time. This feature allows „brackets of fiction‟ to exist within whatever is 
designated as „reality‟. For that reason, in the broadest sense, I consider play as a 
condition for representation – language, writing, art, and the empirical activity of play, 
among others.   
In my view, this perspective situates the concept of play beyond the conflict of 
rational and prerational narratives. Play as an „undecidable‟ can be manifested as a 
subjective and controlled activity, but simultaneously enabling the states of immersion, 
improvisation, direct sensation as well as letting things go, uncertainty, indecision, 
incompetence and indeterminacy. However, these elements of the „heightened 
experience‟ and „anti-mastery‟ belong, in most cases, to the calculated strategy or tactic, 
so inevitably must be regarded within the representational frame. PF
35
FP Nonetheless, in my 
view, inscribing the concept of play (the „undecidable‟) as an internal element of the 
notion of representation makes the latter inclusive of the practices that contest the 
traditional ergon of art and use „experience‟ instead of, or together with, the traditional 
artistic means and materials. Play as a trigger for representation implies that there is no 
need to go beyond representation in art, but also that it is not possible. 
In order to point out why play, nevertheless, has been interpreted and used as a 
non-representational tool, and to explain further the utopian character of such projects, I 
will now discuss Derrida‟s analysis of deep-rooted prejudice against representation in 
Western thought and his analysis of speech/writing opposition as fundamental for the 
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context of the „tactic of play‟ and artist as a game master. 
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„metaphysics of presence‟. This section will also help me to introduce the redefined 
relationship between ergon and parergon – work and play of art. 
 
Some problems with representation  
The art of representation is therefore a long way removed from truth, and it is able to 
reproduce everything because it has little grasp of anything, and that little is a mere 
phenomenal appearance. For example, a painter can paint a portrait of a shoemaker or 
any other craftsman without understanding any of their crafts; yet, if he is skilful 
enough, his portrait of a carpenter may, at a distance, deceive children or simple people 
into thinking it is a real carpenter. PF36 
Plato sees artistic representation as the imitation of things we deal with in our life 
(which are already copies or shadows), with no access to the world of ideas or the world 
of origins, the truth. Therefore it is only an imitation of appearance. Plato ranks 
imitation as lower than narration, which is recounting events in the „first‟ person and 
comes from personal experience. In this tradition, the classification and hierarchy of art 
forms is dependent on the closeness of a given practice to the truth, the essence, the 
original experience, the real existence of things, etc. There continues a quest to discover 
the form of representation that would be the closest to reality as essence, not just a 
„mere‟ appearance or interpretation (e.g. role-playing, „becoming‟ the shoemaker 
instead of contemplating his portrait). 
Derrida, in his analysis of Plato and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, deconstructs the 
conventional primacy of the „origin‟ over the representation, with the example of 
speech and writing. For Rousseau, the essence, truth and authenticity are located on the 
side of „nature‟, which, across his whole oeuvre, is presented as opposed to culture – 
false, modern and degenerate. Writing, according to Rousseau (like to Plato in 
Phaedrus) exemplifies the detachment from nature, from what is good and original: 
„Writing, which would seem to crystallize language, is precisely what alters it. It 
changes not the words but the spirit, substituting exactitude for expressiveness.‟PF37FP 
Writing substitutes a living presence, which is not always perfect, but reliable, with a 
calculated pretence. The danger of this supplementation for Rousseau lies in disastrous 
effects for society. Christopher Norris describes Rousseau‟s argument as follows:   
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On the one hand are ranged the positive values: speech, self-presence, origins, nature, 
and the virtues of a small-scale „organic‟ community where writing would not yet have 
worked its effects. On the other can be found those bad concomitants of modern mass-
society: writing, inequality, structures of power, the impossibility of people simply 
coming together to talk out their differences in a communal forum. PF38 
 
The question that can be derived from Rousseau – how to avoid representation 
as a cultural “artifice” – seems to be crucial for many practices in the history of art, and 
in 20P
th
P century art in particular. How to come closer to „being‟, to the world as we 
experience it, the truth? How to escape pretence, simulation, frame, and authority 
inherent to art? Art (writing) as a medium of communication acts as a necessary evil, a 
pharmakon. And although not all representation is art, all art is representation (as under 
the operation of play-parergon). However, paradoxically, the activity of play 
(interpreted in the prerational way) has become an attractive model in the quest for life-
like art. The prerational narratives stress that play occurs only through its players – it is 
inseparable from the immediate experience. This is why it fits well within the rhetorics 
of presence and origin. It is an activity, doing, being, acting, performing, here and now, 
in the given place and moment of time. In contrast to the traditional image of 
representation in art, play, as an ephemeral living presence, seems to be instinctive, 
expressive and innocent. What is more, play acts as a democratic „communal forum‟ 
where people can „come together‟ and act collectively and spontaneously against the 
dominant official structure that tends to represent them in a distorted, ideological way.PF
39
FP  
However, Rousseau‟s reflections on his own practice of writing reveal the 
ambivalence of his argument, and the inherent paradox, or what Derrida names „the 
logic of supplementarity‟. In Confessions (1782) Rousseau admits that writing down his 
memories is a way to reveal the true nature of his feelings and reflections, impossible 
for him to utter in the presence of other people. In Of Grammatology (1976) Derrida 
quotes Rousseau confessing:  
I would love society like others, if I were not sure in showing myself not only in 
disadvantage, but as completely different from what I am. The part that I have taken of 
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writing and hiding myself is precisely the one that suits me. If I were present, one 
would never know what I was worth. PF40 
Therefore, to some degree, speech as an ephemeral phenomenon depends on external 
conditions – favourable or deterring – and can never present the truth in an ultimate, 
objective way, but must depend on writing to perform this task. A written form can be 
filled with meaning the speaker was unable to express in a given moment. What is 
more, speech reveals its detachment from the thought, so, according to Derrida, it is 
itself a form of representation and „writing‟. The idea which is seen as “the source”, 
“the origin”, “the essence” always already contains the “derivative” one, and its 
primacy as the original becomes problematic.  
 
Derrida‟s readings of Plato and Rousseau show that in Western thought there 
exists a very powerful tradition based on the „myth of origin‟ or the „metaphysics of 
presence‟ – the preference of what is natural, authentic, pure and original over any form 
of mediation, imitation, representation, and over anything that „comes after‟ the „origin‟ 
– culture, civilisation, technology, art, and so on. This praised natural state exists in 
some timeless past, and as Derrida shows, it indeed belongs to myth, since every closer 
analysis of such a perspective reveals that every human act, including thought and 
speech, is already a form of representation. “The belief that Derrida prefers writing over 
speech is mistaken. He is suspicious only of the idealization of speech because it 
involves a phantom promise of the natural, the pure, the original.”PF41FP Derrida does not 
deny that “there exists a world „out there‟, or that language can engage with that world 
in a variety of practical ways.” PF42FP He just points out that we must pay attention to “the 
problems involved in arriving at “the real” through our representation of it”. PF43FP We must 
be aware, therefore, that most theories of art try to establish one form of representation 
as more „natural‟ than the other – claiming that speech is more natural and therefore 
better than writing, music more natural than painting, participatory art better than 
traditional media, and so on. When we apply the Derridean perspective, „play of art‟ 
must be seen as equally representational as a traditional „work of art‟. In my view, also 
on a philosophical level, the work of art as ergon, and the redefined notion of play as 
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parergon („undecidable‟), must be seen as equally important and mutually dependant 
elements of the concept of art and artistic representation.    
 
Synergy of ergon and parergon: work and play of art 
“Parergon is what the principal subject must not become”.PF44FP The traditional 
relationship between ergon and parergon in other words can be (sticking to the 
common etymology), described as – allergic – in which the origin, the essence, guards 
its identity against “the dangerous supplement”, the harmful agent. What I propose is to 
look at this relationship as a possibility or even a necessity of synergy. Synergy is a 
word derived from Greek sun-ergos "working together". In this kind of relationship two 
agents interact in such a way that the result is greater than the sum of the effects of the 
individuals involved in the interaction. This is how, in my view, the third concept – art, 
as synergy of ergon and parergon – emerges. This process is analogous to the 
Derridean deconstruction of writing as no longer subordinated to speech, but still 
engaged with it in a productive relation.  
Third term: ... „writing‟, as Derrida employs the word here, is not just synonymous with 
written or printed marks on a page. Nor it is opposed to a real world existing outside or 
beyond the text, at least in the sense that one might draw a clear demarcation between 
the two realms. This is what Derrida terms arche-writing, that which exceeds traditional 
(restricted) sense of the word in order to release all those hitherto repressed 
significations which have always haunted the discourse of logocentric reason. PF45FP  
Art as synergy of ergon and parergon is not synonymous with the detached painting 
hanging on a wall and „representing‟ the person or a situation in their absence. Neither 
is it synonymous with this situation or experience. It is neither pure presence nor 
absence. It is experiential and symbolic, meaningless and meaningful, a display of 
mastery and play of chance, and so on. Art is always purposive and an artist has a 
purpose – to produce/evoke an object/experience of art. At the same time the artist has 
to feel free to follow fluid multiple directions, change his or her mind, wander, get lost, 
let things go, experiment and so on. The „undecidability‟, synergy, and the constant 
tension between ergon and parergon permeate various levels of the actual activity and 
concept of art.    
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The material value of art, as Boris Groys has it, forces the public to respect the 
artwork, even if it is not particularly liked. PF
46
FP On the other hand: “The binding value of 
art can thus be sought only in non-commercial practice”. PF47FP An art object must therefore 
act as a commodity that can be bought, sold or exchanged but at the same time it has to 
contain the possibility of becoming priceless, being outside the system of everyday 
commerce, or having no commercial value at all. The situation of synergy in this 
context can be described as an „interstice‟, after Nicholas Bourriaud, who borrows this 
term from Marx:  
Over and above its mercantile nature and its semantic value, the work of art represents a 
social interstice. This interstice term was used by Karl Marx to describe trading 
communities that elude the capitalist economic context by being removed from the law 
of profit: barter, merchandising, autarkic types of production, etc. PF48 
In terms of ethics, in the Western world, moral values are closely related to 
every human „function‟ properly performed in private and professional life. In the 
Protestant and capitalist tradition, play acts as a dangerous distraction from the proper 
and moral path. The synergy of work and play in art makes it possible to go beyond the 
unquestionable unity of the dominant ethical, social and political system, challenge it 
and protect it from dogmatism. However, play should not be treated instrumentally, as a 
safety valve or a carnival mask, tamed and supervised, ready to keep the social life in 
balance. Play as the „undecidable‟, pharmakon and parergon is unpredictable and not 
innocent, with the power to transform the social realm, and undermine the decorum of 
any situation from within. Consequently, art as a synergy of ergon and parergon 
remains sensitive to the ethical values of the given society, neither subordinated nor 
detached.  
Political values are also ascribed to art on the grounds of the work or play 
identification. The traditional „work‟ of art, with the bounding authority of the artist‟s 
intention, his or her position as a „creator‟ of the fixed microworld of forms and ideas, 
dictates to the viewers its own proper interpretation. The „work‟ of art is then a form of 
dictatorship, with the dominant voice of the artist. The most vulgar forms of such a 
dictatorship take place when art serves the particular political system, is a job done 
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according to a non-questionable routine (i.e. Socialist Realism). On the other side of the 
dichotomy of work/play, play, is seen as a sign of democracy – it allows freedom, 
change, rebellion, common negotiation of rules. However, considering play as a 
guarantee of democracy in art is problematic. In art „as play‟, viewers can be suspicious 
that play is applied as the populist strategy trying to manipulate them into some ideas or 
values.  Panem et Circenses – „Bread and Games‟: this ancient Roman phrase implying 
the choice of food and fun over freedom, independent views and actions, shows that 
games have been always entangled with politics. However, such a play or game can be 
treated as a form of work, only in the disguise of entertainment. Play cannot serve 
external rules; it exists between the „realities‟, including political systems and 
regulations. Therefore, art cannot be decided as either a tool of democracy or 
dictatorship. However it is also never totally independent from the political reality. 
Again, art has to be both: work (responding to the rules of a given political system) and 
play (experimenting with and testing different outlooks).  
 
Work and play, ergon and parergon, shape the practice, experience and 
reception of art. Art is always a synergy of its two agents. However, different 
interpretations of this relationship, decisions made during history, were in most cases 
promoting just one of the concepts. In order to establish the stable essence, art was 
proclaimed to be work – techne, or play – celebration, work – production, or play – 
self-actualization, work – entrepreneurship, or play – entertainment. Art‟s essence is 
impossible to pin down, precisely because it has none. Whatever aspect we analyse, we 
always find ourselves in between oppositions, on a ground of „undecidability‟. Whether 
it is the problem of creativity (or repetition), freedom (or limits), instinct (or reason), 
chance (or calculation), spontaneity (or self-awareness), there exist only interpretations 
and individual or group decisions, but there is no single right choice. From the 
perspective of the ergon and parergon relationship as the possibility of the idea of art, 
the question about art‟s essence or even appearance is no longer useful. There is no 
essence as there is no one appearance; there are only decisions made during the long 
history of art, but they cannot serve as arguments to „define‟ art, they just try to 
establish a version that makes sense in a given context. It is like translating the word 
pharmakon, which Christopher Norris describes as:   
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... governed by the ideal of the adequate transfer of sense between languages, a transfer 
that respects the priority of the signified (the meaning itself) over the mere written signs 
that necessarily serve to communicate its presence. So when translators tend to reduce 
the pharmakon to one or other of its violently disjunctive senses, what is in question is 
not just a localized example of semantic insensitivity, but a need to ignore the 
problematical effects of a writing that nonetheless resist such reduction. 
Reducing art to ergon or parergon is then a kind of escape from the disturbing 
uncertainty and a way to use art as a safe concept serving specific needs.  Also, the 
problem of locating it on just one side belongs mainly to theoretical discourse, or to any 
attempt to communicate what art is, to formulate its principles or procedures. In effect, 
all revolutionary approaches to, and strategies of art „as something‟ inevitably highlight 
the aspects that have already belonged to it. Rebel against art of the past is like healing 
the illness with a homeopathic pill which contains the pathogenic substance. I do not 
mean that progress or change in the state of the arts is impossible or it does not occur, 
but „pushing the boundaries of art‟ can be rather seen as an exploration of the unknown 
land. If we adopt this perspective we can say that generations of artists add to the 
knowledge of what art might be (as already encoded in its non-identity), instead of 
extending its scope beyond the „original‟ meaning. The theories of „the end of art‟ turn 
out to describe the „final discovery‟, ultimate unveiling the bigger picture. However, 
since each epoch sees its achievement as the final word, we cannot be sure if this is 
really „the end‟. Maybe we need to ask whether the end is possible at all; whether art is 
not the endless deconstruction of its own sense (or non-sense)? 
 
Conclusion 
 The purpose of this chapter was to overcome the reduction of the concept of 
play to be either work-like rational activity or the prerational manifestation of the 
unmediated power beyond subjective control. In the context of art, my intention was to 
go beyond the opposition of the rational and prerational concepts of play, but also 
beyond the more basic dichotomy of work and play.  
I argued that the traditional notion of representation is structured by the concept 
of work, and specifically, work as a philosophical principle of ergon – „proper function‟ 
of humans, objects and activities. As introduced in Plato and Aristotle, ergon entails 
connotations with hierarchy, order, permanence, structure, control, stable identity and 
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purposefulness. Artistic work as ergon is aimed at achieving goals determined in 
advance and the use of skills and tools belonging to the traditional toolkit of a trained 
professional artist. It is the highest manifestation of homo faber, a self-conscious 
producer, who shapes the human-made world as representation or transformation of the 
natural world. The artistic work as ergon subordinates itself to moral rules, social 
conventions and tradition. If it introduces changes it is a matter of gradual evolution 
rather than revolution.  
In the Western world (from Plato, through Christian, Protestant and capitalist 
traditions) this notion of („rational‟) work dominates the („prerational‟) sensuous, 
frivolous and non-serious play. Work is central value and play merely marginal. In 
order to illustrate this relationship between work and play in the context of art, I 
referred to Derrida‟s analysis of Kant‟s differentiation between ergon – the body of the 
work of art (painting, sculpture), and parergon – ornament, addition (drapery, frame, 
colonnade). Derrida analyses parergon as a supplement, and he argues that the 
relationship between ergon and parergon (as well as between all metaphysical 
dichotomies, e.g. speech/writing, inside/outside, seriousness/play) is governed by the 
„logic of supplementarity‟. This means that the dominant, first, term is supplemented by 
the second, due to its own internal lack – it needs the supplement to be completed. 
Derrida‟s approach deconstructs the traditional hierarchy – parergon becomes a 
„dangerous supplement‟ because it undermines authority and domination of ergon. 
Applying this perspective to art enables us to see work (as ergon) and play within the 
concept of art as mutually dependant and of equal rank.  
The notion of parergon helped me also to establish the function of play in this 
redefined framework. Play, like parergon, can be considered as „ornament‟, excess, as 
well as frame, limit of the work of art (ergon). Parergon in my use means „playing with 
ergon‟ – it is related to ergon, but in an „unlimited‟ way (as a challenge, mock, 
transgression, subversion, etc.). In order to make the ambivalent character of play-
parergon explicit, I analysed it with the use of various metaphors – passé-partout, 
passport, pharmakon, and pharmakos. I wanted to show that play must be considered as 
the Derridean „undecidable‟ – in which oppositions are produced and are coexistent not 
opposed. Play-parergon cannot be „decided‟ as either... or..., but it operates „in 
between‟ the opposite poles. It is both lock and key, locus and movement, here and 
there, I and the other, real and make-believe, serious and non-serious, present and 
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absent, etc. Like pharmakon (cure and poison), play cannot be reduced to just one 
meaning, one interpretation according to the given rhetoric. It is prerational and 
rational; it does not have a stable identity or a proper function. As I argued, this ability 
to move in between the opposites, makes play an agent enabling the creation of 
metaphors, and representation – something „as something else‟. 
However, as I will demonstrate in the following chapters, modern and 
postmodern artists most often have used play to go beyond representation. According to 
Derrida, the reluctance towards representation (and in consequence the quest for the 
life-like art) has its roots in Western metaphysics. The powerful and long-established 
„metaphysics of presence‟ advances what is natural, authentic, pure and original over 
anything that „comes after‟ the „origin‟ – culture, civilisation, technology and art. 
Nonetheless, the logic of supplementarity shows that „the origin‟, as experienced and 
communicated by humans, always already contains the „derivative‟ element. What 
Derrida points out, is that we cannot reach the „unmediated‟ original state through our 
representation of it – no matter how „natural‟ it seems. What is more, the „origin‟, as 
always contaminated by representation, must be regarded as a myth. „Play of art‟ (both 
the philosophical principle and a creative method based on the activity of play) must be 
seen as equally representational as traditional „work of art‟ (ergon). Moreover, in my 
view, these two „poles‟ of the concept of art and artistic representation are inseparable; 
they inform and transform each other. 
 In order to overcome the metaphysical dichotomies structuring the concept of 
art („a mere phenomenal appearance long way removed from truth‟), I proposed to look 
at work and play, ergon and parergon, as indispensable and equal elements. Instead of 
the traditional allergy between the opposite terms, I suggested the view of art as a 
conceptual and performative synergy (working/playing together). Art must be then seen 
as neither work nor play, but something else, a third term, surpassing the sum of the 
effects of work and play. It is purposeless and purposive, creative and repetitive, free 
and limited, instinctive and calculated, and so on. Nevertheless, the actual theory and 
practice of art always favours one element at the expense of another. Still, the 
undecidability, synergy, and the constant tension between ergon and parergon structure 
approaches to the concept of art and its various uses and interpretations. 
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In the next chapter I will introduce play as a „strategy‟ employed by Western 
artists at the beginning of the 20 P
th
P century, in their pursuit of life-like, expressive and 
truthful art. The reason of the choice of play as a remedy for art‟s artificiality is 
connected with the prerational rhetorics shaping the image of play as unmediated 
manifestation of Being. The artists were inspired by the performative character of play 
– seemingly being more of a „presentation‟ of things than representation, or at least 
being „representation embodied‟, lived and present.  
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Chapter 4 
Strategy of play: modern „remedy‟ for representation 
 
Introduction  
In the previous chapter I established my approach to the notions of work and 
play within the concept of art, as ergon (proper function and stable identity) and 
parergon („playing with ergon‟, possibility of movement, being in-between). I proposed 
to see these two agents as interconnected in a creative synergy constituting the idea and 
practice of art. I argued that play as parergon – the Derridean „undecidable‟ 
transgresses the regime of binary oppositions and must be regarded as both „rational‟ 
and „prerational‟. In effect it must be also seen as both, the immediate experience, and a 
frame – a condition for this experience „as something else‟, as representation. This 
approach to play will serve as a point of reference for the analysis of particular 
„decisions‟, in the history of 20 Pth P and 21 Pst P century art; what play is and how it can be 
used in artistic practice. 
In this chapter I will discuss the conceptual background of the emergence of 
play (in most cases interpreted as „prerational‟) as a creative tool in modern art. I will 
specifically analyse the rhetorics of primitivism – the trend in modern avant-gardes 
positioned against the traditional notion of representation, and deeply rooted within the 
„metaphysics of presence‟, and prerational narratives in general. I refer to „primitivism‟ 
as a popular creative attitude at the beginning of the last century that inspired formal 
experiments and conceptual journeys exceeding methods belonging to the traditional 
toolbox of the „professional‟ artist. I am aware that the notion of primitivism has caused 
controversy. From the contemporary perspective the term „primitive‟ together with the 
whole range of accompanying assumptions is viewed as patronizing, ignorant, racist 
and ethnocentric. However, it is not in the scope of this research to take part in the 
discussion about the implications of the use of this term and its history in Western art 
and culture.PF
1
FP I use „primitivism‟ as an art-historical term, describing Western artists‟ 
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interest with, and reaction to, the art of so called „primitive‟ people. Primitivism 
inspired various further paths and researches, often quite detached from the initial 
fascination with African sculpture or children‟s drawings. In this chapter I will identify 
and analyse the narratives of primitivism, which I name the „myth of origin‟ and the 
„myth of presence‟, as well as the artist‟s interest with performative methods and the 
issue of „Otherness‟, as catalysts for both, the growing interest in play, and the search 
for non-art or non-representation.  
The main purpose of this chapter, however, is to introduce modern „strategy of 
play‟ as inscribed within the primitivist outlooks. In contrast to play-parergon – the 
„internal‟ or philosophical condition for representation and art‟s existence – play as a 
„strategy‟ can be seen as an „external‟ medication prescribed by the artists to the 
creation process to evoke certain effects. The artists undertook their experiments in 
order to oppose the rational, conventional, ergon-like notion of art, and the artwork as a 
detached artefact or commodity. I will show that the artists turned to the ideas and 
activities perceived as marginal, with the intention to revolutionize and modernize art 
and social life. As I will argue, („prerational‟) play, together with the spheres of 
„Otherness‟ like „primitive‟ culture, childhood, mental illness, and the unconscious, was 
located „outside‟ the traditional well-established identity of the Western artist and 
interpreted as external or merely supplementary to creative process in the traditional 
sense. This is why the artists extensively explored these areas as possible sources of 
fresh and unconventional solutions. As I will argue in the following chapters, modern 
strategy of play has contributed to the gradual transformation of Western approach to 
representation and to the functions of art, artists and viewers. Application of the 
„strategy of play‟ helped rediscovering or highlighting the parergon aspect of art.  
This chapter will serve, therefore, to establish the conceptual background of 20 P
th
P 
century artists‟ interpretation and use of play in their practices. However, the strategy of 
play goes beyond the first avant-garde interest in savage art and the formal inspirations 
that can be found in modern painting and sculpture. I present this strategy as a creative 
multilayered attitude that emerged from the primitivist outlooks, but found its 
manifestations in the experimental practices that I will analyse in the next chapter.    
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Modern avant-gardes   
The „primitivist‟ attitude that inspired experiments with play must be seen as a 
part of a bigger movement, namely of the modern avant-gardes, with the set of key 
questions like: How to overthrow the artistic status quo and tradition, and “infuse new 
life into art” PF2FP? How to contribute to progress? How to get closer to the authentic 
experience? How to provoke the viewers to react, to be active and engaged? These 
questions outline the working definition of modern art I refer to in this text. I am not 
going to present a whole range of different points of view and perspectives dealing with 
the description of modernism. Neither, will I focus on the exact time brackets, art styles 
and currents. PF
3
FP For my research, the most useful is to mark out the modern 
understanding of what the „proper function‟ of art should be.   
I find the phrase „the Age of Manifestos‟ PF4FP the most appropriate to capture the 
crucial features of modern art in this respect. Modern artists were no longer just making 
art – producing art objects. They were actively engaged in explaining, defining and 
theorizing their practice in order to demonstrate its specific, unique and revolutionary 
features. In many cases they collaborated with writers, poets and critics who published 
texts about their art. A manifesto of any type became a theoretical introduction and 
artistic statement, necessary to explain the artist‟s intentions to the audience not 
prepared to appreciate new forms of art. A manifesto in a wider sense means narration 
that accompanies the creative process and legitimizes it – “it is a document of an 
ideology, crafted to convince and convert” PF5FP. It is a presentation of the worldview – 
context of why and how – which sometimes becomes more important than what. 
Manifesto shifts the focus from the final product – the artefact – to the processes of its 
making, or more precisely of its becoming, and its desirable operation in the social 
realm. It supplements the artwork with a set of information that turns out to be 
indispensable to understand, appreciate and fully enjoy or detest the aesthetic 
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experience and what is also important – to be able to participate in, and actively 
contribute to the discussion about it. 
A manifesto can be then described as a meta-narration or meta-communication 
about the artistic process, saying: “this is art, because...”, and also often: “this is the 
only right way to make art”. To some extent the artwork itself is always open-ended and 
can evoke different interpretations. Manifesto indicates precisely ergon the artists find 
to be central to their definition of art. Manifesto‟s operation is therefore somehow 
paradoxical. It brings attention to the „new‟ processes – traditionally marginal to the 
„work‟ of art – so it exposes the parergon, but at this very moment it fixes it, defines, 
uses it to build a new dichotomy, and in effect creates a new ergon, a new proper 
function of art. The following are several excerpts from manifestos or programmes of 
different modern groups written in different times, which illustrate the revolutionary 
agenda of modern avant-gardes. I highlight with bold print some of the „new central 
values‟ proposed by the artists.  
 
As youth, we carry the future and want to create for ourselves freedom of life and of 
movement against long-established older forces. Everyone who reproduces that which 
drives him to creation with directness and authenticity belongs to us. PF6 
E. L. Kirchner, The Brücke, 1906 
 
And so Dada was born of a need for independence, of a distrust toward unity. Those 
who are with us preserve their freedom. We recognize no theory. We have enough 
cubist and futurist academies: laboratories of formal ideas.  
...  
abolition of logic, ...: Dada; abolition of memory: Dada; abolition of archaeology: 
Dada; abolition of prophets: Dada; abolition of the future: Dada; ... elegant and 
unprejudiced leap from a harmony to the other sphere ... Freedom: Dada, Dada, Dada, a 
roaring of tense colours, and interlacing of opposites and of all contradictions, 
grotesques, inconsistencies: Life. PF7 
T. Tzara, Dadists, 1918 
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I. CIVILISATION, CULTURE, WITH THEIR ILLNESSES – TO THE TRASH. 
we choose simplicity ordinariness, happiness health, triviality, laughter.  
from laughter the spirit fattens and grows strong stout calves. ... 
X. we praise understanding and therefore throw out logic, that limitation and cowardice 
of the mind. Nonsense is wonderful by virtue of its untranslatable content... PF8 
S. Przybyszewski, Polish „Primitivists‟, 1920 
 
Dictated by thought, in the absence of any control exercised by reason, exempt from 
any aesthetic or moral concern. 
... Surrealism is based on belief in the superior reality of certain forms of previously 
neglected associations, in the omnipresence of dream, in the disinterested play of 
thought.PF9 
A. Breton, Surrealists, 1924 
 
The new attitude that is being formed as a result of these searches is concerned with the 
invention of objects affecting man psychologically by means of physical phenomena. It 
is a new form of magic. The artist no longer feels that he is „representing reality‟, he is 
actually making reality. Direct sensual experience is more real than living in the midst 
of symbols, slogans, worn out plots, clichés – more real than political-oratorical art. PF10 
I. Lassaw, American Abstract Artists Group, 1938 
 
The new art takes its elements from nature. ... 
We demand art that is free of all aesthetic artifice. ... 
We will draw closer to nature than ever before in the history of art. PF11 
L. Fontana, 1946 
 
Promote a revolutionary flood and tide in art. Promote living art, anti-art, promote 
non art reality to be grasped by all peoples, not only critics, dilettantes and 
professionals. PF12 
G. Maciunas, Fluxus, 1963 
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With time the „manifesto‟ as such has transformed into artists‟ texts, statements 
and declarations printed on different occasions. What they have in common, and what 
to a large degree is a modern invention, is their public character, even if the style is 
informal, provocative or poetic. They are not simply private notes in the artists‟ diaries; 
they are meant to supplement the artworks, bring into light the processes, theories, 
intentions, outlooks, experiments, researches – all those elements of artistic processes 
that Picasso called the “unpaintable”. PF13FP The second common feature of the above 
manifestos is the use of binary oppositions. All authors contrast old (wrong), a status 
quo, which they consider as traditional and widely accepted, with the new (right), a 
domain regarded by them as suppressed, and unjustly marginal (in bold). The main 
function of all those texts is to call for the overturn of the long-established hierarchy.  
This characteristic of modern art is closely connected with the operation of 
traditional metaphysics which locates certain values as central and essential. Modern art 
can therefore be described as ruled by „centrisms‟, ideas regarded as dominant, right 
and positive in a given historical moment. In general, „new‟ central values, even though 
different in different movements, were located in the notions of progress, change, 
novelty, originality and revolution. As I mentioned in chapter 2, in modern art these 
values emerged from the rebellious attitude towards the tradition of Enlightenment, 
hierarchy and rules of the Western civilisation, and post-Kantian „aesthetics of 
autonomy‟, with the dominant proper function of art as a self-conscious production of 
aesthetic objects detached from the „authentic‟ experience.  
Summing up, the most significant feature of modern art, from the perspective of 
my thesis, is the artists‟ growing self-consciousness of their positions, processes and 
goals as different from what they regarded as traditionally proper, and the intention to 
include the whole context into the „work‟ of art – directly, or indirectly in the form of 
the supplementary theory. Theoretical discourse on art was not a modern invention, but 
in the 20 P
th
P century the theoretical or the conceptual aspects have come to be regarded as 
central in „visual‟ arts. The act of writing and also often performing a manifesto 
indicates a shift in the approach to the creative process. A modern artist became a 
researcher, philosopher, politician, performer, critic, curator, and all these roles were 
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not just supplementary, but often equally important as being a maker. New roles of the 
artist were closely linked to new subjects, ideas and values proclaimed to be 
fundamental, not just for the artists, but for the whole society and human relations. The 
„new‟ essentials of art were coming from the spheres concerned as marginal and 
neglected, including: dreams, visions, mental dysfunction, chance, play, games, group 
activities, non-professional or „primitive‟ creation, and everyday life. These particular 
realms became integral to what can be identified as the tendency of primitivism – the 
search for the means that would “draw closer to nature [origin/essence/ 
truth/reality/experience] than ever before in the history of art.” PF14FP   
 
Primitivism  
According to Oxford Dictionary of 20th-Century Art, primitivism is a:  
term employed in the context of 20th century art to refer to the use of Western artists of 
forms or imagery derived from the art of so-called primitive peoples, or more broadly 
to describe an approach in which the artist seeks to express or celebrate elemental 
forces by using unconventional procedures or techniques that bypass the methods 
normally associated with the trained painter or sculptor PF15FP.  
Primitivism can be then seen as an approach to creative practice open for 
experimentation and exploration of the exotic territories, which are often perceived as 
„non-professional‟ or simply marginal to the values represented by traditional Western 
art with its requirements for training, knowledge and skills vocation proper. The interest 
in the „primitive‟ is a catalyst for art‟s deprofessionalisation. Also, the primitivist 
„experiment‟ is being undertaken in search for “more fundamental modes of thinking 
and seeing”PF16FP, and for the means to represent those fundamental modes in a way as 
close to the original experience as possible.  
The „primitive‟ – African tribe members, Tahitian fishermen, peasants in 
Brittany, folk or naïve artists, the insane and the child – were regarded by modern 
artists as unspoiled by history, culture and civilization and therefore “living closer to the 
elementary aspects of human existence” PF17FP. The artworks produced by „primitives‟ were 
for the modernists the manifestation of primary vision: seeing the world as for the first 
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time, unconsciously and with wonder. Due to the nature/culture hierarchical opposition, 
the „primitives‟‟ creative powers were regarded as superior to those of the professional 
artist. This view can be well exemplified by the exclamation by August Macke: “Are 
not children more creative in drawing directly from the secret of their sensation than the 
imitator of Greek forms? Are not savage artists who have forms of their own powerful 
as the form of thunder?”PF18FP  
Modern artists, depending on the perspective represented, were inspired by 
different aspects of „primitive‟ art. Although most of them praised its raw and „natural‟ 
qualities, simplicity and spontaneity, the actual works produced out of this inspiration 
were formally distant from one another, ranging from symbolism to geometric 
abstraction. 
For the Expressionist painter and printmaker Emil Nolde, the main quality of 
primitive art was its sensuality and vitality:   
The products of primitive peoples are created with actual material in their hands, 
between their fingers. Their motivation is their pleasure and love of creating. The 
primal vitality, the intensive, often grotesque expression of energy and life in most 
elemental form – that, perhaps, is what makes these native works so enjoyable. PF19FP   
The pioneer of abstract art, Wassily Kandinsky was also fascinated with the anti-
intellectual, anti-analytical features of „primitive‟ art. However, in the absence of 
rationality, instead of the sensual, he was looking for the spiritual element in the 
primitive-inspired art. In the book On the Spiritual in Art (1911) he suggests that even 
customary objects can make a spiritual impression when we encounter them for the first 
time. According to Kandinsky, “this is how the child perceives the world”PF20FP. In his 
drawings and paintings, the artist was trying to preserve this fresh first impression or 
resonance of things and to develop the outer form that would be able to reflect the inner 
and essential feelings, the „inner sound‟, as it exists in children‟s drawings. In his view, 
„primitives‟ as well as modern artists, “sought to express in their work only internal 
truths, renouncing in consequence all consideration of external forms” PF21FP. Robert 
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Goldwater (Primitivism in Modern Art, 1938), points out “a kind of symbolic animism” 
in Kandinsky‟s as well as Paul Klee‟s approach, which he describes as “an attribution 
of independent life and activity to the forms of the canvas themselves.” PF22FP  
 
          
            Copyright image 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Paul Klee, Death and Fire, 1940 
 
 Primitivism also found its manifestation in geometric abstraction, with its 
search for pure, simple and universal form. For Kasimir Malevich “the suprematist 
square and the forms proceeding out of it can be linked to the primitive marks 
(symbols) of aboriginal man which represented, in their combinations, not ornament but 
a feeling of rhythm” PF23FP. 
Dadaists believed that a true work of art belongs to nature and its “organic processes 
of becoming” PF24FP. The Zurich group‟s representatives were looking for the inspiration in 
tribal art, as an artistic expression closest to nature, to oppose Western culture and 
civilisation. This is how Hans Arp describes his work and his use of non-traditional 
materials and methods:  
Instead of cutting the paper, I tore it up with my hands, I made use of objects I found on 
the beach, and I composed natural collages and reliefs. I thus acted like the Oceanians, 
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who never worry about the permanence of their materials when making masks, and use 
perishable materials like sea shells, blood, and feathers. PF25 
Dadaists also explored chance as a manifestation of natural powers ruling the universe – 
“the voice of the „Unknown‟” PF26FP. As Hans Richter recounts, the experiments with 
chance as a “mysterious collaborator” of the artist made the Dadaists aware that they 
were “not so firmly rooted in the knowable world as people would have us believe.” PF27FP 
Richter writes, “We felt that we were coming into contact with something different, 
something that surrounded and interpenetrated us just as we overflowed into it.” PF28FP 
Incorporation of chance became a trademark of the Dadaist agenda to challenge the 
“infallibility of reason, logic and causality” PF29FP. 
The adoption of chance had yet another purpose, a secret one. This was to restore to the 
work of art its primeval magic power ... By appealing directly to the unconscious, 
which is part and parcel of chance, we sought to restore to the work of art something of 
the numinous quality of which art has been the vehicle since time immemorial... PF30 
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7. Hans Arp, Collage with Squares Arranged According to the Laws of Chance, 1916-17 
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For Surrealists, the interest with “primitive art” was closely linked with their 
pursuits of the alternative, anti-rational modes of creation. Like Dadaists, they also 
extensively experimented with chance, as well as with dreams and the use of the 
unconscious, and they tried to reduce controllable and rational factors in the creative 
process. According to Surrealists, a conscious thought and consciously created art could 
not reach the most hidden and essential aspects of human experience. Goldwater refers 
to the primitivist aspects of this „strategy‟ as follows: 
Thus by sinking back to a lower level of experience for its inspiration, art tries to 
become the expression of the basic qualities of the human mind – qualities which are 
primitive both in the sense of being pervasive and of possessing the power of 
occasionally overwhelming the more refined levels of the mind. PF31FP   
 
Primitivism can be interpreted as a mode of creation, a certain attitude framing 
the creative process, a narration, rather than a specific imagery, a set of forms or a style. 
As Victor Li puts it in his book The Neo-Primitivist Turn (2006), “the term „primitive‟ 
lacks singular definition and possesses protean, multiple identities. The „primitive‟ is 
not an ontological entity – it is relational concept that expresses various „modern 
needs‟”.PF32FP As discussed above, these needs included: the expression of inner, essential 
feelings and the “energy and life in most elemental form”; preservation of fresh first 
impression or „resonance‟ of things; celebration of natural forces, ephemerality and 
randomness; reduction of conscious control and “sinking back to a lower level of 
experience”. However, primarily, it was a need to no longer „represent reality‟, but to 
„make reality‟ PF33FP. These motives behind the primitivist positions disclose its „prerational‟ 
and anti-representational character. The artists, and especially Dadaists and Surrealists, 
were openly anti-rational and anti-intellectual and they searched the ways to get outside 
the restraints of the subjective control and artistic mastery. In my view, play has 
become an attractive model in this respect. I do not mean, however, that „primitivist‟ 
equals play-like. What I suggest is that strategies of play in 20th century art, in most 
cases, were triggered by the first avant-garde‟s fascination with „primitive‟ art.   
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In the following sections I will explain what I mean by the „strategy of play‟ and 
how I see it fitting into the modernist and primitivist outlooks.  
 
“Strategy” of play  
I borrow the term „strategy‟ from Michel de Certeau‟s book The Practice of 
Everyday Life (1988). However, I reappropriate it in the context of my thesis. In de 
Certeau, „strategy‟ means “actions which, thanks to the establishment of a place of 
power (the property of a proper), elaborate theoretical places (systems and totalizing 
discourses) capable of articulating an ensemble of physical places in which forces are 
distributed.”PF34FP In other words strategies are loaded with the notion of power operations 
of the dominant order. According to de Certeau, every strategy is bounded by its own 
clearly designated identity that dictates the proper moves and actions. 
As in management, every “strategic” rationalisation seeks first of all to distinguish its 
“own” place, that is, the place of its own power and will, from an “environment”. A 
Cartesian attitude, if you wish: it is an effort to delimit one‟s own place in a world 
bewitched by the invisible powers of the Other. PF35FP  
I use the word „strategy‟ to describe methods and approaches aimed by modern avant-
gardes against the dominant, official, cultural and social conventions. The „strategy of 
play‟, as I identify it, was to a large degree a revolutionary tool. It was inscribed within 
the relations of power, and was based on a clearly articulated position of “power and 
will”, determined to overthrow the status quo. The artists were trying to establish their 
identity in opposition to the traditional „proper function‟ (ergon) of the artist. The Other 
(i.e. „savage‟ artist, the child, the madman) was not regarded as a threat, but as an 
attractive point of reference (a possible model) in the process of transformation of their 
roles and identities. The strategy of play was aimed against the official „strategies‟, but 
to a large degree, it followed their polemical methods and rhetorics, based on 
metaphysical dichotomies. As I introduced in the section on modern avant-gardes, the 
artists aimed to overturn the conventional hierarchy of values; they proclaimed new 
values to be central and essential, old – to be noxious or marginal.    
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The harnessed opposition between old and new, exposed play as a desirable 
alternative to the traditional artistic „work‟. Play, interpreted as „primitive‟, child-like 
and irrational has become an attractive remedy for the criticised sophisticated, academic 
and rational attitudes in art and social life. The word „strategy‟ suggests the conscious 
intention and plan. However, it is important to stress that „the strategy of play‟, as I 
approach it here, means a „conscious intention‟, but not necessarily „to play‟. „Play‟ 
does not designate the actual activity of playing. The artists I include in my analysis PF
36
FP 
did not intend „to play‟ instead of making art (although this could be a side effect), but 
rather they treated play as a model, a creative method to supplement and potentially to 
do away with the conventional modes of making art. This strategy was also aimed 
against the traditional notion of representation as separated from reality and Being. The 
artists hoped that play would serve as a reservoir of new means of expression that 
would bring art (or „anti-art‟) closer to the actual experience than the traditional 
representation, and would help to redefine the „proper function‟ of the artist, the 
artwork, the viewer and the gallery space. However, the self-conscious and calculated 
use of play as a method to arrive at desirable outcomes makes the „strategy of play‟ 
falling inevitably within the representational frame.  
As I have already suggested in the previous chapters, play, in order to become a 
„remedy‟ for the work-oriented notion of art and artistic representation, had to be 
interpreted as prerational. This is why, initially, it was closely connected with the 
primitivist agenda and was regarded as a manifestation of children‟s powerful and 
innocent creativity. I will return to this issue in the section dealing with Louquet‟s and 
Bataille‟s dispute about children‟s drawings. However, I would now like to discuss the 
narratives or myths supportive of primitivist approach that can be also identified within 
the „strategy of play‟ (interpreted as „prerational‟). 
 
Myth of origin 
I use the phrase „myth of origin‟ to refer to the narrative that claims to trace 
back the original and primary state of things and calls for its regeneration – the return to 
what is presented as pure, unspoiled, essential and good. PF
37
FP In this rhetoric, the natural 
state of man and the world is contrasted with the „here and now‟, long detached from 
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the origin. Artists and theorists who shared the primitivist approach, often referred to 
the dangers brought about by civilisation changes, and the need to turn back to nature. 
They saw the primitivist art as a remedy for art‟s artificiality and detachment from the 
„origin‟. This approach can be illustrated by the quote from the painter Alexander 
Shevchenko: 
We who hold Neo-Primitivism to be the artist’s religion say: 
Physical nature in the true sense no longer exists. It has become the foundation of 
apartment blocks, and the asphalt of pavements and streets. Physical nature is nothing 
but a memory, like a tale about something marvellous that has long since disappeared. 
... 
We take as the starting-point of our art the lubok, primitive art, and the icon, for there 
we find a more precise, more direct perception of life ....PF38 
The common tendency in the primitivist trend, regardless of the style adopted, was the 
pursuit of artistic means that would be able to represent the „pure‟ and „original‟ state of 
things, feelings, thoughts, impulses, needs, and so on. The artists intended to get rid of 
all unnecessary supplements and additions – ornaments of civilisation – that, in their 
view, corrupted the essence (of whatever was considered as the „origin‟) in its purity. 
They based their experiments on the assumption that “the further one goes back – 
historically, psychologically, or aesthetically – the simpler things become; and that 
because they are simpler they are more profound, more important, more valuable.” PF39FP 
The elements traditionally constitutive of the notion of art, such as style, artistic skills, 
knowledge and tradition were treated as secondary to the original experience, “the inner 
sound”, as the source of the artwork.   
The search for the „natural‟ art belongs to the debate on the primacy of the 
natural state over the cultural change which has lasted since the invention of writing. 
Modern artists, proponents of primitivism, could therefore be seen as the successors of 
king Thamus, in their protection of the „origin‟. However, as I argued in the previous 
chapter, after Derrida, in culture and in any form of human communication there does 
not exist the state of purity which is not already contaminated with some form of 
mediation or representation.  
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The „myth of origin‟ also permeates the prerational interpretation of the concept 
of play in culture and society. Play, within this rhetoric, is treated as a „pre-activity‟, 
and it belongs to childhood (individual and of the whole mankind). This notion of play 
was strengthen by Huizinga as a primary activity of humans and the root of all culture. 
The primitivist myth of origin refers exactly to the same values and presents savage art 
as a cradle of art, a „pre-art‟, closer to nature and essential experiences than the 
sophisticated and refined Western art. Play and the art of „primitive‟ people meet in the 
mythical human Eden, paradise lost, the original innocent state of happiness, freedom 
and disinterestedness.  
For the avant-garde artists, play, as a basic experience common to all people, 
served as a gate to the artistic creation freed from the burdens of civilisation, 
artificiality and cultural training. It is a contribution of modern artists that play has 
become linked with creativity. Creativity, in contemporary understanding, is identified 
with the ability to get „outside the box‟, or as I would say – outside the ergon of the 
particular activity.PF
40
FP „To play‟ with ideas or materials means to refresh one‟s approach, 
go back to the starting point, to try to see things as if for the first time. PF
41
FP  
 
Myth of presence 
By the „myth of presence‟ I mean the narrative that praises actual experience, 
practical knowledge and sensation, as superior to representation in any form. It is, in 
fact, a variation of the myth of origin that claims it is possible to achieve an effect close 
to the „unmediated‟ experience, to the „essence of being‟ through the one specific form 
of representation, chosen in a given time in history, as the most natural and accurate. 
This myth belongs to the dispute on the primacy of speech over writing, presented in 
the previous chapter, as well as to the ongoing quest for the art form that would do 
away with the art‟s artificiality and become life-like, which would „present‟ instead of 
represent.  
As Goldwater writes, the use of primitivist means by modern artist was in many 
cases linked with their desire to present their subjects immediately, “with as little 
“psychic distance” as possible” in order to produce the visual effect “which will not be 
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analyzed as a variegated formal composition, but will absorb the spectator, or be 
absorbed by him in a direct and undifferentiated way”. PF42FP The artist‟s emotions would 
therefore be „present‟ in the work, not just represented, and the expressive power of an 
image would evoke similar reactions in the viewer. The communication between the 
artist and the viewer would occur beyond the rational processes of coding and decoding, 
beyond the language and logic. It would be more of a shared sensation or experience.  
Such an attitude was also linked with the growing orientation on the creative 
process as an ongoing experimentation, and the role of an artist as a creative agent, who 
not only produced the artefacts, but also caused reactions and immediate effects in the 
social and cultural spheres. The art of „primitive‟ people was regarded by modern artists 
as vivid and sensual, woven into the processes of life. The objects and gestures of tribal 
art belonged to rituals, and were attributed with performative (methetic) or even magic 
powers. They were not meant to be contemplated but used and acted with.   
As primitive man, driven by fear of nature, sought refuge within himself, so we too 
have to adopt flight from a „civilisation‟ which is out to devour our souls. The Savage 
discovered in himself the courage to become greater than the threat of nature, and the 
alarms and terrors of storm and of ravening beasts and of unknown dangers, never 
deserted him, never let him in – in honour of this he drew a circle of guardian signs 
around him, signs of defiance against the threat of nature, obstinate signs of 
demarcation to protect his possession against the intrusion of nature and to safeguard 
his belief in spirit. PF43FP  
This quotation by Hermann Bahr exemplifies modern attraction with the “performative” 
character of savage art as different from the traditional Western „descriptive‟ 
representation. PF
44
FP “Drawing a circle of guardian signs” is not simply an imitation of 
nature, but an act of power, causing certain effects. It is like an utterance of a magic 
spell, involving the bodily and mental powers of the „primitive‟ artist who confronts 
this special act with the dangerous world. It can be also seen as an active confrontation 
with the overwhelming natural phenomena, which in “civilised” man evokes the feeling 
of the sublime. Moreover, as I wrote in chapter 2, art as ritual becomes inscribed within 
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social life and has power to overturn social relations or to invent new ones. PF
45
FP. The view 
of „primitive‟ art as ritualistic and performative was to some degree inspired by the 
book Totem and Taboo by Freud (1913). As he writes, art did not begin as “art for art‟s 
sake. It worked originally in the service of impulses which are for the most part extinct 
today. And among them we may suspect many magical purposes.” PF46FP Pablo Picasso 
recounts his inspiration with African sculpture in Les Demoiselles d‟Avignon in terms 
of performing a spiritual act, not just imitating interesting forms.  
But all the fetishes were used for the same thing. They were weapons. To help people 
stop being dominated by spirits, to become independent of them. ... Les Demoiselles 
d‟Avignon must have come to me that day, but not at all because of the forms: but 
because it was my first canvas of exorcism – yes, absolutely!...PF47 
The similar performative quality was attributed by modern artists to art and play of 
children: 
Surely you will agree with me that when a child builds the figure of a person from the 
cubes and arches of his brickbox, and makes himself a “man”, he is arriving at 
something more fundamental, more mysterious, and more organic than the shepherd in 
the ancient myth who is said to have discovered painting – for he with a piece of coal, 
outlined the shadow of his lover. PF48 
According to Čapek, a child does not simply represent a man, does not „trace his 
shadow‟, but instead he „makes‟ a man; to some extent acts as a creator of a new being. 
Play was perceived by modern artists as an activity performed „here and now‟ and an 
immediate social process, as theorised later by DenzinPF
49
FP. In effect, the moment of 
creation as such has become equally important as the outcome. In this moment the artist 
can experience art as reality, can exercise his own creative power like a god, and 
witness the origination of things. According to the „myth of presence‟ an artist does not 
represent reality; his actions belong to reality and shape it. From the primitivist, as well 
as from the prerational perspective, play and art belong naturally to the tissue of life, 
and have power to reveal its essence as well as transform it. 
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By creating narratives, myths supporting the primitivist approach to creative 
process, modern artists legitimized their works as „true art‟ with the access to the 
original states of being. The artistic creation was seen as parallel to the organic 
processes of becoming, but not representing them in the old sense (as imitation). By 
using spontaneous gestures, the unconscious, chance, automatic techniques, etc., the 
artists hoped to reduce or eliminate the element of controlling power of reason and 
conventional codes of meaning making – the authorial mediation – infected by the 
culture, civilisation, tradition, knowledge and skills. As Dadaist Hugo Ball writes,  
When art is brought into line with everyday life and individual experience, it is exposed 
to the same risks, the same unforeseeable laws of chance, the same interplay of living 
forces. Art is no longer a „serious and weighty‟ emotional stimulus, nor a sentimental 
tragedy, but the fruit of experience and joy in life. PF50 
 Play as a prerational concept and a children‟s non-serious activity, could then become a 
primitivist tool to arrive at creative, non-rational states of mind, productive of 
absorbing, sensual, anti-intellectual art. However, the primitivist play, interpreted as 
“the Other of reason” PF51FP, must be seen as a conscious strategy in the context of modern 
avant-gardes – their intellectual discourse, revolutionary outlooks and numerous 
manifestos.  
 
The Other 
The issues of the encounter with the Other, or „becoming‟ (role-playing) the 
Other, are constitutive for the primitivist orientation, as well as for play. The primitivist 
Other – mentally ill, member of the African tribe or a child, was seen as embodiment of 
natural forces, acting according to instincts, needs and feelings not tamed by the rules 
imposed by civilisation. It was, therefore, perceived as a guide leading to the world of 
nature, to the original state of being. The Other played a double role – representing 
values repressed by the development of the civilised society (like free sexuality, 
spontaneity, irrationality), so in fact being dangerous to the social order and on the other 
hand regarded as a potential moral and innocent rescuer for the corrupted and 
demoralised West. These roles can be compared to the Derridean pharmakos – a 
metaphor for exclusion and inclusion, infection and curation. Both perspectives, 
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however, present the Other as completely alienated from the Western self-identity, and 
existing outside the „city walls‟. 
In the earlier primitivism [19 PthP century], the primitive is regarded as inferior and 
justifiably superseded by modern civilisation, whereas in the later version [20 P
th
P century] 
the primitive is seen as corrective to the malaise of Western modernity. But in both 
cases the primitive is known, given a value, and exists only as an antithesis to the 
modern West, which not only remains the central point of reference but also is the 
source from which the idea of the primitive emerged in the first place. PF52 
The primitivist movement is often accused of strengthening the stereotype of the „noble 
savage‟, exotic and amusing but completely detached from the existence and experience 
of the „civilised‟ man. No doubt it is true, when we think of superficial fascinations and 
narratives created by modern artists to support their work. However, the Other, even on 
this very basic sentimental level, as a colourful illegible mask, had entered the world of 
well-established Western identification and gradually transformed it. The Other became 
an attractive figure, different, mysterious, but worth imitating. Tristan Tzara in his Note 
on African Art from 1917 calls the „primitive‟ artist his „brother‟, which indicates the 
process of incorporation of the „external‟ values and approaches into the traditional 
frames of art.   
Influences of a foreign sort, which mix in, are the shreds of Renaissance lining, still 
hanging on the soul of those close to us, for my brother has the soul of autumn‟s sharp 
black branches. My other brother is an innocent; he is good and laughs. He eats in 
Africa and in the bracelet of Oceanic Islands ....PF53 
It can be said that the Other became an alter ego of a modern artist, like a temporary 
mask or costume, which nonetheless leaves a trace on its wearer. Encounter with the 
„primitive‟ inspired modern artists to use “unconventional procedures or techniques that 
bypass the methods normally associated with the trained painter or sculptor”PF54FP so in 
other words, to transcend their own professional identification, and the traditional ergon 
of Western art.    
“We need difference because we can only construct meaning through a dialogue 
with the „Other‟”.PF55FP According to Mikhail Bakhtin, meaning arises in the dialogue 
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between two or more speakers, it is fundamentally dialogic. PF
56
FP From the Derridean 
perspective, the Other is essential to the creation of the self, the Other is the self. The 
difference produces identities, but also identities blur this difference. The margins 
inform and transform the „centre‟; there is no definite border in between.  
This entails the radically disturbing recognition that it is only through the relation to the 
Other, the relation to what it is not, to precisely what it lacks, to what has been called its 
constitutive outside that the „positive‟ meaning of any term – and thus its „identity‟ – 
can be constructed (Derrida, 1981; Laclau, 1990; Butler, 1993). PF57 
This is also the function of play. Play-parergon subverts and challenges ergon – stable 
identity. The role of play as we know it from children‟s activities is also – to develop 
one‟s identity. Children confront themselves with different figures from real life, books, 
and movies, and through the temporary identifications in play they can construct or 
transform their own self-identity. What is more, as Jacques Lacan argues, the Other can 
be encountered by a child as his or her own reflection in the mirror. “It is this reflection 
from outside oneself, or what Lacan calls the „look from the place of the other‟, during 
the “mirror stage”, which allows the child for the first time to recognize itself as a 
unified subject, relate to the outside world, to the „Other‟, develop language and take on 
a sexual identity.”PF58FP The encounter with self as the Other can also occur when one gets 
in touch with the sphere of the unconscious wishes and desires. As I wrote in the 
section about the sublime in chapter 2, modern artists experimented with automatic 
techniques in order to eliminate the authorial subjective control. However, it was also 
an opportunity to transgress the mundane self, to recognize the Other in oneself. The 
use of costumes and masquerades (e.g. in Duchamp, which will be discussed in the next 
chapter) also served to challenge the idea of self as a unified and controlled whole with 
one and proper identification (in terms of gender, social expectations, artistic 
conventions and so on). 
In consequence, the „external‟ position of the Other becomes questionable. It is 
rather one‟s own projection, the embodiment of fears and desires belonging neither to 
the inside nor to the outside. It is the indispensable figure in the process of establishing 
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one‟s own identification but also the sign of the possibility of its change. Thus the 
figure of the Other in modern art can be seen as the embodiment of parergon. What is 
more, ergon of a man (proper function or identity) turns out to be constructed – 
socially, culturally and ideologically. Self-identity becomes a role “constituted through 
the mediation of others, through, paradoxically, a process of self-alienation”. PF59FP Ergon is 
thus constructed by the operation of parergon – the Other, the marginal and the 
repressed.  
The primitivist fascination with the Other, as belonging to a different culture, 
historical time, or stage in human development, contributed to the gradual shift of 
perspective – from the ruling dichotomy internal/external, to the postcolonial and 
poststructuralist explorations of constitutive differences within the society, politics and 
culture. The passage between the „inside‟ and the „outside‟, „self‟ and „the other‟ is 
crucial, as previously discussed, in the liminal experiences such as ritual or carnival. 
More generally, however, it marks the operation of play. In my view, the encounter 
with the external, primitivist Other – including the playing child – was an important 
element in the gradual transformation of Western artists‟ interpretation of their own 
roles and transgression of the well-established ergon of art. In contemporary artistic 
practice the momentary change of identity, becoming the „other‟, or entering realms 
different from the everyday experience have become a part of an accepted artistic 
methodology which I identify as play. I will return to this issue in chapter 6, in the 
context of a role-playing game as a structure of recent participatory projects.  
 
“Innocent child” versus “counterprimitivism”  
The narratives of primitivism provide a good background to introduce the 
discussion on the „play of art‟ as either beneficial for the individual development and 
social relations, or subversive; either “re-stitching the relational fabric” PF60FP or breaking 
the taboo. In the first chapter I described various perspectives regarding play „as a 
“constructive behaviour”, essential for healthy growth and development‟ of the child. 
However, the interpretation of play as a didactic tool – good, innocent, socializing and 
bonding – have been criticised by the proponents of play as an ambivalent concept, seen 
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as both creative and destructive. PF
61
FP I find this issue important, because it keeps recurring 
in the context of participatory art that uses play as a model, e.g. in the recent debate on 
„relational aesthetics‟. Here, I will discuss the particular moment in this ongoing 
argument, which took place between George Luquet and Georges Bataille in 1930. 
Their polemic regarded the „primitive‟ art and children‟s creative activities in particular.  
In the early years of the primitivist fascination, children‟s drawings and 
children‟s way of approaching the world manifested in play, were juxtaposed with those 
of the prehistoric and tribal artists, and the myth of the „noble savage‟ was closely 
related to the one of the „innocent child‟ as essentially good, naive, honest, creative, 
natural and spontaneous. George Luquet in his book Primitive Art (1930) goes so far as 
to argue that: “it is legitimate to call all art „primitive‟, at whatever time and space it is 
found, to the extent that it presents the same traits as children‟s drawings.”PF62FP He 
regarded the „primitive‟ and the child to be “the first artists” – their activities marking 
the „origin‟ of art. PF63FP Children‟s creative activities, including play, were seen by the 
majority of modernists (at least up to the 1930s) as performed spontaneously, naturally, 
with joy and pleasure and driven solely by the positive and creative impulses. Luquet 
writes that „primitive‟ art and children‟s creative activities share the same initial 
impulse – a need or a drive. According to him, this first attempt to draw is the 
manifestation of instinctive pleasure to make marks on a sheet of paper or on a wall. As 
the main features of children‟s drawings Luquet lists lack of ulterior motive, vital 
necessity and elaboration. PF
64
FP  
The primitivist assumptions behind the analysis of children‟s drawings and 
“primitive art” were criticized in the review of Luquet‟s book written by Georges 
Bataille in 1930. He considered the joy of destruction as a main impulse to draw, in 
children and the „primitive‟, instead of Luquet‟s creative pleasure. To describe this 
destructiveness or sadism he used the term „alteration‟, indicating the state of change, 
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both positive and negative. Destruction was for him the essential element of artistic 
transformation of images and objects.  
It is a matter, above all, of transforming what is at hand. … This evolution is easy to 
follow, starting with some scribbles. Chance isolates a visual resemblance from a few 
strange lines that can be fixed through repetition. This phrase represents a kind of 
second degree of transformation; that is to say, that the altered object (paper or wall) is 
transformed to the point where it becomes a new object, a horse, a head, a man. … Art, 
since that is incontestably what it is, proceeds in this sense through successive 
destructions. Therefore, insofar as art liberates libidinous instincts, these instincts are 
sadistic. PF65FP  
The apparently innocent desire of a child to make a personal sign has, according to 
Bataille, a double – creative/vandalistic nature. He was one of the first theorists to 
transgress the one-sided view on the „primitive‟ art and human creative acts in general. 
Bataille considered high and low, sacred and profane, life and death as inseparable in 
the artistic impulse of any kind. PF
66
FP His thought, however, did not have much influence 
among his contemporaries, except Surrealists. As Hal Foster writes: 
Indeed, the dissident surrealists (Bataille chief among them) present, if not a 
“counterprimitivism” as such, then at least a model of how the otherness of the 
primitive might be thought disruptively  … Which is to say that they prized in the tribal 
object not its raisonnable form but its bricolé heterogeneity, not its mediatory 
possibilities but transgressive value. PF67FP  
Bataille‟s account can serve therefore as a counter position to the primitivist myths of 
savage art and play. The moral innocence of children‟s activities in the tradition of 
Rousseau becomes juxtaposed with the innocence „beyond good and evil‟, both creative 
and destructive, in the tradition of Nietzsche. PF
68
FP In my view, Bataille‟s position also 
exemplifies the approach to the creative act as permeated by the operation of play-
parergon – that transgresses „the proper‟ and „the accepted‟, and enters the spheres of 
doubt, anxiety and ambiguity. „Play of art‟ must be seen as a constructive as well as a 
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deconstructive force. It is involved in the movement of structure and its boundaries. It 
enlarges some facts, manipulates them, shows hidden relations and exposes weak points 
or desires. It can apply a structure or deform, reshape it. The artistic strategy of play 
must be therefore seen as a pharmakon (cure and poison); its effects cannot be set up in 
advance.   
In the following chapters I will return to the constructive/destructive 
characteristics of play when discussing „child‟s play‟ versus „dark play‟ models in 
modern art, and „relational aesthetics‟ versus „relational antagonism‟. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I introduced the conceptual background of the modern artistic 
tool, which I labelled the „strategy of play‟, that emerged in Western art at the 
beginning of the last century. I linked the application and interpretation of the notion of 
play in modern art with the rhetorics of the avant-gardes and particularly the creative 
attitude common to various movements, namely, the trend of primitivism.  
I reappropriated de Certeau‟s term “strategy” to point out the conscious use of 
play as a creative model, as well as a conceptual attitude, used by modern artists to 
oppose the dominant, official cultural and social conventions. The „strategy of play‟ as 
a revolutionary tool was loaded with the notion of power and was closely connected 
with the operation of traditional metaphysics which locates certain values as central, 
others as marginal. Modern avant-garde artists, with help of written statements – 
manifestos – were trying to establish their identity in opposition to the traditional 
„proper function‟ (ergon) of the artist. They called for “directness and authenticity”, 
sensual experience, freedom, “abolition of logic” and “living art” among other, as 
alternative values, new „centrisms‟ to become essential in the artistic and cultural 
realms.  
Predictably, the notion of play generated by the primitivist approach is 
„prerational‟. It is play as an unmediated experience or sensation: unconscious, anti-
intellectual, anti-rational, and fundamentally innocent. In my view, this concept of play, 
as well as the primitivist attitude, is based on the metaphysical myths: of origin and of 
presence. The hierarchical order structuring these myths locates what is seen as 
„original‟ and „present‟ (immediate, tangible, unmediated) as more valuable than what 
is „derivative‟ (historically, psychologically, or aesthetically), and „represented‟. 
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According to these narratives, savage art is situated at the origin of art, as „pre-art‟, 
closer to nature and essential experiences, than the refined art of the West. Play is, in 
turn, conceptualized as a „pre-activity‟ and a root of culture. Inspiration from “primitive 
art” and the use of play as an artistic method were therefore regarded as bringing 
modern art closer to the spring of art and culture. Moreover, modern narratives linked 
children‟s play and the art of „primitive‟ people due to their “performative” character – 
as actions performed in real time and causing certain consequences (in contrast to 
merely “descriptive” abilities of traditional representation).  
Play as a prerational concept and a children‟s activity, was therefore regarded as 
a creative tool to arrive at non-rational states of mind, liberated from conventions, and 
productive of absorbing, sensual and anti-intellectual art. However, the primitivist play 
must be seen as a conscious strategy in the context of modern avant-gardes, whose 
representatives were engaged in intellectual discourses, and were expressing clearly 
articulated conceptual positions in their manifestos. Nonetheless, even if the encounter 
with the Other, was controlled to some extent, it has influenced the development of 
modern art beyond the artists‟ expectations. 
The modern representatives who shared the primitivist fascination built their 
strategic identification in relation to the traditional Other of the trained, professional 
artist – the savage artist, the child or the insane. The primitivist Other has gradually 
became the alter ego of a modern artist, like a mask or costume, which has the power to 
transform its wearer. This symbolic encounter inspired the use of unconventional 
procedures or techniques, such as experiments with chance and automatism, direct work 
on canvas without preparatory drawings or use of „raw‟ colours and „crude‟ forms. 
More generally, positing the Other as the constitutive aspect of the self (as in Freud and 
Lacan), has contributed to the process of „decentring‟ the subject and destabilizing 
one‟s ergon (in life and art). In consequence, play-parergon – movement and 
transgression, has become for modern (and especially postmodern) artists an alternative 
and attractive path to follow. The subversive character of the artistic act was theorised 
by Georges Bataille, who recognized its creative, as well as destructive, impulses.  
 
 In the next chapter I will analyse selected modern practices which harnessed the 
„strategy of play‟ to go beyond the frames of traditional art. These experimental 
positions, from Dada to Performance Art, stemmed from or referred in some degree to 
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the primitivist outlooks, but they used play to introduce new forms of art and new 
artistic problems, and to redefine the role of the artist, viewers and exhibition space. In 
other words, the modern „strategy of play‟, although rooted in the primitivist narrations, 
in the course of the 20 P
th
P century belonged to the artistic practices quite detached from 
the purely visual attraction of modern artists to children‟s drawings or tribal sculpture. 
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Chapter 5 
From cabaret to the „little laboratory‟:  
modern avant-garde‟s experiments with play 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter I introduced the notion of the „strategy of play‟ in 20 Pth P 
century art, and analysed its conceptual background. I described this strategy as a 
creative approach catalysed by the narratives accompanying the avant-garde artists‟ 
fascination with „primitive‟ art. However, the strategy of play, as I will demonstrate in 
this chapter, goes beyond the inspiration with „primitive‟ objects of art, expressed in the 
traditional form of sculpture, drawing or painting. Instead, modern artists directly 
employed various play activities in their artistic experiments. They searched for creative 
models „outside‟ conventional art frames, trying to implement non-art or popular art 
and entertainment into their practices.   
On the following pages, I will identify different types of empirical play that 
served as vehicles to arrive at the state of creative „playfulness‟ as a possibility of 
transgressing the well-established roles and rules in the domain of art, and the ergon-
like notion of artistic representation. I will discuss the most significant 20 P
th
P century 
„Artists the Players‟ (from Dada to Fluxus) who employed forms and methods from a 
range of playgrounds of human life, such as cabaret, festival, excursion, parlour and 
language games, masquerades, play of chance and para-scientific experiments – as 
alternative  „modes of production‟ of the work of art. I will analyse the intentions and 
narratives behind the artists‟ choice „to play‟ and of a particular kind of play.  
In the second part of this chapter (Viewer the Player), I will focus on the rise of 
Environments and Installation art as interactive, ambient art forms, inviting the 
audience to become a part of the artistic situation in a physical way. I will argue that the 
post-war shift in approach to the gallery space and the viewer‟s presence in this space 
must be seen as a further manifestation of the prerational need for the „experience‟ 
instead of the traditional representation. In terms of play, I will compare these projects 
to a theme park – a well-designed playground isolated from reality – which nonetheless 
offers „real‟ adventures, thrills and sensations. I will also refer to the book Art as 
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Experience by John Dewey that inspired Allan Kaprow in his attempts to provide the 
viewers with an interactive environment and to gradually transform them into active 
„playmates‟. 
In the last section (Let‟s play together) I will turn to the process-oriented 
projects which used play as performance. I will mainly analyse Kaprow‟s ideas 
concerning children‟s play as a model for unscripted, participatory art forms – 
Happenings, and a new role of the artist – educator in play, freely changing professional 
identification. I will also refer to the opposite model of „dark play‟, aimed at testing the 
boundaries of social norms and conventions within the situation of participatory art. 
These two approaches continue the argument between „good‟ and „destructive‟ play 
introduced in the previous chapter. They also bring attention to the issues of 
danger/safety, togetherness/antagonism, negotiation of rules, and the role of the artist in 
the collective projects, which remain crucial in the recent process-oriented relational 
projects (as will be discussed in the two final chapters).  
The main purpose of the present chapter is to expose various, often 
marginalized, forms of the avant-garde„s activities in the 20 Pth P century which can be 
identified with the operation of the strategy of play, and which brought about decisive 
shifts in the artists‟ approach to the creative process, the role of the viewers, functions 
and forms of the artworks. These shifts also influenced the interpretation of the notions 
of the central and the marginal – the relationship between ergon and parergon within 
the concept of art, and the contemporary approach to the idea of representation. The 
analysis of the modern uses of play will also help me to contextualise postmodern play-
like participatory and „relational‟ practices in the next chapter.  
 
„Artist the Player‟ 
If there is one activity in Surrealism which has most invited the derision of imbeciles, it 
is our persistent playing of games, which can be found throughout most of our 
publications over the last thirty-five years. Although as a defensive measure we 
sometimes described such activity as „experimental‟ we were looking primarily for 
entertainment, and those rewarding discoveries it yielded in relation to knowledge came 
only later. ... Furthermore, the urgent need we felt to do away with old antinomies that 
dominate work and leisure, „wisdom‟ and „folly‟, etc – such as action and dream, past 
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and future, sanity and madness, high and low, and so on – disposed us not to spare that 
of the serious and non-serious (games). PF1 
The above quotation from André Breton (1954) summarises the Surrealist approach to 
playing games. Surrealists consciously tried to do away with metaphysical dichotomies 
structuring traditional approaches to the „work‟ of art. They persistently explored the 
„play‟ of art as a way to transcend the binary oppositions and to challenge the 
traditional ergon of art, identified by them with social norms, conventional and 
conscious decisions, and aesthetic beauty.  
Breton‟s words can be seen, however, in a more general context, as a description 
of the modern discovery of play as an artistic and conceptual strategy, and a powerful 
tool to revolutionize art. This discovery, fitting into the primitivist outlooks and 
encouraged by the modern theoretical study on play (by Spencer, Freud, Huizinga and 
Caillois, among others), must be seen as a shared achievement of a few generations of 
artists who developed different play-like forms and methods, and who used play to 
achieve various effects. PF
2
FP However, all of them tried to overcome traditional 
dichotomies structuring the „work‟ of art, and, in most cases, to overturn the dominant 
hierarchy, to negate the traditional ergon of art and to expose the parergon (the values 
identified by them as unjustly marginalized). In the following sections, I will briefly 
discuss the most innovative and seminal uses of play in the first and second avant-
gardes applied instead of, or together with, the traditional creative processes. In most 
cases play remained a means in the production of art objects or was treated as a 
complementary activity, not a final outcome. The artists still identified themselves as 
painters, poets and sculptors who modernize their artistic toolboxes.  
 
- Dadaist Cabaret, social events and excursions 
In 1916, in Zurich, Hugo Ball and Emmy Hennings PF
3
FP established Cabaret 
Voltaire to provide a venue for independent outlooks and a free artistic spirit, in 
opposition to the overwhelming climate of politics, war and nationalism. PF
4
FP The playful, 
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provocative character of a night-club suited well the pacifist or anarchist, multinational 
and experimental ideals of young art. The shape of the Dadaist cabaret was inspired by 
the Futurist manifestos and actions; however it was devoid of the political, national and 
social, goal-oriented agenda. Dadaists celebrated artistic freedom, extensively 
experimented with various art forms and created a kind of a multimedia workshop of 
the bizarre, provocation and play – as Hugo Ball put it: “playground for crazy 
emotions”. PF5FP  
 
 
8. Hugo Ball reciting Karawane6 in a Cubist costume at the Cabaret Voltaire, Zürich, 1916 PF 
 
Paris Dadaists continued the Zurich tradition of live performances, and in 1920 
they organised the Dada Festival at the Salle Gaveau:  
Breton appeared with a revolver tied to each temple, Eluard in ballerina‟s tutu, Fraenkel 
in an apron, and all the Dadaists wore funnel-shaped ‟hats‟ on their heads. Despite these 
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preparations, the performances themselves were unrehearsed, so that many of the 
events were delayed and broken up by shouts from the audience as performers 
attempted to straighten out their ideas. PF7FP  
The artists were performing in ridiculous costumes – in most cases unprepared – using 
chance, improvisation and the flow of events as their artistic tools. The Dadaist cabaret 
can be seen as a mixture of „high‟ art with mass entertainment, play with the audience, 
the ongoing and exposed artistic process, letting things go without constraints, beyond 
the norms and conventions. Such an attitude was typically evoking the collective 
„madness‟, „throwing eggs, veal cutlets and tomatoes‟ PF8FP at the performers – the reaction 
anticipated by the artists, who wanted to push the viewers out of the contemplative 
detachment of usual art public. PF
9
FP  
The Dadaist show was always a collaborative work, transgressing the 
professional roles – painters not only created the decorations and props, but were also 
engaged in performing drawing or painting on stage, reciting poems, and playing 
instruments. In effect, each event was becoming a kind of a „total work of art‟ 
composed of the multi-media art forms and the crucial element of the viewers‟ active 
response.    
 
 The opening of the Gallery Dada in Zurich in 1917 was an impulse to expand 
the range of forms of interaction with the viewers. Apart from the exhibitions, the artists 
organized meetings, readings, lectures, and guided tours “with the aim of establishing 
direct contact with the public. This contact did not always take place without friction. 
As an experiment, the public was treated with the open rudeness of which Tzara and 
Serner were such masters.” PF10 
Later in Paris (1921), Tristan Tzara and the future Surrealists organized a Dada 
excursion to the little-known church of St. Julien de Pauvre, with the artists as guides. 
They advertised the event in the city with the posters “offering a series of visits to 
selected sites, „particularly those, which really have no reason for existing‟”.PF11FP No 
audience showed up. However, the important aspect of these kind of events organised 
by Dadaists and Surrealists, was their willingness to go beyond the traditional artist‟s 
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role, and to meet the public (surely, with the provocative intention in mind) on a new, 
non-artistic ground.  
 
The Dada events encouraged excess, according to Marinetti‟s dictum that art 
“must be an alcohol, not a balm” PF12FP. The gestures and methods of play, absurdity and 
parody, applied by Dadaists, offended, deterred, attracted and excited the public, but did 
not leave anyone indifferent. The artists wanted their collective activities to become like 
a persuasive revolutionary weapon to make way for „new‟ art, to change the bourgeois‟ 
taste and expectations, and, simply, to test the limits. The artists could also infuse new 
ideas and values into the artistic scene, such as: humour, irrationality, chance, chaos, 
lack of skill, nonsense and orientation on the process. Their projects can be described as 
„carnivalesque‟ – “a unique mixture of instable curiosity, playfulness and pure 
contradiction” PF13FP. Like in Bakhtin‟s model, Dadaists used humour and chaos to 
undermine the official style of social interaction.    
However, they had to face the consequences of their playful experiments. Like 
one of their predecessors, Frank Wedekind, a German performer and playwright, they 
knew that their activities “revelled in the licence given the artist to be a mad outsider, 
exempt from society‟s normal behaviour” and that “such licence was given only 
because the role of the artist was considered utterly insignificant, more tolerated than 
accepted.”PF14FP Dadaists and Surrealists consciously occupied roles as society‟s jesters or 
naughty children. In the text introducing Parade – the collaborative ballet (mixture of a 
circus and music hall) by E. Satie, P. Picasso, J. Cocteau and L. Massine – Apollinaire 
writes that the show promises “to modify the arts and the conduct of life from top to 
bottom in a universal joyousness” PF15FP.  
However, the artists were also aware that their revolutionary gestures should not 
repeat without an end. This kind of play, a provocation aimed at the audience, burns out 
quickly, and the shock value fades. As Francis Picabia puts it, “The bourgeois 
represents the infinite. Dada will be the same if it lasts too long.” PF16FP The Dadaist 
example illustrates the fact that the movement between ergon and parergon in art is an 
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ongoing process. With time, the marginal becomes accepted or treated with 
indifference. Play, as a strategy, can become predictable and safe or it can follow the 
old structures instead of disrupting them. PF
17
 
 
- Surrealists parlour games and wordplay 
Surrealists, apart from organising playful events in the tradition of Dada, 
indulged themselves in the collective playing of different kinds of games – their own 
inventions, or modified versions of well-known parlour pastimes. The list of the games, 
most of which were based on automatic techniques, is very long and it includes:  
- Chain games (the texts or images created by adding one‟s line not knowing 
previous players contribution): “The exquisite corpse”PF18FP (“Heads, Bodies and 
Legs”), “The Game of Definitions”, “Conditionals” (e.g. If there were no 
guillotine. Wasps would take off their corsets.); “Opposites”, “Echo Poems”, 
“One into Another”, “Directions for use”. 
 
 
   Copyright image 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9. Greta Knutson, Valentine Hugo, Andre Breton, Tristan Tzara,  
“The exquisite corpse”, 1936 
 
-  “Inquiries” – games of questions and answers, in which the answering player is 
required to tell the truth or give the first answer that comes to his or her mind. 
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- Determining irrational characteristics of the object. 
- Oral description of objects perceived by touch. 
- Inventing new proverbs, superstitions and myths. 
- Visual techniques: automatic drawing, frottage, fumage, decalcomania, collage, 
photomontage, potato and paper cuts, etc. PF
19
 
 
Playing games was for Surrealists not only a great way of having fun together, 
but in time it has become a tool to stimulate creativity, generate ideas, and get in touch 
with the unconscious. It can be seen as a Surrealist methodology to come up with the 
unexpected insights and formal solutions. With help of play, paradox, chance and 
collaboration, they tried to “transform and revaluate the categories into which we 
habitually order the familiar world, and substitute a surrealist viewpoint for the 
conventional one”.PF20FP As I quoted earlier in this chapter, Breton refers to games as 
activities overcoming “old antinomies”. In the same essay he pays tribute to Johan 
Huizinga: 
And the great Dutch historian and thinker specifies that ‟All things that have come to be 
recognized in poetry as conscious qualities – beauty, a sense of the sacred, magical 
power – are implied from the outset in the primary quality of the game.‟ It is clear that 
to shut oneself off from the play of imagination as adult discipline prescribes it, is to 
undermine the best of one‟s own humanity. PF21 
The Surrealist „Artist the Player‟ tried to exercise the whole potential of his or her mind 
through the exploration of its irrational, unconscious paths. The mixture of fun and 
seriousness, freedom and constraints within the world of games, provided the best 
emotional and intellectual space for the Surrealist „research‟. As I have already 
mentioned the unconscious was for Surrealists the sphere of „internal‟ Other and the 
limit of the authorial control. Moreover, because of their relation to the unconscious, 
games and automatic techniques were treated as democratic creative tools common to 
everybody. In effect, art could potentially lose its „high‟ and detached position, and 
become an everyday activity or a social experience, as it was attributed to „primitive‟ 
art. The idea of democratisation of „high art‟ belonged to the overall agenda of 
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modernization, revolution in the social structure and in the arts. Play and games were 
models for the creative practice, but also for the preferable form of social interaction, 
where the rules were collectively negotiated. “Rules are accepted voluntarily since they 
have the opposite purpose to constraints imposed on the individual by society. Their 
aim is the provision of pleasure, not the imposition of repression.” PF22FP Surrealist games 
can be then seen as a revenge taken on the „reality principle‟ – the ergon of artistic, 
social and political life. The artists often quoted Freud‟s theory of the function of 
humour, “that it is the revenge of the pleasure principle on reality. The game has a 
similar function, and none more so than this GAME OF PROVOCATION in which 
Surrealists taken delighted revenge on its enemies.” PF23FP However, the games were also 
played to draw the “magic circle” of „sur-reality‟ – an alternative world as a small 
„uncivilised‟ but democratic community, in which a man organically belongs to 
environment/nature/events, and not just rationally controls them. The agenda of 
„democratisation‟ through play has later recurred in various practices, i.e. in Kaprow, 
Fluxus and „relational aesthetics‟.  
 
Experiments with language (sound and writing), and incorporating language 
games into Dada and Surrealism were the result of contacts and creative exchanges 
between painters and poets. Guillaume Apollinaire, the French poet, art critic, and 
proponent of „primitive‟ art, was one of the main contributors to the growing interest in 
the „first principles of language‟, jokes and word games among the avant-garde. He 
himself was influenced by children‟s poems, the work of Alfred Jarry (Ubu Roi) and 
Raymond Roussel‟s writing, and he introduced Marcel Duchamp and Francis Picabia to 
the creative output of the latter. Both artists took an inspiration from Roussel‟s attitude 
of „antisense‟, his playful motives, use of homonymic puns, code, enigma, and a general 
climate of mystification. PF
24
FP Duchamp developed the concept of wordplay into one of the 
main strategies of his art. His language games and puns “appear throughout his career, 
in all formats from offhand remarks, to the titles of most of his works”. PF25FP  
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In the interview with Katharine Kuh (1961) Duchamp says:  
... puns have always been considered a low form of wit, but I find them a source of 
stimulation both because of their actual sound and because of the unexpected meanings 
attached to the interrelationships of disparate words. For me, this is an infinite field of 
joy – and it's always right at hand. ... If you introduce a familiar word into an alien 
atmosphere, you have something comparable to distortion in painting, something 
surprising and new. PF26FP  
For Duchamp, play with words, considered traditionally as a childish and „primitive‟ 
form of humour, was the means to evoke the „unexpected‟ and to infuse multiple 
meanings, ambiguity and the conceptual approach into his works. It was also a strategy 
to overturn the well-established dichotomies – high/low and serious/non-serious. A 
famous and provocative example is his Mona Lisa with moustache and goatee, entitled: 
L.H.O.O.Q. (1919). When the letters are read quickly in French (“el-hache-o-o-ku”), the 
meaning turns out to be: "elle a chaud au cul" (she has a hot ass).PF
27
FP Together with a 
gesture of transforming the reproduction of the Western art masterpiece, this work 
reminds of a children‟s provocative, sexually loaded play, aimed at teasing adults, in 
this case the “adults” of the artworld. Duchamp‟s approach can be then described as 
„alteration‟ – a term proposed later by Bataille for the creative/destructive ambivalence 
of the creative act. However, Duchamp, as quoted above, was fascinated by the creative 
potential of wordplay and visual connotations; he produced endless puns for sheer joy 
and pleasure, and to discover the surprising qualities of the ordinary words and objects. 
Despite the highly intellectual character of Duchamp‟s „games‟ they maintain the child-
like, light and effortless quality of joyous play. 
 
- Duchamp‟s masquerades  
Another dimension of wordplay in Duchamp emerges in his equally playful 
fancy for masquerade and inventing non-existent personas and alter-egos. During his 
artistic career Duchamp created a few aliases and used them in his correspondence, in 
artistic and non-artistic projects and collaborations.  
Thus, whilst we know of Duchamp‟s adoption of disguise mostly with regard to the R. 
Mutt and Rrose Sélavy personae, he was also Marcel Douxami, Marsélavy, and Sélatz, 
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not to mention the ersatz names he was given by others: Victor and Totor by Henri-
Pierre Roché, Marchand du sel by Robert Desnos, Pierre Delaire by Henri Waste. (De 
Duve, 1998: 399–400). 
A final act in this unstable existence is found in the Wanted poster of 1923, an imitation 
of a police circular featuring Duchamp posing as a criminal, „George W. Welch, alias 
Bull, alias Pickens etcetry etcetry‟ (it goes on). PF28 
 
The most often used persona was Duchamp‟s female alter-ego: “Rrose Sélavy” 
(“Eros, c‟est la vie”). This figure emerged in a series of photos of the artist dressed as a 
woman taken by Man Ray (1921). Later, Duchamp signed a few works with this 
pseudonym (i.e. film Anemic Cinema, 1926) and used it in a title of the assemblage Why 
Not Sneeze, Rrose Sélavy? (1921).  
 
 
10. Marcel Duchamp as Rrose Sélavy, photographed by Man Ray, 1921 
 
In 1921 Duchamp and Man Ray created a photograph of the bottle of toilet 
water with the image of “Rrose Sélavy” on it. The bottle is labelled: Belle Haleine Eau 
de Voilette (“Lovely Breath: Veil Water”) – which is a phonetic play with the phrase: 
“Belle Helene Eau de Toilette”. This work is in fact a multilayered masquerade and a 
chain of substitutions – Duchamp “looks” like a woman named Sélavy on the bottle of 
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„toilet‟ water Belle Haleine that sounds like Belle Helene.PF29FP The photographed object 
becomes indeed the „veil‟ water – its actual function causes confusion, its fragrance is 
supposed to „veil‟ the odours but the „masking‟ function is also related to the artist 
himself and his own cross-dress disguise. The artist, in these and other works, employs 
the creative potential of using simultaneously double or multiple planes of rational (and 
irrational) thinking. Through his own disguise he exposes the fluidity of artistic (and 
non-artistic) identity, the ongoing tension between the absurd, the irrationality and the 
precise calculation, or even manipulation in the artistic process. He questions not only 
the opposition feminine/masculine, but also fiction/reality, art/life, and serious/non-
serious.   
Duchamp masquerades contributed significantly to the development of the 
strategy of play as performance, with the possibility of literally stepping into the 
Other‟s shoes. Moreover, they exposed the human‟s ergon – as his or her proper 
identification – to be constructed and played out as well. Duchamp/Sélavy exposes the 
performativity of gender and sexuality, as theorised later by Judith Butler. PF
30
FP According 
to Katharine Conley, “Duchamp disguised as Rrose Sélavy but still recognizably 
Duchamp in most of Man Ray‟s photographs also projects a layered sexual identity that 
runs from the masculine to feminine and back to the masculine again.”PF31FP In Belle 
Haleine he remains himself „as‟ the „other‟, at the same time resides inside and outside 
his usual identification. “Marcel/Rrose mobilizes this transitive field, occupies both 
sides (or even an in-between) of the ambivalent (or perhaps more accurately, 
multivalent) playing out of gender and sexual identities.”PF32FP Duchamp goes beyond the 
male/female and self/other opposition, clearly using play-masquerade as a tool of 
subversion. However, Amelia Jones also speculates that maybe Duchamp‟s 
performance is a reaffirmation of a patriarchal state of affairs “in which the best woman 
is a man”; an appropriation of woman‟s role in order to control.PF33FP In context of my 
thesis, this perspective evokes questions about the mastery in general – is it possible to 
go beyond one‟s ergon in art and social life and overcome the will (or the necessity) to 
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control? I will address this issue in the next chapter in the section relating to artist as a 
game master. 
The use of disguise in Duchamp, the calculated role-playing, can be interpreted 
as his discovery and use of play, not as an exotic and „primitive‟ supplement, but a 
necessity and a philosophical condition for the artistic act. Masquerade as a conceptual 
tool unveils the multilayered structure of the artistic activity and its reception, and the 
functioning of the art world as such. It highlights play that is not opposed to rational 
mind (not stereotypically “naive”, „primitive‟, “childish”), but rather deeply embedded 
within rationality to be able to transgress it and to bring new unexpected insights. 
Duchamp as a „master‟ of subversive, rational and prerational play exceeds the 
modernist/primitivist approach to play, and creative process in general. He is rather 
credited as being the initiator of the postmodern ambiguity, fluidity, and movement „in-
between‟ the opposites.PF34FP All his strategies (use of wordplay, chance, humour, games, 
costumes and performance) were explored and applied by other artists as well (as 
discussed in the previous sections). Duchamp‟s oeuvre, nonetheless, marks a shift in the 
application of the strategy of play – from the „prerational‟ supplement, to the much 
more consciously applied conceptual device. This approach was further developed in 
the post-war era by American artists, John Cage, Allan Kaprow and Jack Higgins, 
among others. 
 
- Cage‟s play with chance  
The element of chance was extensively explored by Dadaists and Surrealists as a 
means liberating art from rules, formal and intellectual constraints. The first avant-
garde celebrated chance and automatism as the expression of nature and natural laws, 
and as a way to employ the unconsciousness in the creative process. The experiments 
held by the American post-war artists added yet another dimension to the use of chance, 
and this time the inspiration came from the East, from the philosophy of Zen Buddhism.  
Flipping a coin, among other uses of chance, to determine the duration of notes 
in a music composition, was practiced by Duchamp‟s chess partner, John Cage, pioneer 
of chance music, non-standard musical performance and composition. Through his 
contacts among the avant-garde, his collaborations and his teaching in the Black 
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Mountain College and New School of Social Research (his students included Allan 
Kaprow and Dick Higgins), he disseminated his Zen-inspired approach to artistic 
creation. Cage studied Zen in the 1940s and based many of his compositions on the 
structure of I Ching, an ancient Chinese philosophical book. 
The American post-war artist‟s fascination with Zen Buddhism had a significant 
influence on the development of the strategy of play in the 20 P
th
P century art, because it 
introduced an alternative (to the traditional Western metaphysics) approach to work and 
play, reality and fiction and other dichotomies: 
The master in the art of living 
makes little distinction between 
his work and his play, 
his labour and his leisure, 
his mind and his body, 
his education and his recreation,  
his love and his religion. 
He hardly knows which is which. 
He simply pursues his vision of excellence 
in whatever he does, 
leaving others to decide 
where he is working or playing. 
To him, he is always doing both. PF35FP  
The fundamental idea that can be derived from Zen philosophy, poetically summarised 
above, is the dissolution of opposites in the overarching flow of life. In the works of 
Cage, and also in the future projects of his students (Happenings, Fluxus), fascination 
with Zen was manifested in the strategy of „letting go‟ or indeterminacy and inviting 
non-art elements to be natural components of the aesthetic experience initiated by the 
artist. This included the use of everyday activities and objects, background noise, 
improvisation, contribution from the viewers and passers-by. Everything, even the most 
banal everyday object or situation could become a part of the work of art because Zen 
does not distinguish between ordinary and extraordinary, high and low, and does not 
impose any other hierarchical classifications. As Cage remarks, “Zen teaches us that we 
are really in a situation of decentring, .... There is then a plurality and a multiplicity of 
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centres. And they are all interpenetrating.” PF36FP The hierarchical Western approach, 
enforcing order and separating „centres‟ from „margins‟, becomes questioned. Like with 
Derrida, there is no one proper and pure „centre‟ which is not already penetrated by 
other „centres‟. Play acts precisely as the all-permeating movement decentring any 
structure („playing with ergon‟), or as the humorous gesture of “pulling out the rug 
from under any pomposity”PF37FP.  
Also, the work of art was to be devoid of the pressure of meeting the designed 
goal, the final effect. As Robert Linssen writes, Zen helps to give up “strivings to 
„become‟, to possess and to dominate” and instead it teaches to “let go” to discover 
“felicity and relaxation of Being.” PF38FP For Cage, this perspective entailed the way of work 
“in a spirit of acceptance rather than a spirit of control”. PF39FP Cage‟s manifesto (1952) 
consists of these three lines: 
nothing is accomplished by writing a piece of music  
nothing is accomplished by hearing a piece of music 
nothing is accomplished by playing a piece of music PF40FP  
These statements remind us of Gadamer‟s notion of play as a disinterested movement 
backward and forward, which “has no goal that brings it to an end” PF41FP. The artist, his/her 
works and the audience, due to the strategy of indetermination, can partake in the 
movement of Being. According to Cage, “Today, beside stability, we allow for 
instability. We have come to desire the experience of what is. But this “what is” is 
neither stable nor unchanging. ... “What is” doesn‟t depend on us, we depend on it.” PF42F P 
As Paul Griffiths writes, “The composer thus becomes a proposer, one who creates 
„opportunities for experience‟ while denying himself those intentions of expressing, 
limiting, and shaping”. PF43FP The artist gives up his mastery but, the question recurs – is it 
really possible? The “letting go”, as a way to experience the „unmediated‟ reality, 
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remains a conscious creative strategy. The artistic intention and decision of some sort 
are inescapable elements of the process. Cage makes it quite clear saying: 
Most people who believe that I‟m interested in chance don‟t realize that I use chance as 
a discipline. They think I use it – I don‟t know – as a way of giving up making choices. 
But my choices consist in choosing what questions to ask. PF44FP  
As I wrote in chapter 2, a work of art is never just a pure manifestation of chance. The 
decision to use chance strategically imposes the frame of representation. The 
meaningless and randomness of events or sounds becomes meaningful, becomes 
something else – a play of chance or – a work of art.  
 
- „Little laboratory‟ of Fluxus  
From the ideas of chance and indetermination disseminated by John Cage, from 
the playful spirit of Dada and the scientific approach of Bauhaus, among other 
influences, emerged Fluxus, a movement officially initiated by George Maciunas in 
1962. Ken Friedman, one of Fluxus artists, in the article Fluxus & Company (1989), 
describes the research programme of Fluxus groups, as characterized by twelve main 
ideas:  
globalism, 
the unity of art and life, 
intermedia, 
experimentalism, 
chance, 
playfulness, 
simplicity, 
implicativeness, 
exemplativism, 
specificity, 
presence in time, and 
musicality. PF45 
The playfulness of Fluxus came from the artists‟ interest in jokes, games, puzzles and 
gags as structures for artistic actions and objects. However, as Friedman explains, there 
was more to play in Fluxus than humour and fun. The artists were interested in play as 
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it occurs in scientific research, as a spirit of sudden creativity – “the playfulness of free 
experimentation, the playfulness of free association and the play of paradigm 
shifting”.PF46FP Unlike nihilistic Dada, Fluxus had a constructive agenda of micro-
transformations within various spheres of people‟s interaction with one another and 
with the environment. Fluxus artists from different countries and continents worked 
together on many projects to come up with new methods and results as it is practiced in 
a collaborative scientific research. However, this scientific programme was a non-
functional tool. The serious methodology was contrasted with absurd, playful or poetic 
works.  
The global „little laboratory‟ of Fluxus produced various ephemeral gestures, 
objects and situations in the form of artist books, mail-art, poems, performances, 
happenings, noise music compositions, and many others. The most specific art forms 
were boxes with the collections of cards, games, puzzles, texts and event scores. These 
works were similar in concept to the hobby or do-it-yourself kits, and were instructing 
on how to make/perform an art piece. Ken Friedman describes the idea behind these 
works as „musicality‟, meaning that the works “can be realized by artists other than the 
creator.”PF47FP  
This approach promoted the modes of collective work, collaboration and free 
exchange of ideas, instead of the authorial control and individualism inscribed in the 
traditional Western notion of artistic creation. The Fluxus artist as a researcher in his or 
her playful laboratory wanted to inspire the viewers and participants of art events to 
implement little experiments by themselves. He or she, instead of being a maker, often 
remained the designer of the event, the animator of play to be enjoyed and carried out 
by the others. The instructions, programmes and plans to be enacted, in the form of 
intimate private happenings, as in case of Yoko Ono works, were addressed to 
everybody:  
TOUCH POEM FOR A GROUP OF PEOPLE 
Touch each other. 
1963 winter PF48FP   
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George Brecht produced many Flux boxes and scores based on the model of 
game. In his Swim Puzzle Box Game (1965) he instructed the „players‟ to “arrange the 
beads in such a way the word CUAL never occurs”. PF49FP However, there were no beads in 
the box, only a seashell. Apart from its poetic quality and a surrealist charm, Brecht‟s 
game implies the possibility of creating new rules, so the new game can be played. 
Brecht opens his „box‟ for contribution, for the creative input from the viewer or other 
artist. He also questions the exclusive authority of the artist and rules of his game. The 
play of art literally transgresses the initial intention locked in the „box‟ and allows it to 
be played by the others in endless unpredictable ways. However, the first move 
inevitably belongs to the artist.  
 
 
   Copyright image 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11. George Maciunas, Spell Your Name with these Objects, 1976 
 
The list of playgrounds occupied by modern artists can probably be extended. 
Nonetheless, I think that the examples presented above cover the most important and 
seminal play strategies concerning artistic process in the first and second avant-gardes. 
All these strategies were employed to activate the public and to make art an anti-
professional, anti-elitist occupation. This agenda was further developed in the practices 
focused directly at the viewer‟s experience and participation. As Duchamp writes in 
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The Creative Art (1957), “All in all, the creative act is not performed by the artist alone; 
the spectator brings the work in contact with the external world.” PF50 
In the next section I will introduce changes that occurred in the post-war 
approach to the gallery or museum space, and the viewer‟s presence in this space, 
which contributed to the development of the interactive and participatory playgrounds 
of recent art.  
 
„Viewer the Player‟ 
This section will analyse a few initial moments in the history of Installation art 
relevant to the development of play as an artistic method in modern and postmodern art. 
As I will argue, the shift of approach to the gallery space and to the viewer‟s navigation 
of this space was a further step in the quest for the authentic, direct and multisensory 
experience in the context of art. It was also a way to activate the viewers, to make them 
aware of their own role in the „performing of the creative act‟, to gradually transform 
them into artist‟s „playmates‟. 
After Claire Bishop, I apply „Installation art‟ as: “a term that loosely refers to 
the type of art into which the viewer physically enters, and which is often described as 
„theatrical‟, „immersive‟, or „experiential‟” PF51FP, and also the one that uses “materials and 
methodologies not traditionally associated with the visual arts” PF52FP. In my view, it is not a 
coincidence that this definition echoes the one of „primitivism‟ (as “using 
unconventional procedures or techniques that bypass the methods normally associated 
with the trained painter or sculptor” PF53FP). The common agenda is to evoke an „experience‟ 
that is not art-like but life-like, that „presents‟ things instead of represent them. In both 
cases, play serves as a model; as an activity performed here and now, immersed in the 
flux of life. 
 
One of the artistic events that influenced the emergence of Installation art was 
the 1938 Exposition Internationale du Surrealisme in Paris. On display, apart from 
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paintings, were typical (bizarre) Surrealist objects, like a taxi with two mannequins on 
the front seats, and water sprinkling down the inside of the windows (S. Dali, Rainy 
Taxi). However, the overall arrangement by Marcel Duchamp, the curator of the show, 
was innovative and transformed the space into the suggestive „Surrealist world‟. 
Duchamp converted the main hall into a „cave‟, with the use of bags of coal hanging 
from the ceiling. The only lighting was provided by a single light bulb, so the viewers 
were handed flashlights to manoeuvre through the darkness and illuminate the artworks 
for themselves. The floor was covered with dry leaves, grass and fern and the air was 
filled with the aroma of coffee. According to the artists‟ expectations, the visitors 
interpreted this arrangement as a provocation and were not eager to immerse in the 
playful exploration of the space. PF
54
 
The shift in the attitude of the wider public, in terms of what is proper and 
desirable in the exhibition space and what kind of experience can be accepted as 
aesthetic, can be attributed, to some extent, to the post-war growth of the entertainment 
industry in the United States. According to Mark Rozenthal, some links can be traced 
between the emergence of Installation art and theme parks with the first Disneyland PF
55
FP 
opened in California in 1955:  
Disneyland was perhaps the single most significant and influential force in shaping a 
large American public‟s expectations about similar experiences, suggesting that a total 
environment of sensory pleasures might be possible in a “leisure” situation. ... In other 
words, some portion of the art-going public came to expect and want to be catered to by 
cultural activities that offer participatory component, and which installations are so 
thoroughly geared to provide. PF56 
For me, a theme park (e.g. Disneyland), acts as yet another model of „playground‟ that 
might have loosely stimulated the artists‟ pursuits in terms of transforming the viewer‟s 
role into more engaged modes of interaction, and of overcoming the isolation and 
detachment of art from other spheres of social life. Whether we accept Disneyland as a 
source of inspiration (or contestation) for the artists in the early years of Installation art, 
there exist similarities that cannot be overlooked. In the „theme park‟ model, the 
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observer has an opportunity to become an active visitor, and to experience different 
reality, just like during the excursion to another country – to touch, see, immerse and 
interpret the experience for oneself. John Hench, one of the chief designers of 
Disneyland, remarks: “As guests traverse the tunnel, they leave behind the everyday 
routine of working, maintaining shelter, obeying rules; they enter a space where they 
can play voluntarily, and where we know they will have opportunity to feel more 
alive.”PF57FP In other words, they can leave behind the world of work and experience a „real 
meaning of life‟. It seems different from watching the movie, spectacle or 
contemplating the painting on a wall. The „visitor‟ can make some decisions about his 
or her own „being‟ within the environment, the one that is tangible and open for 
exploration in time and space. “Not only the journey to Disneyland, but the journeys 
between the lands within Disneyland became active spatial stories.”PF58FP  
Apart from the common purpose of providing the viewers with the „heightened 
experience‟ of tangible and ambient „reality‟, both Installation art and Disneyland 
follow the specific social agenda. Disney intended his parks to be “reminiscent of 
American utopian communities” PF59FP where people can “express their inherent sociability, 
but free of contamination of modern cities”. PF60FP As Claire Bishop writes, many 
Installation works (especially of „relational‟ character) try to generate communication 
between visitors, to foster the direct face-to-face interaction, and to „set up functioning 
“microtopias” in the here and now‟. PF61FP The frames of play are used in these works to 
separate participants from all dangers and disappointments of real life (like a tall bank 
around Disneyland), and to provide them with the experience of natural human bonds, 
and the long lost spirit of togetherness – the promises that bring to mind the primitivist 
myths.  
Despite the similarities between the rhetorics of Installation art and a theme 
park, it is difficult to prove the actual role of the latter as a source of inspiration for the 
artists. Allan Kaprow, the pioneer of Installation art in the form of “Environments” 
(from 1958), in his early three-dimensional assemblages was interested primarily in the 
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transformation of the typical “art look” of art objects and arrangements – this was the 
intention behind the use of “materials and images that referred to commonplace forms 
of entertainment and advertising, such as carnivals, shooting galleries, and sandwich 
boards”.PF62FP However, most of his inspirations came from the art world and they included 
Jackson Pollock‟s action painting (as an activity incorporating space); Kurt Schwitters‟ 
Merzbau; Japanese Gutai group events (from 1954); John Cage‟s process rather than 
product-oriented experimental approach; and first of all, the book Art as Experience 
(1934) by John Dewey – American philosopher, psychologist and educator.  
 
According to Dewey, the work of art cannot be reduced to the aesthetic object, 
but it rather must be traced in what this object “does with and in experience” PF63FP. To 
achieve this effect art should become interwoven with the processes of everyday life 
and not “remitted to a separate realm, where it is cut off from the association with the 
materials and aims of every other form of human effort, undergoing and 
achievement.” PF64FP The proposition to bring art back to life, as a part of natural „being‟ 
instead of „artificial‟ and „detached‟ representation, echoes the primitivist manifestos of 
modern art. It is especially evident when Dewey refers to the “artworks of the past” as 
inscribed within the “significant life of an organized community” PF65FP, and when he 
prescribes direct experience coming “from nature and man interacting with each 
other”PF66FP as a remedy for the modern aesthetics of autonomy.  However, Dewey, as a 
philosopher, not artist, does not propose specific artistic means. He leaves the 
possibilities open, simply pointing out promises of art as „experience‟:   
Experience is the result, the sign, and the reward of that interaction of organism and 
environment which, when it is carried to the full, is a transformation of interaction into 
participation and communication. PF67FP   
Interaction with the environment occurs through the senses and it consists of the 
processes of “doing and undergoing” PF68FP. In the situation of art, the viewer must then be 
                                                            
P
62
P Kelley J., Childsplay: the art of Allan Kaprow, University of California Press, Berkeley, London, 2004, 
p. 14, further quotations refer to this edition 
P
63
P Dewey J., Art as Experience, 1934, A Perige Book, New York, 2005, p. 1, further quotations refer to 
this edition 
P
64
P Ibidem, p. 2  
P
65
P Ibidem, p. 5 
P
66
P Ibidem, p. 15 
P
67
P Ibidem, p. 22  
P
68
P Ibidem, p. 50 
141 
 
seen as the receiver as well as the producer of experience and meaning. By the 
„experience‟, in the context of art, Dewey means a sort of revelation, a moment in the 
stream of events interpreted as unique. As he writes, it is “defined by those situations 
and episodes that we spontaneously refer to as being „real experiences‟; those things of 
which we say in recalling them, “that was an experience”.” PF69FP   
From the perspective of my thesis, „having an experience‟ as different from 
simply experiencing things, exposes the operation of play-parergon and the frames of 
representation. The usual „meaningless‟ matter of life becomes meaningful, becomes 
double, symbolic, different from its ordinary self. It starts resonating with some 
memories or desires, and provokes movement of thoughts and emotions. 
 
Kaprow‟s Environments were to a large degree the artistic interpretation of 
Dewey‟s theory. He intended to create the art form that would be “as open and fluid as 
the shapes of our everyday experience”, but not simply imitating it. PF70FP Like other artists 
from the New York circle at that time, he was interested in the use of junk, raw 
materials of industrial and everyday objects and spaces, as opposed to the „white cube‟ 
of the gallery and museum which he saw as responsible for isolating art from life. 
Kaprow defined Environments as: “intensified interiors or exteriors” that give the 
viewer the opportunity to “GO IN instead of LOOK AT”. PF71FP  
The first two Environments (Beauty Parlour) were created by Kaprow in Hansa 
Gallery, New York in 1958. These were interiors arranged with “layers of cloth and 
plastic sheets, loosely painted in heraldic bands”, “swarms of tiny blinking Christmas 
lights”, broken mirrors, and spotlights aimed at the spectator, among other objects. “An 
oscillating electric fan circulated chemical odours, and electric sounds were broadcast 
from loudspeakers.” PF72FP These Environments met with the artist‟s intention to surround 
the viewer with various stimuli which were not „represented‟ but „present‟ to cause the 
direct sensation.   
Works like these initiated the chain of changes in the approach to the viewer‟s 
interaction with the artwork and the space, which continues in recent art as well. It can 
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even be said that the model of Disneyland (as an alternative reality), becomes much 
more relevant these days, due to the ongoing technological revolution and the 
domination of digital multimedia. According to US artist and writer Robert Smithson, 
“museums and galleries could become venues for new forms of entertainment like 
discotheques”PF73FP. Due to the light and sound effects, and the monumentality of many 
projects (i.e. Diller and Scofidio, Blur Building, 2002, Olafur Eliasson, The Weather 
Project, 2003), the audience can indeed feel enchanted, immersed or even lost in the 
„reality‟ designed by the artists. Viewers, in the artistic playground, can become 
children scared or entertained, sitting around the magician who shows his tricks, but 
also consumers on a Saturday night in the techno club, „guinea-pigs‟ in the futuristic 
laboratory, tourists in non-existing states, and so on. Installation works introduced the 
approach to the gallery space (and the space of art in general) as an ambient „micro 
world‟, which has been developed further in recent participatory process-oriented 
projects. I will expand on this issue in the next chapter.  
 
Let‟s play together  
Kaprow‟s Environments were only the transitional stage in his pursuits of life-
like or non-art art. In Happenings (from 1959) he enabled the viewer not only „to be 
inside‟ the work of art, but to „be an active participant‟. Some of Happenings combined 
the new interactive elements with the specifically designed spaces, like in the former 
Environments; some were based mainly on the interaction among the participants. The 
idea of Happenings was partially a further development of Kaprow‟s interpretation of 
Dewey, his readings of Huizinga‟s Homo Ludens and Erving Goffman‟s The 
Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, but also, it came from the observation of his own 
children in their play. Kaprow‟s Happenings were among the first process-oriented 
works in which play-like activity was not just an artistic means to produce an artwork 
but a „final product‟ itself. 
 
- Children‟s play 
“In the end, works of art are the only media of complete and unhindered 
communication between man and man that can occur in a world full of gulfs and walls 
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that limit the community of experience.” PF74FP According to Dewey, art „as experience‟ 
should first of all become a collective experience, which occurs through communication 
as “the process of creating participation, of making common what had been isolated and 
singular.”PF75FP The participation, as suggested by Dewey, was for Kaprow the possible 
solution for blurring the boundary between artist and viewers, between the 
commonplace and the „artistic‟ – a strategy to achieve his non-art ideal of art. 
Children‟s play became the direct inspiration for the development of the new, wholly 
participatory form of art – Happening. 
Around this time [1960-61], Kaprow began noticing how his three small children 
played together in an unscripted yet wholly participatory way. Theirs was a self-
generated kind of play in which a proposal – “let‟s play house” – would either be 
accepted or an alternative – “no let‟s make a fort” advanced. Roles would be 
negotiated, after which the playing would commence without an audience. ... Kaprow 
wasn‟t interested in mimicking children‟s play in his art, nor was he inspired by 
sentiments about childhood. Rather, he began seeing “childsplay” as an attitude towards 
playing that he could imagine in its adult forms. PF76FP  
The most important aspect for Kaprow was the lack of audience, the anti-theatrical 
character of children‟s play. Instead of treating viewers as an element of the 
Environment – partially the active participants, partially the passive onlookers – he 
started to see them as playmates. They could become co-creators of the events inspired 
by everyday tasks and routines, games and exchanges. The artist‟s role was to prepare a 
general plan, which would be open for improvisation, chance, and the participants‟ own 
choices and inputs.   
A plan is not the same as its enactment, however; one is an invitation to play, and the 
other is actually playing. While the invitation is meaningful as metaphor, the enactment 
of the invitation generates meaning as experience. The spectator “embodies” the 
metaphor by enacting the plan, and it is the embodiment that constitutes our 
participation in the work. PF77FP  
From my perspective, this approach highlights the fusion of „rational‟ and „prerational‟ 
play in the creative act. The artist remains an initiator; he proposes a metaphor to be 
worked/played with, but the whole process occurs on the edges of subjective control 
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and improvisation, representation and experience, the individual and the collective and 
so on. 
One of the first works that included the Environment-like space arrangement 
and the open-ended plan for the audience‟s participation was The Apple Shrine (1960). 
The gallery was transformed into a labyrinth or a modern jungle constructed with 
Kaprow‟s usual materials – cardboard, rags, straw, crumpled newspapers and chicken 
wire. The central place was occupied by a table with real and plastic apples on it. The 
viewer could either eat the real apple or take the fake one home. In his later works 
Kaprow has gradually extended the participants‟ options and, in most cases, he also 
replaced the gallery with the open-air environment of the backyard, farm, beach, woods, 
city dump, parking lot and many others. 
The 1964 Happening Household took place at the Ithaca City Dump in New 
York. The general plan focused around the domestic conflicts between man and women 
and “was played out using sexual stereotypes in a kind of children‟s war game”. PF78FP Some 
photographs of this Happening show the groups of people – students and young 
families – immersed in a vital, joyous play of chasing, hitting and wrestling on a 
ground.     
 
 
Copyright image 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12. Allan Kaprow, Household, Ithaca City Dump, New York, 1964 
 
The success of this Happening, as well as many other of Kaprow‟s works, lay in the fact 
that the metaphor the participants were enacting was meaningful to them, they could 
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spontaneously contribute to its embodiment, and feel part of the event. To some extent, 
they could act out their own fantasies and fears, just like children do in their play. The 
participants always knew the artist‟s intention behind the Happening and felt invited 
and treated as partners in the creative process. In Assemblages, Environments and 
Happenings (1966) Kaprow states his role as the initiator of the event, one who 
prepares the score, and introduces it to participants. “In this respect it is not different 
from the preparations for a parade, a football match, a wedding, or religious service.” PF79FP  
 
In his essays Kaprow elaborates on the potentials of non-art as play and the role 
of play in the social life in general. According to him the traditional activity of „art‟ 
(production of aesthetic objects) should be abandoned. The artist in a new role as „un-
artist‟ would act as a social educator in play. In the essay Education of the Un-Artist, 
Part II, Kaprow writes:  
Utopian visions of society aided or run by artists have failed because art has failed as a 
social instrument. ... 
Only when active artists willingly cease to be artists can they convert their abilities, like 
dollars into yen, into something the world can spend: play. Play as currency. We can 
best learn to play by example, and un-artists can provide it. PF
80
 
The role of the „un-artist‟ is to play and to lead others in the social exchange based on 
play. One of the strategies would be to give up art as a profession; instead, the un-artists 
could slip between professional categories and “become, for instance, account 
executives, an ecologist, a stunt rider, a politician, a beach bum.” PF81FP “Replacing artist 
with player, as if adopting an alias, is a way of altering a fixed identity. And a changed 
identity is a principle of mobility, of going from one place to another.” PF82FP Kaprow‟s 
position fits, to some extent, therefore, within the model proposed in chapter 3. He 
approached play as parergon, the condition of movement, change and alteration. He 
also saw it as marginal in the traditional status quo, and called for the overthrowing of 
the „fixed identity‟, the ergon of the artist. However, his version of play was a kind of 
modern secular ritual, a “stratagem for the survival of society” PF83FP, offering the 
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experience of community and transcendence. It was important for Kaprow that play, 
unlike games with winners and losers, could be used as an occasion to act together not 
against each other. He saw play as an activity providing its participants with fun, 
pleasure, satisfaction and relaxation from the pressures of the goal-oriented game model 
of life. Even if his Happenings, like Household, were sometimes plotted around the 
conflict theme, their role was to overcome the conflict in a playful manner and to focus 
on the collective action.  
I consider Kaprow‟s Environments and Happenings as one of the most elaborate 
and theoretically articulated contributions to the development of the strategy of play in 
20P
th
P century art. However, to a large degree he followed the primitivist myth of 
„prerational‟ play with its promises of direct experience instead of representation and a 
new form of collective ritual instead of isolation and detachment. What is more, 
Kaprow, who wanted his art to become life-like, paradoxically based it on an idealistic 
model of play derived from antagonism and competition, “play inherently worthwhile, 
play stripped of game theory” PF84FP (educational, social, collective, fostering positive 
human relations, etc.) Nonetheless, even if Kaprow‟s prescription for art to become un-
art play may seem overly optimistic or even naive, I think that things actually went this 
way. However (as always in the case of play-pharmakon), the effects are much more 
complex than the planned social renewal. I will return to this issue in the following 
chapters in the context of recent participatory projects.  
 
- “Dark Play” 
On the opposite pole to Kaprow‟s „children‟s play‟ model, I identify the form of 
artistic play that, using Richard Schechner‟s phrase, can be described as „dark play‟. He 
defines it as an activity which might be physically risky and allows the playing of 
alternative selves. However, “the play frames might be so disturbed or disrupted that 
the players themselves are not sure if they are playing or not”. PF85FP It is usually due to the 
element of danger that the border between play and reality seems to disappear. The 
example of dark play can be the “Russian Roulette”. The tradition of dark play in 
modern art developed as a shadow version of overly idealistic primitivism. Instead of 
innocence, creativity and sociability, the explored notions included: danger, violence, 
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sacrifice, destructiveness and confrontation. A hint of dark play was present in the 
provocative experiments of Dada and Surrealism; however, their actions were 
essentially safe and harmless.   
As I introduced in the previous chapter, George Bataille can be pointed out as a 
modern theorist of the „dark‟ side of artistic creation, which according to him – like a 
sacrifice ritual – can lead to transcendence. His notion of „alteration‟ refers to the 
“partial decomposition, analogous with that of corpses and at the same time the 
transition (passage) to a perfectly heterogeneous state corresponding to... the sacred”. PF86FP  
If a poem genuinely affects, then it transforms being, doing so in a way that is beyond 
words; .... This sense of shock – of recognition and intimacy – is the essence of poetry, 
and is what connects it with sacrifice, which similarly effects a common consecration 
beyond expression.” PF87FP  
Artistic creation, therefore, becomes an activity that is more of a communion than 
communication; that has a power to transform its participants in ways that cannot be 
wholly grasped. It can be compared to the experience of the sublime – as overwhelming 
and testing one‟s reaction to the situation of „shock‟. The artistic act provides a chance 
to experience something „unpresentable‟ or something beyond “an absolute limit of 
human experience” PF88FP (e.g. death), or at least come very close to this experience. “The 
most one can experience is the vertigo of the edge of the chasm.” PF89FP This is precisely the 
role of the „dark play‟ of art. 
Some authors who inspired Bataille‟s work were Friedrich Nietzsche and 
Marquis de Sade – the proponent of personal and sexual freedom, the pursuit of 
pleasure despite the social and moral norms. Sexual liberation in de Sade could be seen 
as a form of „dark play‟ – the perverse device to test boundaries and limits, and 
gradually break all rules and to violate moral values. The passage between play, game, 
pleasure and abuse, violence, pain, and even between life and death becomes blurred 
and relative. This version of play can be seen as „prerational‟ – in de Sade “man is a 
natural force not reducible to his social situation.” PF90FP   
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  The elements of primitivist „dark play‟ to a significant degree permeate the 
artistic work of Viennese Actionists (from 1965), and Hermann Nitsch in particular. 
Independently from the American art scene, the group developed the art form akin to 
Happenings, but mainly inspired by sacrifice rituals. The artists used animal and human 
blood, viscera and flesh of the slaughtered lambs in the projects ranging from action 
painting to the performative dramas based on ancient Greek Dionysia and the Christian 
motives of the Last Supper and Crucifixion. The main intention was to provide the 
viewers/participants with the experience of catharsis, release of aggression and libidinal 
forces. Nitch referred to these Actions as Abreaktionsspiel (abreaction play). PF
91
FP In On 
the Essence of Tragedy (1965), he points out the role of art 
as a means to rebel against the censorship of our Super Ego. The intellectual and 
conscious control of our lower life energies is pushed aside in order to attain an insight 
into our subconscious, unbridled, chaotic libido. A short contact with these vital forces 
leads to their liberation. They are pushed to extreme satisfaction, ecstasy, joyful cruelty, 
sadomasochistic reactions, excess. PF92 
Nitch‟s art as ritual, with the actions lasting as long as a few days, with slaughtered 
animals and performers eating raw flesh, brings the metaphor, the „something as 
something else‟ element of parergon, to the extreme. The intended symbolic 
purification and liberation from the feelings of guilt is achieved through the activities 
inflicting pain to the animals and the performers. This is the moment where the world of 
representation violates the „reality‟. Art does not become life, but it threatens life.   
 Performance and body art in the 1970s were probably two art forms that have 
reached most often for the repertoire of „dark play‟. The direct contact between 
performers and their audience, the relations of passivity and activity, power and 
subordination have inspired experiments with psychological reactions of the crowd, 
group responsibility, tension between reality and fiction and so on. In the most radical 
cases, the viewers‟ misjudgement of the situation – whether it still belonged to the 
„play‟ frame or had just crossed the line – could have had serious or even fatal 
consequences. In one of her most famous performances Rhythm 0 (1974) Marina 
Abramović placed on the table 72 different objects that could give pleasure or pain PF93FP.  
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They included knives, razor blades, a gun and a single bullet. The participants were 
informed that they can use the objects on the artist‟s body in any way they wished. The 
initial reservation had developed into aggression in some of the participants, provoked 
by the artist‟s passivity. They stripped her naked, cut her body with razor blades; 
someone even put a gun against her head. The line between play and abuse turned out 
to be thin. If some of the participants played their „alternative selves‟ they would have 
seen Mr. Hyde in the mirror. Dark play is always one step, one gesture, deferred from 
falling into the „chasm‟. One step further and it is play no more, nor is it representation.  
 
Conclusion 
The models of play, presented in this chapter, served as a repertoire of strategies 
to modernize art and make it more life-like, immersive, participatory and democratic. 
Modern artists explored the potentials of play as a source of vital, untamed creativity 
and unexpected solutions, and they praised games as activities transgressing the 
traditional dichotomies of work and leisure, serious and non-serious, useful and useless, 
central and marginal. However, in their artistic practices they rather tended to overturn 
the dominant hierarchy and to marginalize the traditional ergon of art. Their rhetoric, 
especially in case of the first avant-garde, was the one of revolution and negation of old 
values.   
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It seems that especially in terms of Dadaists and Surrealists, the cliché of the 
„artist as a playing child‟ is apt to some extent. Their playful strategy was aimed against 
the bourgeoisie – the social group who were the traditional consumers of art, and also 
the one dictating the codes of proper behaviour and appointing rules, including the 
aesthetic ones. The artists were like adolescent children teasing the „adults‟ and testing 
the limits of freedom – each time trying to push the boundary a little further. They were 
continuing the 19 P
th
P century bohemian „game‟ of „Épater la Bourgeoisie‟ – shock the 
middle class. In the first avant-garde, games and play served as provocative and utopian 
models, carnivalesque devices, temporarily overturning the everyday status quo, and as 
an occasion to take revenge on the „reality‟ with its rigid social and political structure. 
Marcel Duchamp‟s conceptual art as play with his masquerades and puns, 
opened up a whole new perspective for the artistic production and the relations within 
the art world. He pushed 20 P
th
P century art to the fluid grounds of parergon, relative 
values and viewpoints, ultimately undermining the ergon side of artistic creation, as 
making aesthetic objects. He also contributed to the re-evaluation of play as a strategy 
transgressing the primitivist connotations. In Duchamp, play is intellectual and rational 
and able to transgress rationality and bring new unexpected insights into the work of 
art. It is also the joint intellectual activity of the artist and the viewers.  
The experimental play of post-war American artists (e.g. Cage, Kaprow) was 
not a weapon anymore; it was much more open for viewers as potential contributors, 
co-artists, players and partners in the activities that tended to blur the boundaries and 
borders between people and between the art world and „real‟ life. I would even say that 
in the post-war era there occurred a gradual role-swap process – the artists started acting 
more like adults who needed to take care of their viewers and provide them with an 
aesthetic/emotional/sensual experience in the most effective way possible. The 
development of Installation art, which I compared to the model of theme park (e.g. 
Disneyland), was another step in the artists‟ quest for „heightened‟ experience instead 
of representation, and collective sociability in the situation of art. Kaprow‟s invitation 
directed to the viewers to join the artists in their activities, and play together, was 
intended to create new spaces of communication, instead of conflict or isolation as 
dominant modes of contact in the urban society. This approach has reached its 
contemporary manifestations in what Nicolas Bourriaud named as „relational 
aesthetics‟, which I will discuss in the following chapters.  
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However, parallel to the „positive‟ model of play (e.g. Kaprow‟s „children‟s 
play‟) there also developed the alternative approach to play as sacrifice, confrontation, 
slave/master relation, etc. – which I labelled after Schechner – as „dark play‟. Both 
models keep inspiring artists and are productive of the contradictory interpretations of 
play – as didactic or subversive (or even dangerous) in social life and art.  
The participatory or process-oriented forms of art have been gaining popularity 
in recent art, and it seems that the model of play or game has become a widely used one 
in these kinds of projects. However, the postmodern application of play generates a 
whole new range of questions, and they refer to the aspects of power distribution, 
political agendas, art as entertainment, and a promise of non-representation – an 
immediate experience – instead of the artistic mediation. In chapter 7 I will discuss 
some of the consequences of the strategy of play for the general „postmodern turn‟ in 
art and culture.  
In the next chapter I will analyse the most recent art phenomena, namely 
participatory and „relational‟ ones which have assimilated modern experiments with 
play to become a part of the official artistic and curatorial agenda, or what I will refer to 
as the „tactic of play‟.  
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Chapter 6 
Role-playing games of participatory art 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter I identified a few types of the activity of play: cabaret, 
excursion, parlour games, wordplay, games of chance, children‟s play and para-
scientific playful research, applied by modern artists to test new ideas and modes of 
creation, to enhance creativity and broaden the range of artistic tools, and to establish 
new forms of interaction with the public. Drawing on popular forms of play or 
entertainment was a strategy aimed by the artists against the traditional bourgeois 
conventions of „consuming‟ the work of art, and, in general, used as a way to stimulate 
the audience out of its usual passive role, either by the means of provocation, shock, 
surprise or an invitation to become an active participant in the creative act.  The 
inspiration with play as an interactive social activity influenced the experiments with art 
forms that would come closer to the „authentic‟ experience than the traditional modes of 
making and displaying art. The use of play was also an anti-commercial statement, 
opposing the work of art as a commodity, artefact, and an outcome of production 
among other modern gadgets and goods.  
In this chapter I will analyse artistic practices that potentially assimilated 
modern „play strategies‟, to become frequently used tools of the „professional artist‟. 
Although I will refer to the particular trend in recent art – namely participatory projects 
– today‟s artists, unlike their modern predecessors, do not form movements under 
unifying slogans. This role is usually left to art critics and curators, who invent different 
terms in order to categorize, describe, or to promote or even create certain artistic 
phenomena. The example could be French curator Nicolas Bourriaud, who coined the 
term “relational aesthetics” to describe the projects by Rirkrit Tiravanija, Pierre 
Huyghe, Felix Gonzalez-Torres, Vanessa Beecroft, Surasi Kusolwong, among others. 
His definition of relational art as: “taking as its theoretical horizon the realm of human 
interactions and its social context, rather than the assertion of an independent and 
private symbolic space”PF1FP can be treated as a general description of practices I refer to in 
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this chapter. They are participatory, interactive, public, dialogical and relational, and 
their common agenda is the use of performative means and the central role of 
viewers/participants interaction with the artwork or with each other in the artistic 
process.  
Similarly to modern avant-gardes, recent art attempts to marginalize or hide its 
own professional side, and the whole range of accompanying consequences and 
conditions in the capitalist and consumerist society it belongs to. Art as commodity is 
not trustworthy as a medium for the anti-commercial, socially or politically engaged 
messages. It is not independent from the various sources of pressure like sponsors, 
collectors, art galleries and museums entangled in the constricting chains of financial 
and political dependences. Obviously, art as a part of social life cannot exist outside its 
rules. However, somehow, it has to pretend that it does, that it possesses the necessary 
distance to be able to comment on these rules. In effect, contemporary artists, like their 
modern predecessors try „to do away with art‟ as „work‟ (specialization, production), 
and as „representation‟ (mediation, artifice). In my view, play remains an important 
element in this process. However, it is not so much revolutionary and strategic as it was 
in modern projects. Using another of De Certau‟s terms, I will refer to the use of play in 
postmodern art as „tactical‟.  
Seeing certain activities as non-representational and the belief in the „non-art‟ 
ideal of art as closer to the „real‟ life and truth (or truths), is one of the modern myths 
still present in the contemporary artistic practice and cultural realm in general. I will 
discuss Nigel Thrift‟s theory of non-representation as an example of this perspective.  
The longing for the authenticity of experience not represented by someone else, 
and most often of the experience that is much different from one‟s own everyday 
activities and identifications, contributed to the development of the contemporary „role-
playing‟ form of participation, employed in education, entertainment and art. The 
purpose of this chapter is to analyse uses and interpretations of play, offshoots of 
modern ones, in the selected works of art from the 1990s to date that employ the 
strategies of role-playing. I will analyse recent participatory works in order to test 
whether play has become their main structural element, or a „tactic‟, instead of an 
externally applied strategy. I will examine whether it is possible to apply the metaphor 
of the Role-Playing Game to critically discuss the elements of participatory projects 
such as the roles of, and relationship between the artist and viewers, and the 
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characteristics of their encounter/artwork. This analysis will provide data for the final 
discussion (in the next chapter) on the effects of structuring artistic activities as „play‟, 
in terms of the viewers‟ participation, the quest for „non-representation‟ and 
ergon/parergon fluctuations. 
 
“Tactic” of play 
 Before I introduce the model of Role-Playing Game, I need to clarify the use of 
terms. In previous chapters I have referred to the application of play in modern avant-
gardes as „strategic‟ (following de Certeau‟s notion of „strategy‟). However, in the 
course of time, there has occurred the gradual assimilation of play as an artistic tool. It 
is impossible to decide when the notion of play has become an accepted component of 
the artistic vocabulary. Nonetheless, in my view, we need to differentiate between the 
use of play in modern and postmodern art (even though all classifications and 
distinctions of this kind are inevitably schematic). In contrast to the modern „strategy‟ 
of play – organized around certain central values and as a revolutionary tool loaded 
with the notion of power – I propose to refer to the postmodern or contemporary use of 
play as a „tactic‟ of play. „Tactic‟ is also de Certeau‟s term, and he describes it as a 
“calculated action determined by the absence of the proper locus”.PF2FP According to de 
Certeau, tactical actions fit into the official structure in order to modify it locally and 
gradually by the micro interventions. They use “opportunities afforded by the particular 
occasion”PF3FP and they lack the view of the whole (because, perhaps, the „view of the 
whole‟ is a demagogic utopia held by the strategic approach). The artistic tactic of play, 
due to the lack of universal ergon in social life and art, supports activities focused on 
the specific problems „here and now‟, instead of the general agenda of artistic or social 
revolution. The tactic is much more open-ended and dialogical than the strategy and it 
coexists with the rules of the given reality. Furthermore, as de Certeau puts it, “The 
space of the tactic is the space of the other. Thus it must play on and with a terrain 
imposed on it and organized by the law of foreign power.” PF4FP It seems that the discourse 
of the modern Other as an external model – followed by the discovery of Other as self – 
has entered the cultural and artistic realm in later modernism and postmodernism as its 
essential ingredient. As I will demonstrate in this chapter, the contemporary artists with 
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the use of the „tactic of play‟, have been actively exploring the spaces and roles bearing 
a stamp of Otherness, in order to disseminate „marginal‟ viewpoints and values within 
the official domain.  
As in case of modern strategies of play, the recent tactics must be seen as frames 
applied in order to structure a broad range of themes, interests, intentions and 
ideological contents. I do not intend to analyse these contents. I am only interested in 
the operation of the play-frame and its consequences for the artist and for the 
participants.  
It is also important to stress here, that adopting play models, either in 20th or 
21st century art, should not be confused with playing. Play as such can occur during the 
process, as in the Surrealist games, but the „strategy‟ and also the „tactic‟ of play belong 
to the notion of work, as a goal-oriented activity. I would even say that the tactic of play 
can be seen, paradoxically, as a „marketing‟ tool today; it makes the art process/product 
more „user-friendly‟, more accessible, more ideologically transparent and so on. What I 
find interesting is that the play models – the play-like remedies or „supplements‟, 
strategic or tactical – tend to transform the characteristics of what we name as „work‟ 
and also the traditional ergon, proper function of art.  
 
Role-Playing Game 
Role-playing – which I propose to see as the common model for participatory 
practices, and the frequent source of recent „tactics of play‟, can be attributed primarily 
to children‟s play (gangsters and cops, playing house), as utilised by Kaprow. However, 
the contemporary version of this kind of play is also often performed by teenagers and 
adults in Role-Playing Games (RPGs).  
A “role-playing game” has been defined as “any game which allows a number of 
players to assume the roles of imaginary characters and operate with some degree of 
freedom in an imaginary environment” (Lortz, 1979, p.30).PF5FP  
It is important to stress that RPGs are not computer or video games such as Tomb 
Raider or Diablo. They are based on a direct verbal interaction between players being 
devoid of the element of competition, and they allow for the player‟s own initiative, use 
of imagination and negotiation of rules. The small group of players is led by the game 
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master (referee), who is responsible for creating/adjusting the game world and the main 
plot of action. The players „perform‟ mainly through verbal communication: they 
describe their activities, negotiate moves and immerse themselves in the imaginary 
world as a team of fictional male and female heroes. Some RPGs are played with the 
use of costumes, often outdoors and remind one of improvisational theatre (with no 
audience). The game “allows people to become simultaneously both the artists who 
create a story and the audience who watches the story unfold.” PF6FP  
In general, RPGs can be described as collaborative and interactive storytelling. 
As Gary Fine points out, due to the significant amount of freedom left for the players, 
“fantasy games are in some ways more like „life‟ than like „games‟”:  
Despite the fact that the worlds in which characters interact have no physical “reality”, 
the social processes which operate are as “real” and as significant as any which operate 
when people are working together or are playing together in other circumstances. PF7 
It is also worth stressing that these processes (social, interpersonal, power relations, 
etc.) belong simultaneously to reality and fiction; “role-playing is never a state of pure 
imagining, because the player is always connected simultaneously to both the diegesis 
and the real world.”PF8FP  
In my view, contemporary participatory practices share many elements with 
RPGs. Artists and viewers/participants often enact symbolic or real-life roles during the 
process which involves typical children‟s make-believe play or theatrical techniques. 
The artist as organizer, manager, animator, director of the set, can be compared to the 
„game master‟. He or she chooses certain reality, often quite distant from his or her own 
everyday experience and skill, to become an arena of the „game world‟. The creative 
process, in most cases, takes the form of a social gathering – a „game session‟, based on 
communication and collaboration among participants.  
This last aspect of RPGs – with emphasis on the participatory, collective actions 
– was explored extensively in modern art strategies of play and remains crucial in 
recent art. Following Kaprow‟s ideas of eliminating the public, modern and postmodern 
artists have developed diverse methods for transforming the viewers into active 
                                                            
P
6
P Padol L., 1996, quoted in: Drachen A., Hitchens M., „The Many Faces of Role-Playing Games‟, p. 6, in: 
International Journal of Role-Playing, Issue 1, 2008, at: http://journalofroleplaying.org/, visited: 
14.10.2009 
P
7
P Fine G. A, „Fantasy Role-Play Gaming as a Social World: Imagination and the Social Construction of 
Play‟, in: The Paradoxes of Play, Loy J. (Ed.), p. 222 
P
8
P Harviainen T., „A Hermeneutical Approach to Role-Playing Analysis‟, in: International Journal of Role-
Playing, Issue 1, 2008, p. 70, at: http://journalofroleplaying.org/, visited: 14.10.2009 
157 
 
participants – the artist‟s „playmates‟. RPG, as a metaphor for participatory artistic 
projects, suggests attempts to experience possibilities, relationships and contexts 
outside one‟s usual spheres of activity, or to experience one‟s own „reality‟ from the 
outside and to offer the same opportunity to the viewers. As Tuomas Harviainen writes, 
“through their experientiality and autotelicity role-playing games convey new 
information and create new correspondences between existing social and mental 
connections.” PF9FP The contemporary participatory practices I refer to in this chapter, like 
role playing games, aim at “creating experiences” P F10FP, or more precisely “low-intensity 
liminal experiences”PF11FP. It can be said that the services offered by contemporary art to its 
consumers/participants, with the help of the „tactic of play‟, are the „guided tours‟ to 
„real‟ life.   
 
As leading examples, showing various applications of this tactic, I will quote the 
collaborative site-specific projects A Trip to Asia: an Acoustic Walk around the 
Vietnamese Sector of the 10 P
th
P-Anniversary Stadium (2006) and The Finissage of 
Stadium X (2007-8), curated by Joanna Warsza. The actions took place in the 
abandoned, post-communist stadium in Warsaw, built in 1955 with the post-war rubble; 
a gigantic sports venue able to accommodate a hundred thousand spectators. In the early 
1990s this (no longer functional) relic of the past had been transformed into the early-
capitalist market called Jarmark Europa (Europe Fair) run by Vietnamese, Russian and 
Polish traders. In 2008 the Stadium was demolished and a new National Stadium will 
soon take its place for the occasion of the Euro 2012 Football Championships.  
The projects, including “a walk, a football match, a Sunday radio station, a 
spectacle on a building site, an exhibition featuring real people” PF12FP were followed by the 
publication: Stadium X. A Place that never was, with the essays by philosophers, 
sociologists, botanists, artists and cultural critics. The multilayered identity of the 
Stadium and its planned future demolition served as a context for the public discussion 
on the invisibility of the Vietnamese minority in the life of the Polish capital city and 
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the Poland‟s post-war architectural legacy, among other issues the project intended to 
tackle.PF
13
FP The use of performative, play-like means in all of the project‟s episodes 
referred to the experience of the Stadium by different groups in different contexts, and 
served to establish a platform for communication (or confrontation), and a crossroad of 
different realities (and fictions).  
Using the examples of Stadium X actions among other contemporary projects, I 
will analyse four elements of the role-playing game model which I consider as suitable 
metaphors to describe today‟s participatory art. These four elements are: „game 
characters‟ or „game roles‟, „game world‟, „game master‟ and „game session‟. 
 
- Game characters 
Alone, Swiss performance artist Massimo Furlan re-enacted one of the most spectacular 
games in the history of the Polish national football team – the Poland-Belgium face-off 
(3–0) at the 1982 World Cup in Spain, reproducing the choreography of the match‟s 
hero, Zbigniew Boniek, who scored all three goals. The „match‟ was reported live by 
Poland‟s leading sports commentator, Tomasz Zimoch, and broadcast by Radio 
Kampus (97.1 FM). ...  
On 14 October, 2007 in Warsaw, at the 10 P
th
P-Anniversary Stadium, Massimo Furlan was 
Zbigniew Boniek, Tomasz Zimoch provided a commentary for a game in Barcelona on 
a June day 25 years earlier, and spectators became football fans, waving Solidarity flags 
in Spanish stands. PF14FP  
The performance by Massimo Furlan, apart from creating an imaginary frame of an 
iconic football match – an occasion for the collective experience of the past/present 
event, was first of all, from the perspective of the artist, a chance to make his childhood 
dreams come true, to „become‟ a famous football player. The same incentive led to his 
performances in 2002 in Lausanne, when he recreated the 1982 Italy-West Germany 
World Cup final as a fictional player wearing number 23 and in 2006 in Paris when he 
played Michel Platini in the France-Germany semi-final.  
The opportunity to comment on the famous match within the frames of an art 
event attracted Tomasz Zimoch with a similar motivation – to temporarily play the role 
of somebody else – a performance artist in his case.  The tactic of play employed in this 
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project allowed two main actors, Furlan and Zimoch, to step outside their usual 
professional identifications – an artist and a sports commentator. Although Zimoch 
played the „sports commentator‟ in the performance of Boniek!, the frame of art, the 
fact that he had to comment on a partially fictional event, made it a completely different 
experience for him – he had to become a performer in the first place.  
 
      
14. 15. BONIEK! A One-man Re-enactment of the 1982 Poland-Belgium Football Match by 
Massimo Furlan, commentary by Tomasz Zimoch; Laura Palmer Foundation 
10PthP-Anniversary Stadium Warsaw, October 2007 
 
The audience consisted of gallery-goers – many of whom had never attended a 
football mach before – joined two main actors in their role-playing game. The art 
viewers spontaneously started playing sports spectators and to some degree, for the 
duration of the „match‟, they could identify with this new role. As art critic and curator 
Anda Rottenberg remarks: “First you enact, then you participate. It‟s like when you 
adopt certain convention. First you only play-act, but at some point the distinction 
between play-acting and actually experiencing real emotions gets blurred.” PF15FP However, 
the play frame remained strongly perceptible during the whole event. Furlan did not 
reproduce the football match. He created a fragmentary image, a representation, 
concentrating on one aspect: the movements of just one player.  
The Swiss performer uses art as a medium to transgress the limits of a man‟s 
primary identity, mainly connected with one‟s professional life. In his actions he 
realizes the symbolic return to the childhood open-ended possibilities of the identity 
yet-to-become. The artistic activity of role-playing becomes a direct extension of 
children‟s fantasy identifications with imaginary figures. It is also an occasion for the 
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viewers to join his pretend play and make the artist‟s experience more „life-like‟, as 
well as immerse themselves in the sphere between reality and fiction for the sake of 
their own play. 
This project belongs to the tradition of spectacle. Becoming someone else, 
although directly experienced, is made „true‟ in the final „show‟ – performance – the 
traditional form of representation. The artist as a role-playing game participant, 
although mimicking the dream hero – a football star – experiences this identification 
within a fragmentary, modified context. He „fulfilled‟ his dream and made statements 
about the impossibility of the ultimate transgression of one‟s identification. Only in 
art/play can dreams of becoming someone else come „true‟. This impossibility, the 
crack in make-believe becomes a part of the outcome, as the reality-show element 
exposed in the interviews. The process of transformation, of learning one‟s role – the 
temporary shift of identity – attracts the audience even more than the final show. What 
excites them is the state of becoming; the possibility of change, and the fact that they 
watch the football star played by the 42-year old artist “who smokes a pack of cigarettes 
a day”PF16FP. Role-playing, as I mentioned it in the analysis of Duchamp‟s masquerades, is 
always a double role – having the new temporary identity and oneself as this other self. 
The artistic potential of role-playing comes exactly from the movement between these 
two aspects of a role.  
 
The more radical example of role-play as a possibility to experience the 
„inaccessible‟ was the multimedia project by Polish artist Zuzanna Janin – I've Seen My 
Death, Ceremony/Games (2003), in which she staged her own funeral procession. After 
the death announcements in national newspapers, the actual funeral took place. The 
artist disguised as an old woman, members of her family (aware that it was a 
performance) and members of the artworld (unaware) participated in the ceremony. 
Leaving aside the ethical controversy this project caused, I see it as an example of „dark 
play‟ applied tactically to initiate discussion about “the experience of absence” and 
“death as a social event” PF17FP. As in Bataille, the artist provided herself and the 
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participants with the experience at “the edge of the chasm.” PF18FP However, for art critics 
and fellow artists, it was not a game; they were not aware of the mystification – the 
game occurred at their expense.  
 
 
16. Zuzanna Janin, I‟ve seen my Death/Ceremony, 2003 
 
Various roles designed by the artist for the participants of this project were, to a 
large degree, a condition of its „success‟. Janin, in her disguise, observing the burying 
of her other self (game character, „avatar‟) could come closer to the inaccessible 
experience her own non-being. Her family could face the fear, „rehearse‟ the mourning 
and “domesticate death” PF19FP (if it was only possible...). The members of the artworld 
experiencing the whole situation „for real‟ made the frames of fiction almost invisible; 
they guaranteed the „reality‟ element of the „show‟. This project is also a good example 
of the artist‟s control (as a designer of roles for other participants) within the frames of 
play/art. I will return to this issue in the section relating to the artist as a „game master‟. 
 
- Game worlds   
 “An account executive, an ecologist, a stunt rider”...PF20FP these were sample 
characters/roles the artist could play to shift operations, slip between various 
professional categories to pursue the un-art model as proposed by Allan Kaprow. This 
strategy, eagerly applied by contemporary artists, allows them to enter and explore 
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various „realities‟, different from their every-day ones.PF21FP The artists enter different 
„exotic‟ professional, social and geographical realms in order to experience new „real 
life‟ roles, and to work/play with new tools within the frames of art. Their shorter or 
longer visits are aimed at addressing certain problems or subjects embedded within 
specific domains which are outside their own expertise, knowledge, everyday 
experience and so on. They travel to these different „worlds‟ to also step outside the 
hermetic circle of aesthetic concerns, and, paraphrasing Emil Nolde, to work directly 
with „actual material of life in their hands‟. The statement by the American artist 
Alexandra Mir about her project Plane Landing (2003) is a good description of this 
approach: 
Well it‟s funny because obviously I don‟t come from ballooning and I don‟t come from 
aviation. I‟m a visual artist and I work in a wide variety of mediums. But every time I 
take on a new challenge in a new field that I have no clue about... so I do a lot of 
research. PF22FP  
The artists leave the studios of the art world and enter the worlds of aviation, biology, 
biotechnology, ecology, medicine, education, social care and social control, 
psychology, trade and services, among many others. They meet professionals, 
consumers, users and makers from these fields. The process of researching and 
exploring the new realm often becomes a long-lasting inhabitation, a part of the every-
day routine for the duration of the project. It includes reading, field research, making 
connections with the experts, establishing communication networks, securing founding 
(often from the organisations from the researched field, not necessarily from the art 
world), and so on. The artists collaborate with the experts but also become temporary 
specialists themselves. Both approaches very often complement each other in the 
project. 
This was the case of the last episode of The Finissage of Stadium X – Schengen, 
when the Berlin-Bern group Schauplatz International built a typical Schengen zone‟s 
observation point. They referred to the status of the stadium as a border zone, after 
researching the „illegal‟ immigration problem of many Vietnamese vendors, and invited 
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experts on national border-related issues to talk to the visitors. A similar method was 
applied by Katie Paterson in her project All the dead stars, mentioned in the 
introduction, in which she entered the previously unknown world of astronomers and 
supernova hunters to collect data for her work with their help.  
 
 
17. Schengen/ Finissage of the Stadium X, Schauplatz International, 2008 
 
The whole enterprise in the form of an office, a laboratory, a cafe, a shop, an 
installation, etc. – may appear to belong to the local reality, but it does not reproduce its 
functions. The artist applies a different (sometimes only subtly modified) set of rules, 
not belonging to the world he or she enters, and creates the actual „game world‟ in 
between two realities. The authors of the collaborative publication An Architecture of 
Interaction (2008) compare this tactic to “playing a board game with a single set of 
pieces but using two different rule books concurrently.” PF23FP  
Yet rather than comply completely with the rule structure of a particular arena, it seems 
essential – and arguably the role of art – that artists create and implement their own rule 
structures as a necessary alternative or refreshing deviation from the standard rule 
structures of specific arena. PF24 
To be able to combine different sets of rules effectively, the artist should become 
familiar with the “rule structure” of the project‟s arena, especially if he or she wants to 
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initiate a connection between the two realms. Otherwise they risk ending up with a 
„UFO‟ intervention, an artistic invasion of the chosen „reality‟, based on 
misunderstanding, or a naive interpretation of a given world in a final art object or 
action. Although expressed in reference to artistic projects more traditional than today‟s 
participatory art, the following opinion illustrates the clash of two different realities in 
the common „game world‟. Richard, a local resident, shares his reservations towards the 
Group Material Gallery on East Thirteenth Street in New York (1981) in conversation 
with Tim Rollins:  
You know, like I don‟t know want to be nosy, and we all got our reasons for doing what 
we do with our lives, but I wonder – everybody here on the block wonders – why are 
you here?  
All I‟m saying is that while a lot of the art and stuff I see happening around here is new 
and interesting and is kind of directed to the people who live here, I‟ve also seen some 
lily-white shit spring up – in art exhibitions, in new bars and eating places... It‟s like a 
lot of bored people from good backgrounds getting into the bad of the neighbourhood. 
And here we are struggling like hell to get rid of bad, you know? We find no romance 
in junk and shit. PF25 
 
To avoid confrontation like this, the relationship between contemporary 
„relational‟ artists and the different worlds they operate in, is, in principle, based on 
intention of understanding and exploring the encountered „rule structure‟. Role-playing 
of recent art involves the process of assimilation, and this is also the default condition 
for any further artistic intervention. The comparison made by Freud is no longer 
relevant in terms of the relations between today‟s artists and the „reality‟ they choose to 
occupy: “Might we not say that every child at play behaves like a creative writer, in that 
he creates a world of his own, or rather, re-arranges the things of his world in a new 
way which pleases him?” PF26FP As we can see from the example of Furlan, the creative act 
can become a symbolic wish-fulfilment, just like it happens in children‟s play. 
However, it is the calculated side effect, an additional gratification, rather than the main 
objective, which is to create a space of negotiation, situated „in between‟ different 
realms – not the manipulated vision of a perfect world or a private symbolic space.  
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The artists, instead of proposing their own authorial, self-expressive versions of 
certain spaces, situations or objects, more often create „models‟. A „model‟ functions as 
a proposition, it does not impose anything; it is just an option, an alternative to the 
existing status quo, open for negotiation. Works by Thai artist Rirkrit Tiravanija are 
often referred to as „models‟. Tiravanija transforms galleries and museums into fully 
functioning (but not according to their „proper function‟) places for public use. Most 
recently, as his contribution to the Making Worlds exhibition at the 53 P
rd
P Venice 
Biennale, he designed a book-store. Text in the catalogue describes his projects as 
follows: 
When Tiravanija turns art gallery into a functioning apartment where people can live, 
work, and sleep, or when he turns an entire art academy into an inn with hundreds of 
guests, as he did in Germany, he doesn‟t really expect to change the function of these 
institutions permanently but merely suggests the possibility of another model – the 
possibility of other ways of sharing things, and perhaps ultimately, other forms of 
human life. PF27 
The artistic „game world‟ is to a lesser degree, therefore, an artist‟s authorial creation, 
than the encounter of two areas of activity ruled by different conventions. In fact it can 
be described as an effect of such an encounter; the „game world‟ occurs when the 
reality of art meets any other human domain (i.e. the world of food catering), and 
frames it as „something else‟ rather than its accepted every-day use. To refer to projects 
like these, Canadian artist and writer Bruce Barber applies the term „littoral‟ art: 
“Littoral describes the intermediate and shifting zone between the sea and the land and 
refers metaphorically to cultural projects that are undertaken predominantly outside of 
the conventional contexts of the institutionalized artworld.” PF28FP Like the fluid line 
between water and land, the spheres of recent participatory art, the artistic „game 
worlds‟, are in most cases temporary, ephemeral or even immaterial. Similar to RPGs, 
the „world‟ is produced mainly in narration by artists, curators, participants and critics. 
A Trip to Asia: An acoustic walk around the Vietnamese sector of the 10th-
Anniversary Stadium (2006), offered its participants the experience between the “urban 
roaming”, and the “headphone-guided museum tour”.PF29FP The participants, equipped with 
train tickets, an MP3-player, a map, 5,000 Vietnamese dongs and a checkered plastic 
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bag with various wares, were instructed to take a train from Warszawa Powiśle to the 
next station – Warszawa Stadion. This trip 
took only three minutes, but it was precisely during that ride that the process began: 
perceiving a different reality, and investing it with an imagined, strange, consciously 
exotic dimension, intensified by the Polish-Vietnamese recorded commentary on that 
surrounding reality.PF30 
After the disembarking at Jarmark Europa, participants had to carry the bag to the 
appointed stall. They met and talked to pro-Vietnamese activists Ton Van Anh and 
Robert Krzysztoń, visited a Vietnamese video-rental shop and shopped in a Vietnamese 
grocery. The journey ended in the Thang Long cultural centre and the Pagoda – a 
miniature version of the One-Pillar Buddha of Compassion pagoda in Hanoi. PF
31
FP The 
participants, as tourists, were offered the experience of rediscovering the well-known 
market place, the one they presumably had visited before, to do some bargain shopping. 
“The action took place in the viewer‟s imagination rather than in actual reality, in the 
experience of another reality that, though invisible, is within hand‟s reach.” PF32FP The game 
world does not physically and permanently exist; it comes to being only through the 
players (artists/participants) and only for the duration of the „game session‟ (artistic 
project). 
 
- Game master  
 The contemporary artist has been ascribed many various roles in recent times, 
all of them beyond the traditional ergon of this profession. As a post-industrial homo 
faber, he or she is involved in the processes of cultural „production‟, but not necessarily 
in making aesthetic objects. According to art critic Miwon Kwon, “The artist as an 
overspecialised aesthetic object maker has been anachronistic for a long time already. 
What they provide now, rather than produce, are aesthetic, often „critical artistic 
services‟”.PF33FP Grant Kester refers to “dialogic artists” who “parted from the tradition of 
object making, and adopted a performative, process-based approach”, as “context 
providers” rather than “content providers”. PF34FP Claire Doherty sees the roles of the artists 
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as “mediators, creative thinkers and agitators” PF35FP, while Nicolas Bourriaud adds: “an 
entrepreneur/ politician/ director”. PF36 
 To stick to the proposed model of the role-playing game, I refer to the position 
of the artist as a „game master‟. This phrase might be problematic for the proponents of 
„relational‟ or „dialogic‟ art, who see the artist not as someone who dominates the 
process, but gently initiates and models situations. However, I would argue that this 
term suits very well the ambiguous position of an artist in relation to the 
viewers/participants and other members of the art world as well. „Game master‟ can be 
interpreted in many different ways, and I think this lack of a singular meaning is 
symptomatic for the play-oriented developments of recent art.    
In RPGs, game master (also called a „referee‟) is a player designated to lead a 
game, to create a setting and coordinate action. This person has to prepare beforehand 
and during the game he or she describes the places, situations and tasks, builds the 
atmosphere and leads the others through the fantasy world. A good game master can 
make a game an exciting experience. Outside the game, in the Asian world, a master 
would be a spiritual or a martial arts teacher, who guides young disciples through the 
journey of self-development. In the West, the word „master‟ is more loaded with 
notions of power and gender – it designates the one who has skills, goods, and takes 
control over his followers or servants. In the art world – a master – is usually a title 
reserved for artists of excellent skill, maestros in their domain, most often the great 
(male) masters of the past. It is also an academic degree title, a sign of scholarship and 
specialisation. All these notions of a „master‟ seem to imply the position that 20 PthP and 
21P
st
P century artists have tried to overturn. However, I refer to them as „game masters‟. 
Locating leadership within the domain of play makes it an ambiguous function from the 
perspective of the „real‟ life and „serious‟ occupations. The figure of a „game master‟ is 
also a good pretext to refer back to some questions that have already arisen in the 
context of modern artists‟ ambition to give up their authorial control. Is the artists‟ 
position the one of authority and domination, even if they deny it? Is a democratic 
negotiation of rules possible in art, as it is in play? Do the artists posses enough skill 
and experience to play roles as guides and community leaders, most importantly in 
projects that transgress the border between the game world and the real world? 
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 The „relational‟ artists‟ activities fit quite well within the description of those of 
a typical role-playing game master. They organize, initiate, animate, coordinate, invite 
and propose situations and actions that are designed as open-ended and allow for 
viewers/participants‟ use of initiative, intervention, choice, and so on. However, the 
question of mastery, in the traditional sense of skill and training, begins to be raised, 
especially when the artists enter the fields of human relations – working with groups 
from backgrounds often quite detached from their own and locating their game worlds 
within the community life. Grant Kester puts it as follows:  
How do artists, whose education typically focuses on the accumulation of craft skills, 
the cultivation of an intuitive formal sensibility, or knowledge of conventional art 
history and theory, prepare for the complex ethical questions that are raised by projects 
that take them into unfamiliar spaces and contexts? PF37 
It is difficult to assess artists‟ methods, successes and failures in this respect. The 
project proclaimed by some as insightful, sensitive and „user-friendly‟ may be criticised 
as superficial and igniting conflict. An example can be The Battle of Orgreave (2001), 
organized by British artist Jeremy Deller. On the website of Tate Britain we can read a 
short description of this action:  
This work brought together veteran miners and members of historical re-enactment 
societies who restaged the controversial clash between miners and the police during 
1984-5. This collaboration resulted in a film, a book and an audio recording, which all 
function to resurrect the raw emotions from the period and provide a fresh account of 
events that have been distorted by the media. PF38 
According to art theorist Claire Bishop the artist‟s initiative was problematic and its 
effects potentially harmful: painful memories were framed within the convention of a 
village fair, and the documentary film on the event was a one-sided critique of the 
Thatcher government. According to Bishop, “Although the work seemed to contain a 
twisted therapeutic element (in that both miners and police involved in the struggle 
participated, some of them swapping roles) The Battle of Orgreave did not seem to heal 
a wound so much as reopen it.”PF39FP Deller, in conversation with Claire Doherty, describes 
his role in the whole project as an initiator. For a year and a half, at first just on his own, 
he was researching the subject, talking to local people, preparing the ground. After this 
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stage, the work was carried on mostly by the production agency and the invited experts. 
He says: 
I know what my limitations are and there were other people there who were far better 
experienced in making the thing happen than me. I had already done the work and set 
the situation up and so it was up to the experts to get on with it. Also, I was interested in 
how other people would interpret the idea, where it would go to. I knew it had its own 
life. I had no ownership over it. PF40 
 
 
18. Jeremy Deller, The Battle of Orgreave, 2001 
 
From this perspective, Deller – the „game master‟ – was not fully responsible for the 
final outcome of this project. In fact, the project itself must be seen primarily as a 
process of negotiation and multilayered interactions between all collaborators who took 
part in it – local community members, historical re-enactment experts, producers, 
filmmakers, and so on. The „battle‟ itself was just a part of the „game‟, initiated by the 
artist. He did not approach ex-miners and policemen as vulnerable victims of the 
political system, in need for a group therapy. He rather invited them to take part in the 
collective play and it was their choice to accept or reject the invitation, and their 
responsibility to negotiate the rules. What the real dynamics and politics of this 
particular play were is hard to determine. Nonetheless, the function of the „game 
master‟ releases the artist from the pressure of being the only person in charge – the one 
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who determines all moves from the initial idea to the final performance. As Deller says, 
it is his strategy to “let go”, to be open to various outcomes. He wants to be surprised by 
other people contributions, but also he admits that it is laziness on his part. PF
41
FP  
 The question arises as to what extent can incompetence, even if acknowledged, 
be a part of the artist‟s tactic? What other qualities should or must characterize the 
effective artist-game master? Grant Kester mentions empathy or empathetic 
identification “between artists and their collaborators” as a “necessary component of 
dialogical practice”.PF42FP Is empathy, together with other managerial skills of team-
building, enhancing motivation and communication, a sign of a professional approach? 
What does it mean to be a professional „relational‟ artist – to be a good community 
worker? Or to be a completely unprofessional community worker and manager, who 
“lets things go”, does not appoint any goals, leaves his/her collaborators to make all the 
decisions? Or does it mean to be a professional player, a juggler of other peoples‟ 
emotions and fantasies, a jester and a sage?   
 According to Wolfgang Zinggl from WochenKlausur, a Vienna-based collective 
engaged in participatory art, “Art‟s opportunity to approach the problem 
unconventionally, naively, and open-mindedly is in principle an opportunity open to 
anyone who approaches the problem from outside.” PF43FP This specific intentional naivety, 
even light-heartedness seems to belong to the contemporary profile (ergon?) of artistic 
activity. Dutch artist and art events coordinator, Wietske Maas, expresses similar views: 
Art‟s advantage is its playfulness, its ability to act between the formal borders of 
society‟s organisation without being obliged to abide by particular artistic, economic, 
political and social rules nor to fulfil their criteria. Art‟s radical potential is its deviation 
from existing rules or the creation of new freedoms between old rules. PF44 
The artist‟s position is often stretched between those of a social activist or cultural 
animator and those of the outsider and incompetent non-specialist. Sometimes, 
however, the role of a community worker dominates the role of an artist. Artists become 
careful „adults‟, responsible organizers of „democratic‟ community play, instead of 
playmates, self-proclaimed „game masters‟ (in my view a much more exciting, if 
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potentially disturbing option). In both cases their function is loaded with authorial 
power which, in my view, is inevitable and it produces desirable and potentially 
creative group dynamics.  
 The function of a „game master‟ is often found with curators, who become 
active organizers and coordinators of projects integrating various, often multiple artistic 
actions. This was the case in the series of events Finissage of Stadium X curated by 
Joanna Warsza from independent Laura Palmer Foundation. It was her initiative to 
invite Massimo Furlan and pair him with Tomasz Zimoch in their collaborative 
performance. Together with Anna Gajewska (filmmaker) and Ngo Van Tuong 
(journalist) she organised A Trip to Asia: An acoustic walk around the Vietnamese 
sector of the 10th-Anniversary Stadium. She also was one of people behind the series of 
events as a whole – as a one big project comprising of six different episodes. It can be 
said (exploiting further the metaphor and the word play) that the curator becomes a 
„game head-master‟.  
 
- Game session 
As I mentioned before, RPGs are about direct interaction among players and a 
game master, and they are based on communication and collaboration rather than 
conflict or competition of typical sports or cards games. This focus on the sphere of 
human relations, exchange, „togetherness‟ is characteristic of the practices I analyse in 
this chapter. The attempts to name them suggest the direction of artistic and curatorial 
pursuits: “new genre public art” (S. Lacy, 1995), “relational aesthetics” (N. Bourriaud, 
1998), “conversational art” (H.K. Bhabha, 1998), “dialogue-based public art” (T. 
Finkelpearl, 2000), “dialogical art”, (G. Kester, 2004). In all these artistic forms the 
encounter between the artist and participants or the interaction among the group of 
contributors is treated as the art process – just as the game session in RPG is both the 
means and the purpose of the game. Nicolas Bourriaud describes the “contemporary 
work of art” not as “the termination point of the „creative process‟ (a „finished product 
to be contemplated‟)” but “a site of navigation, a portal, a generator of activities”. PF45FP 
These activities bring into being the contemporary work/play of art, and “provide a 
structure to create a community, however temporary or utopian this might be.” PF46FP  
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The dialogic, relational art offers participants a plot to be enacted, a setting to be 
inhabited, or a problem to be negotiated. It also usually contains a hint on how to 
„navigate‟ the space or situation – a provisional set of rules. These rules create the 
alternative to the usual, traditional, every-day function of the given „world‟ (i.e. cooking 
in the art gallery). The above characteristics of the contemporary work/play of art fit 
into the description of a game, by Antony Storr: 
Organized games have rules to which the players must adhere, and a game is spoiled if 
the rules are broken. In this way a game is a microcosm set apart from ordinary life, and 
much better ordered than our habitual, chaotic existence. The game displays a 
formalized pattern in which each player knows his task and how he should behave. PF47 
Even if at first the artist‟s proposition causes surprise and shifts the usual concepts 
about the given problem, the participants quickly assimilate the new rules as the rules of 
a new game. The frame of fiction, the “formalized pattern of play”, provides them with 
the sense of safety that allows them to go beyond the conventional patterns of 
behaviour. This characteristic of a game session (art project) as “separated in time and 
space”PF48FP is often used by the artists to help to solve local problems. WochenKlausur 
organised “boat trips” on Lake Zurich for local attorneys, councillors, activists, editors, 
to address the drug problem in Zurich. During these journeys the participants could step 
outside their everyday roles and abandon the rhetoric of the courtroom, the editorial 
page or parliament. As Grant Kester remarks:  
On the boat trips they were able to speak and listen, not as delegates and representatives 
charged with defending a priori positions, but as individuals sharing a substantial 
collective knowledge of the subject at hand; at the least, these external forces were 
considerably reduced by the demand for self-reflexive attention created by the ritual 
and isolation of the boat trip itself. PF49FP  
The playful trip is used here as a means to help to arrive at solutions in the public 
sphere; it is a tactical intervention with the non-art goals in mind. The forms of artistic 
„game sessions‟ often take as their models different types of group entertainment: 
walks, tours, boat trips, cooking parties, parades, creativity workshops, sports events, 
festivals, among many others. As I discussed in the previous chapter, walks, tours and 
festivals had already been organized by the modern avant-garde, to meet the public 
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outside usual „art spaces‟, but with a completely different agenda. Their play of 
provocation, confrontation and parody contrasts with today‟s empathy and 
„togetherness‟ of collaborative artistic events. The play models support collective 
experience, but also they are flexible and easily adopted in almost all situations, in 
various contexts and locations. When the content of the work of art is serious and 
challenging, the form of a community fair/parade/festival can serve as a platform for 
communication. However, from the more critical perspective it can be seen as a 
rewarding „carrot‟ instead of a modernist offensive „stick‟, yet another form of 
manipulation.  
 
The game session/art process creates a „temporary community‟, which in both 
cases might last and remain integrated in „real life‟ as well. The ideal type of temporary 
community, the relational type of art tries to evoke, can be described using the notion of 
„communitas‟ – a term applied by Victor Turner in 1960s (adopted from Paul 
Goodman‟s usage PF50FP) – referring to a group experience of a full unmediated 
communication, sharing and togetherness.  
The original sense of communitas is spontaneous and concrete, not abstract. The 
experience of communitas matters much to the participants. ... Communitas liberates 
individuals from conformity to general norms. It is the fount and origin of the gift of 
togetherness, and thus of the gifts of organization, and therefore of all structures of 
social behaviour, and at the same time it is the critique of structure that is overly law-
bound. PF51 
According to Turner, communitas is likely to occur in three types of situations: 
“through the interstices of structure in liminality, times of change of status; at the edges 
of structure, in marginality; and from beneath structure, in inferiority.”PF52FP This is also 
where today‟s artists look for inspiration and most often locate their game worlds – 
within the marginal groups, temporary states of being, abandoned locations. This is why 
the 10 P
th
P-Anniversary Stadium was the perfect place for the artistic interventions – the 
deserted ruin and lively bazaar in a transitory moment of its own history, the relic of the 
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„glorious‟ national past colonized by the outsiders. The experience offered to the 
participants of the Finissage‟s episodes was the one of the communitas – they could 
share the unique moment beyond the rules of reality, transgress their own 
identifications for a short while, feel the collective bond of initiation into the mystery of 
Stadium – the „invisible‟ place which was very soon going to disappear.  
  
 
 
19. On-site inspection / Finissage of the Stadium X,  
Joanna Warsza, Cezary Polak, 2005 
 
It is also important to ask, and this question will probably remain unanswered – 
what does it mean to join the artistic game for its participants, non-artists, temporary 
visitors/players in the world or art? Is it fun, distraction from routine, a lesson in 
creativity, play therapy or maybe an aesthetic experience? It is a very individual matter, 
but can it really become „communitas‟, which in principle is unmediated and 
spontaneous? Can art, as Bourriaud puts it – be like “angelic programme” so as to 
“patiently re-stitch the relational fabric”? PF53FP And what if the viewer does not respond to 
the proposition in the game-like convention? Does he or she become a spoil-sport, the 
group outsider? Bourriaud writes: “Feeling nothing means not making enough effort.” PF54FP 
Relational projects require a willingness to participate, to get immersed, engaged, and 
involved in the rhetorics of the given „game‟. Group activities, as I wrote in chapter 2, 
in the context of communal celebrations, apart from the promise of togetherness, 
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contain the element of exclusion. They need outsiders, or even scapegoats to exist. 
Dave Beech, after Jacques Ranciere, points out that participation, as an inclusive 
practice, cannot include all. “Seen in this way, participation must be excluding because 
it sets up a new economy which separates society into participants and non-
participants.” PF55FP And even more importantly, after Butler and Derrida, he argues that 
“Outsiders have to pay a higher price for their participation, namely, the neutralisation 
of their difference and the dampening of their powers of subversion.” PF56FP Play/game 
reveals here its ambivalence – blurring boundaries between people and their „worlds‟ 
annihilates differences, which can be both subversive and neutralising.  
Another possible problem with the play-frame of relational works is that 
participants may approach them playfully but not as an inspiration for a deeper 
reflection, and they may not really distinguish an effect of the art process from other 
„playground‟ experiences: theme parks, paintball sessions, sports events, pub crawling, 
etc. They may become active participants in play, but not in art. Also, the dialogical, 
game-session form is not the universal passé-partout that opens all doors. Kester, the 
advocate of dialogical art, nonetheless remarks: 
Not all conflicts can be resolved by free and open exchange because not all conflicts are 
the result of a failure among given set of interlocutors to fully “understand” or 
empathize with each other. In many cases social conflicts are the result of a very clear 
understanding of material, economic and political differences. PF57 
More efficient than trying to evoke the illusion of conviviality and micro-community, 
can be addressing the differences, in order to provoke confrontation, to disturb, not to 
flatter. Claire Bishop names this tendency, in response to Bourriaud‟s “relational 
aesthetics”, as “relational antagonism” (which echoes Bataille‟s concept of alteration – 
destructiveness/transformation as an impulse to create). According to her, the works by 
Santiago Sierra and Thomas Hirschhorn among others, do not “offer an experience of 
human empathy that smoothes over the awkward situation before us, but a pointed 
racial/economic non-identification, this is not me.” PF58FP The role-playing is no longer 
relevant, as the artists confront the viewers with the certain situation, but not necessarily 
invite them to step inside. This is how Thomas Hirschhorn describes his approach: 
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I do not want to invite or oblige viewers to become interactive with what I do; I don‟t 
want to activate the public. I want to give of myself, to engage myself to such a degree 
that viewers confronted with the work can take part, and become involved, but not as 
actors. PF59 
Such a position, paradoxically, can give more autonomy not only to the artist, but also 
to the viewers. It acknowledges the fact that “reflection is an activity” PF60FP, and that 
„playing house‟ or having a dinner in a gallery may not necessarily contribute to any 
insights. It may rather be a distraction and not a self-directed gesture but a programmed 
response to the given environment.  
 
Non-Representation  
Rooted in the primitivist, prerational tradition, recent artistic projects as „game-
sessions‟ often employ play as a tool of non-art (non-representation), “a direct, 
apparently unmediated engagement with particular audience groups” PF61FP. The theory of 
non-representation is the latest link in cultural writing, summarising the chain of ideas 
including: performance, happening, non-art, situation, intervention, participation, 
interaction, relational art and so on, which try to get away from the traditional 
representation in art and society. This theory, authored by Nigel Thrift, originally 
belongs to human geography and acts as a methodology for an “experimental rather 
than representational approach to social science and humanities”, and as a means it 
employs “fugitive practices that exist on the margins of the known”.PF62FP This is also the 
theory where performance and play meet as strategies to arrive at a “special kind of 
knowledge” that is practical, engaged, and which “derive from improvisatory 
immediacy and presence”.PF63FP Thrift locates performance and play outside representation, 
as opposing “representational economy in which we live”. He writes: “performance 
cannot be seen as (though it may well involve) „text‟”.PF64FP   
It may sound provocative, but in my view, Thrift‟s theory can serve as a 
manifesto of what I name as the strategy or tactic of play (of a prerational heritage) in 
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arts and culture in the 20 P
th
P and 21 P
st
P century. As central values he appoints process, 
practice, activity and dialogue. The „relation‟ becomes a new solution for 
„representation‟. Performative methodologies allow “their participants equal rights to 
disclosure, through dialogical actions rather than texts, through relation rather than 
representation”. PF65FP The proposed style of work is therefore democratic and anti-elitist, 
which does not “pretend to grand theory” but must be rather seen as an “attempt to 
produce strategic and hopefully „therapeutic‟ interventions which stress the disclosive 
power of performance as recognition of the fact that all solutions are responsive, 
relational, dialogical.”PF66FP  
Play and other „marginal‟ human actions are credited an important place in the 
non-representationalist methodology: 
... emphasis on classes of experience which have been too rarely addressed, the 
productive, the interactive, play; all those responsive activities which are usually 
involved in „setting up‟ situations which, because they are often considered to be 
always already there, are still too little considered; they are regarded as „trivial‟. This 
means moving forward a poetic of encounter which conveys a sense of life in which 
meaning shows itself only in the living ....PF67 
Play is thus presented as a kind of experience that is both „the living‟ and conveys the 
sense of life, but not as „representation‟. Thrift quotes Schwarzman writing: “play is 
functional because it teaches about contexts; it teaches about frames not being at the 
same level as the acts they contain”. PF68FP Play “teaches” about representation, but it is not 
representational. The non-representational theory treats play as a “process of 
performative experiment”PF69FP.   
In my view Thrift‟s theory is an attractive, contemporary version of the „myth of 
presence‟. No doubt, performance and other relational practices can be treated as 
important and refreshing elements in the methodologies of human sciences and the arts. 
However, I cannot agree with the assumption that play, performance, and other 
practices that use them as research or creative tools belong to non-representation. Is the 
prejudice against „writing‟ still so strong that we tend to locate truth and essence in 
„speech‟ and we cannot accept the fact that „speech‟ is also a form of representation? I 
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cannot help reading Thrift as echoing Plato (“The art of representation is therefore a 
long way removed from truth...” PF70FP) or a modern „primitivist‟ manifesto (“Direct sensual 
experience is more real than living in the midst of symbols, slogans, worn out plots, 
clichés – more real than political-oratorical art.”PF71FP). As Thrift writes: Non-
Representational kind of knowledge 
... gives up modern assumptions about knowledge, reality, the orderliness of the world, 
unreal and underlying appearances, in favour of a new stance towards the world-
political-moral knowledge which argues that the world is constructed through activity, 
and especially the activity of talk, talk as action, not communication, which includes the 
expressive powers of embodiment. PF72 
Again, Thrift presents talk as „truth‟, as non-representation, existing apart from 
communication, code, and „writing‟. Similarly, dialogue, in dialogical or relational art, 
attempts to be a non-representational method of expression – a shared activity of talk. It 
reminds me of Gadamer‟s observation that  
To reach an understanding in a dialogue is not merely a matter of putting oneself 
forward and successfully asserting one's own point of view, but being transformed into 
a communion in which we do not remain what we were. PF73FP  
Play and performance act in these theories as methods of understanding through 
embodiment, as prerational pharmaka for cognitive interpretation of things.   
Play, when analysed as a separate activity, can be perceived as lived and 
present, existing only in a given moment „here and now‟ and „natural‟. It has a strong 
performative side to it and cannot exist separately from its players. It can be seen as 
opposed to art‟s artificiality and absence of the author. However, play in all cases is a 
trigger for metaphor, code, „writing‟, representation; the rest is just a form, whether it is 
a village fair, a community event, a reality-show or a role-playing game.  
 
Conclusion  
In this chapter I have analysed a few aspects of recent participatory art works, 
described by curators and critics as “relational”, “dialogical” or “conversational”, with 
the use of terms coming from the world of play, namely Role-Playing Games. My 
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intention was to test whether it is possible to look at play as a widely approved and 
applicable method, or maybe even a structural element of participatory projects. I think 
that the different elements of RPGs like „game roles‟ and „characters‟, „game world‟, 
„game master‟ and „game session‟ can be easily applied in the discussion of the roles 
adopted by the artists and designed for the viewers, and the creation of the art arena 
within the „real life‟ with the use of different sets of rules. The game vocabulary helps 
to expose the character of participatory works as framed by the artist occasions for 
social interaction which promise the collective experience or sensation instead of the 
authorial interpretation or representation of this experience. The artist as a game master 
is no longer a master in the old sense as being attributed with authority and skills. He or 
she is rather an animator of group activities, a „context‟, instead of a „content provider‟, 
and their methods may include „letting go‟, „incompetence‟, and using other people‟s 
skills and knowledge to produce/arrange the situation as art. The game model also 
brings attention to the problems involved in participation, such as unequal distribution 
of power (play at the expense of a certain group), enforced engagement, exclusion of 
„spoil-sports‟ or non-participants, neutralisation of difference and powers of individual 
subversion. 
The indication of assimilation of play, as a typical artistic tool, a tactic, is that 
play is no longer used to produce a shock value through the reference to „the marginal‟ 
as it was rehearsed in the modern avant-gardes. It seems that the strategy of play has 
domesticated the sphere of Otherness. Contemporary artists consciously occupy or 
explore the „interstices‟ of social life: the „marginal‟ groups, the temporary states of 
being, and abandoned locations. Instead of being a provocative tool, play is more often 
prescribed to provide the artist and the viewers/participants with the experience of 
fiction that would be perceived by them as „reality‟, however, safely framed „as art‟. 
This application of play follows the general cultural trend (in media and entertainment) 
of blurring the boundary between „reality‟ and „fiction‟, and producing „alternative 
worlds‟, more sophisticated, realistic, and first of all much more flexible and accessible 
than traditional alternative modes of social interaction, as, for example, festivals. But 
similarly to festivals, different forms of cultural play are intended to temporarily 
overturn the dominant structure of „reality‟, to twist rules, and to allow participants the 
liberation from the everyday work-bounded routine. To some extent, the rhetoric behind 
this use of play reminds one of Gadamer‟s notion of play that was supposed to reveal 
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the truth and the essence of Being. In non-philosophical words, and in the contemporary 
application, experiences framed as play are designed to reveal the truth about ourselves 
and our actions, our desires, fears, instincts and hidden potentials. This is what reality 
shows and RPGs offer. This is what relational, dialogical projects try to achieve – to 
help the participants to look at things as for the first time, in a new context, as 
somebody else or as a „true self‟ – freed from the limitations of the everyday life.  
The promise of „real experience‟ instead of the authorial representation belongs 
to the tradition of modern, primitivism-catalysed, pursuits of life-like art or non-art. The 
latest idea coming from this tradition is Thrift‟s theory of non-representation, describing 
play as a “performative experiment”. However, I argued that play cannot be regarded as 
a non-representational method, because, even though experiential, it triggers 
representation. It may have a performative, immersive form of a role-playing game or a 
reality-show but it is not reality and it is not an unmediated experience. 
  
I have so far deliberately avoided discussing the RPG model of art in terms of 
ergon and parergon relationship. I did not want to advance the simplistic conclusions 
here. I will devote the whole next chapter to the final discussion of possible changes in 
the structure of ergon and parergon within the concept of art, brought about by the use 
of the strategy and tactic of play by the 20 P
th
P and 21 P
st
P century artists. I will also suggest 
the „game session‟ as a model/metaphor overcoming the problematic rhetorics of 
traditional representation as well as the utopian belief in non-representation in the 
context of art. 
 
181 
 
Chapter 7 
Play as context 
 
Introduction 
In the previous chapters I incorporated the notion of play into the reading of the 
history of Western art in the 20 P
th 
Pand 21 P
st
P centuries. I analysed play as a concept that 
emerged parallel with that of the „primitive‟: as marginal to the traditional theory and 
practice of art, but which gradually had attracted attention of modern artists and 
contributed to the transformation of the modes of practice and spectatorship, as well as 
challenged the notion of „marginality‟ itself. I inscribed the „strategy of play‟ within the 
trend of primitivism due to the common agenda of art‟s deprofessionalisation and the 
search for the direct experience or sensation instead of its conventional representation. 
The artists used play-like techniques under the prerational „umbrella‟ of primitivism to 
experiment with chance, unconsciousness, automatism, verbal puns and „letting go‟, to 
overcome the control power of reason, skill, tradition and conventions, and to celebrate 
the creative process as a disinterested immersion. 
The aesthetic product, although still belonging to the artistic ergon in modern 
art, was often supplemented and even substituted (in the post-war avant-gardes) by 
traditionally marginal elements of supporting texts (manifestos, journals, scores), events 
(theatrical performances, excursions, trips, meetings) and activities (playing games, 
provoking the public, organizing collaborations, doing researches, experimenting). 
Many of these „marginal‟ elements came from the „playgrounds‟ of human life, spheres 
of leisure, entertainment or activities directly opposing goal-oriented „rational‟ and 
productive work. In chapter 5 I discussed some of the models of play that were tested 
by the artists as tools of new art (or non-art): cabaret, festival, trip, wordplay, parlour 
game, chance play, playful „scientific‟ experiment, child‟s play, and „dark play‟. In 
most cases the notion of play was tuned in to the primitivist outlook, as instinctive, anti-
rational, creative, collective and joyful. However, some artists also utilized different 
aspects of play as an intellectual exercise and paradigm shifting (Duchamp, Fluxus), a 
tool to overcome metaphysical dichotomies (Surrealists, Cage), and a means of 
confrontation and catharsis (Vienna Actionists, Abramović).  
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All those modern experiments with play can be interpreted as explorations of 
parergon of traditional art in order to question, challenge and eventually transform art‟s 
„proper function‟. The examples of participatory art analysed in the previous chapter 
indicate that external strategies of play tested by modern artists, have been assimilated 
as an inner structure of many recent artworks, and acknowledged by art institutions, 
critics, and curators as an essential vocabulary or popular tactics of contemporary art.  
In this chapter I will argue that in the 20 P
th
P century, there occurred the 
disturbance of the traditional hierarchy work/play, with „play‟ becoming significant in 
many contemporary practices of a participatory character. I will speculate about the 
new position of play and discuss some of its potential consequences for the artist-
viewer relation, the status of the art projects, and the ongoing quest for non-
representation and the blurring the boundaries of art and life. I will refer to the 
discussion on the limits of representation and propose the role-playing game session 
model, developed in the previous chapter, as a possible flexible concept of 
representation, a synergy of lived experience and a symbolic act.   
 
Attractive supplement 
In chapter 3, paraphrasing Rousseau and Derrida, I referred to play as a 
“dangerous supplement”. That was the position of play within the traditional art and 
society: a risky and improper departure from the right path of work, or a „safety valve‟, 
carnivalesque activity, celebrated on clearly designated occasions. Despite major 
lifestyle transformations in the last century, the work and play hierarchy in the Western 
world, parallel to the one of a virtuous deed and a sin (as in the Protestant work ethic, 
mentioned in chapter 1), still holds a very strong position in the contemporary value 
system. As Allan Kaprow puts it:  
Play is a dirty word. Used in common sense of frolic, make-believe, and an attitude free 
of care for moral and practical utility, it connotes for Americans and many Europeans 
idleness, immaturity and the absence of seriousness and substance. PF1 
One of Kaprow‟s ambitions, and also of many other modern artists, was to overcome 
the stereotypical connotations of play and to bring it back to life as a valuable element 
in society and culture, as they saw it functioning in childhood and in „primitive‟ 
communities.   
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This reinterpretation of play was related to the fascination with „primitive‟ art as 
a model of art‟s deprofessionalisation, with a possibility of transgression of the deep-
rooted identification of Western artists, but also, to a large degree, by general changes 
in the spheres of economy and production. With the growth of mechanisation, the 
dominant notion of human work as „physical labour‟ has been transformed. The 
development of the entertainment industry in the post-war era contributed to the further 
changes of the notions of work and play in human life. The particular activities which 
today we treat as play or work differ in many cases from their pre-modern equivalents. 
As Brian Sutton-Smith puts it, “these days we „play‟ at hunting, fishing and boating; 
while we „work‟ at group creativity, synectics, and divergent thinking.” PF2FP However, the 
approach to work as ergon, the proper function of a given object or activity, aimed at an 
output indicated in advance, is still applicable. It refers to the „frame‟, not to the 
content. Consequently, play can still be described as an activity performed „outside the 
work‟ (para ergon), for its own sake, in between two realms, and two sets of rules.   
Art has been traditionally conceptualized within the discourse of the proper and 
the marginal. The conventional – peripheral, outcast position of play – and the history 
of its (re) discovery by modern artists, can be read according to the logic of 
supplementarity. Play, in modern art, operates as its embodiment in Derrida‟s text – the 
god Thoth, who “is opposed to its other ..., but as that which at once supplements and 
supplants it.” PF3FP „Prerational‟ play was seen by the avant-garde artists as opposed to its 
„other‟ – work (the conventional, „rational‟, aesthetic production of representations). 
However, play cannot be offered as an innocent gift, an external remedy, because it 
already belongs to the system and shapes it. Nonetheless, to preserve its (non) identity 
is to treat it as an “outsider” of this system, like a joker in a deck. The danger of the 
play supplement comes from the fact that as an external/internal force, it influences the 
„essence‟ (ergon) of art, questions its identity, traditionally „opposed‟ to play, and 
challenges the whole hierarchy of central and marginal values. ”The pharmakon is that 
dangerous supplement that breaks into the very thing that would have liked to do 
without it yet lets itself at once be breached, roughed up, fulfilled, and replaced ...” PF4FP   
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The agenda of modern art was exactly to violate the old system, to replace the 
old conventional aesthetic „production‟ with the new, exciting and unpredictable „play‟ 
of art. For the avant-garde artists play was not the threat – they eagerly welcomed the 
possibility of revolution. Play was therefore an attractive model, strategy, metaphor or 
supplement to expose and to experiment with. However, it was not possible to simply 
overturn the hierarchy and make play a new ergon of art. Play cannot be fixed, reduced 
to a desirable set of characteristics or prescribed as an everlasting potency pill. Play 
implies the ongoing movement, change and shift of perspective.   
I think that modern artists, as the „avant-garde‟ term suggests, were operating on 
the edge between ergon and parergon of traditional art. They had the unique chance to 
experience „the moment of play‟ before their experiments crystallized into new 
conventions. „Dada cannot live forever‟, but the playful strategies of Dada and the 
movements which followed have been assimilated in art, education, science, politics, 
and so on. We can easily apply the model of Role-Playing Games to analyse 
contemporary art practices. Play has become a positive concept, ticking many boxes in 
the agenda of contemporary art. In today‟s jargon of art and academic research, to be 
“playful” means to be creative, interdisciplinary, flexible, independent and open-
minded, and this is what every artist and researcher wants to be. 
In my view, the revolution carried out by the modern avant-gardes disturbed the 
hierarchy of the traditional main body and the supplement of the concept of art, and has 
contributed to the change of accents and valuations. The position of play within the 
concept of art has evolved, at least from the „dangerous‟ to the „attractive supplement‟. 
However, in my opinion, it cannot be ignored as marginal, in the traditional sense, in 
the contemporary theory and practice of art.  
 
Portable frame 
Richard Jochum, Austrian artist and philosopher, in the text on his Playground 
(2005) exhibition writes:  
Playground is not just a title referring to some of the exhibited "games", the title also 
exemplifies a certain understanding of contemporary art which is not just a practise of 
producing more and more beautiful images but a cultural activity busy with creating 
playful concepts to deal and cope with reality every day. More over: while artists enjoy 
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a freedom of expression that is extraordinary, the price to do so is remarkably high: 
Their work is just a game, their exhibition a "playground". PF5 
Although I think Jochum‟s description of contemporary practices is appropriate, and 
artistic play-like activities are still approached with caution by the wider public, the 
term „playground‟ has become a „buzzword‟ within the art world. It is not an insult or a 
patronizing term any more. It signifies orientation on process and experiments, 
ephemerality and open-endedness of the works. It therefore fits within “New 
Institutionalism”, a recent trend in curatorial and museal practice aimed at transforming 
art institutions into „part-community centres, part-laboratory and part-academies‟ PF6FP. As 
Claire Doherty writes:  
New Institutionalism is characterised by the rhetoric of temporary transient encounters, 
states of flux and open-endedness. It embraces a dominant strand of contemporary art 
practice – namely that which employs dialogue and participation to produce event or 
process-based works rather than objects for passive consumption. PF7 
According to Doherty, transformation of the conventional gallery or museum (a 
showroom) into a social space may cause “a risk of creating a new set of conventions T– 
Tthe convention of role-play or prescribed participation”. TPF8FPT Nonetheless, Tthe big 
international art events, curatorial shows, biennials and triennials which take place 
around the world, promote works and projects that follow the agenda of participatory, 
interactive, process-oriented and playful art.   
The recent 53 P
rd
P Venice Biennale serves as an example. Although the curatorial 
exhibition was to a large degree a selection of traditional works, most of the prizes 
awarded by the jury honoured the artists and curators focused on the process, relations 
and narrations instead of the aesthetic production. PF
9
FP Golden Lion for the Best Artist in 
the Fare Mondi/Making Worlds exhibition went to Tobias Rehberger “for taking us 
beyond the white cube, where past modes of exhibition are reinvented and the work of 
art turns into a cafeteria. In this shift social communication becomes aesthetic 
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practice.”PF10FP However, much more open for the viewer‟s imaginative or actual „play‟ 
within the exhibition space were the Danish and Nordic countries‟ pavilions, honoured 
with special mention for the curatorial achievement (for “reimagining the national 
pavilion as a collaborative universe”PF11FP). Using art and design objects, painting, 
sculptures, installation pieces and furniture by numerous artists, the curators created 
two interiors with the feeling of mysterious film sets, inhabited by imaginary characters. 
The artworks served only as props and parts of the interior design and were 
subordinated to the fictional world. The curators acted as game masters and invited the 
visitors to explore the narrative spaces, where they could hang out, relax, watch the 
video, and try to decipher the stories behind the setting. 
 
 
20. One of the interiors of the Danish and Nordic countries‟ pavilions, Venice Biennale, 2009 
 
In my view, the rhetorics of play-parergon have entered the discourse of 
contemporary art for good. To „occupy marginal spaces‟, to „operate in-between‟ sets of 
rules, „realities‟, conventions and to „generate temporary communities‟– these are just a 
few among many other recurring phrases which describe recent works in variety of 
styles and media. They all may be interpreted within the notion of play, even if it is not 
the conscious intention of their authors. Cultural theorist (and the juror at the 2009 
Venice Biennale) Homi K. Bhabha in his text Border Lives: The Art of the Present 
(1994) indicates the desirable position of engagement with cultural processes as the one 
beyond the well-established identities and hierarchies of binary oppositions. 
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What is theoretically innovative, and politically crucial, is the need to think beyond 
narratives of originary and initial subjectivities and to focus on those moments or 
processes that are produced in the articulation of cultural differences. These „in-
between‟ spaces provide the terrain for elaborating strategies of selfhood – singular and 
communal – that initiate new signs of identity, and innovative sites of collaboration, 
and contestation, in the act of defining the idea of society itself. PF12 
The tactic of play, as operating „in-between‟, has become a general cultural trend, not 
just in visual art. Zygmunt Bauman, describes it as follows: 
I propose that in the same way as the pilgrim was the most fitting metaphor for the 
modern life strategy preoccupied with the daunting task of identity-building, the 
stroller, the vagabond, the tourist and the player offer jointly the metaphor for the 
postmodern strategy moved by the horror of being bound and fixed. PF13 
All the metaphors used by Bauman can be attached to the contemporary artist who 
explores the regions which once used to be peripheral to the artistic profession. The 
„Artist the Player‟ like Bauman‟s tourist “is the conscious and systematic seeker of 
experience, ..., of the experience of difference and novelty”PF14FP. However, these pursuits 
are not always systematic. The artists often immerse themselves in the flux of events, in 
the narratives they encounter; they let things go, improvise, react to given situations, 
affirm ephemerality and ambiguity.  
To be in the move, to be outside, on the margins of, or in-between the dominant 
narratives of power, in cultural, social, political or economical realms has become the 
“proper” space of the artistic activity. The “margins” of social life are treated as the 
points of departure to pose essential questions. Paradoxically, to occupy „the interstices‟ 
of human relations means to be in the centre of the contemporary discourse on art and 
culture. It seems to me, therefore, that the „marginal‟ (ephemeral, dialogic, relational, 
collective, etc.) practices, of Deller, Tiravanija, or WochenKlausur, among others, have 
become central to the notion of art, negotiated and accepted among the artists, critics, 
curators, theorists, and cultural workers, representing big institutions and funding 
bodies, as well as independent galleries, foundations, collectives and so on.  
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Can we therefore locate play as ergon of recent art? According to Claire Bishop: 
“This mixed panorama of socially collaborative work arguably forms what avant-garde 
we have today: artists using social situations to produce dematerialized, antimarket, 
politically engaged projects that carry on the modernist call to blur art and life.” PF15FP In her 
essay she lists the projects like: “Jeremy Deller‟s Social Parade for more than twenty 
social organisations in San Sebastian (2004), Lincoln Tobier‟s training local residents in 
Aubervilliers, northeast of Paris, to produce half-hour radio programs (Radio LD‟A, 
2002)” or Lucy Orta‟s workshops in Johannesburg (and elsewhere) to teach 
unemployed people new fashion skills and discuss collective solidarity (Nexus 
Architecture, 1995)”PF16 
 In terms of play, the above projects would fit into the image of play as a process 
supporting human‟s development, necessary for competence building and socializing 
skills. This would be play utilized in education, in creativity and psychological 
workshops, play promoting progress, good play accepted by Plato in his ideal state, and 
by every parent, happy that a child plays and learns at the same time. But is it play? Or 
is it play „decided‟ as constructive, educational and productive, despite the promise of 
disinterestedness, open-endedness and a lack of predeterminated outcomes? A play-like 
version of work? 
 Maybe the proper function of today‟s art is work, just a different kind of work 
(or to use Marxist terms: a „non-alienated‟ work or „self-activity‟PF17FP) – a socially, 
culturally and politically engaged work, which produces new models of interhuman 
relations? But why is it so difficult to approach these new models as functional 
propositions, not just the ephemeral play situations, representations of authorial micro-
utopias? Why the roles of the artist – social worker, researcher, anthropologist, 
supernova hunter, seem to be only roles, temporary identities or characters in his or her 
games?  
I cannot say that play has become a new ergon of art, because it would 
annihilate the concept of play. Nonetheless, the production of alternative human 
relations – presumably the basic intention of today‟s participatory art – is strongly 
dominated by the operation of play. It seems to me, that many members of the artworld 
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would like to locate play (the „undecidable‟) as the central value, the main body of art, 
but it is not possible because of some issues. “Playing is really sinning”, as Kaprow 
wrote; it is the luxurious, decadent position to play freely beyond the rules and 
conventions (and this is why it is so attractive; it is a transgression). Art (work and 
play) has to be productive and goal-oriented, and has to leave traces, even if they are 
ephemeral, fleeting, subtle or almost transparent. It has to act as if it is a serious adult 
occupation and to rationalize and contextualize the “pleasurable and unproductive states 
of uncertainty and indecision”. PF18FP However, the most important obstacle is that play 
simply cannot be fixed as ergon. It can be tried on in different configurations and 
contexts, as a temporary strategy, gesture, side-effect, but it cannot become an ultimate 
purpose of the artistic activity. Moreover, as Norman Denzin writes,  
Persons as players ... are always at the edge of moving into the moment of play. This 
moment is always in front of them, and yet as they move forward into it, they are 
moving from it. Play, to use William James (1890) term, is always on the player‟s 
horizon.PF19FP  
Paraphrasing Chris Rojek, quoted in the first chapter, it can be said that play is also „the 
place on the map of the human world artists are constantly trying to land, but which 
perpetually evades their reach‟ PF20FP, because it immediately turns into a strategy, tactic, 
method or tool.  
 
Nonetheless, it is quite tempting to see the operation of play in the last century 
as challenging the whole structure of ergon and parergon, and questioning singularity 
and authority of one proper function, one master narrative of the artistic activity as a 
whole, but also of the particular artistic forms or individual practices. Contemporary 
artists try to avoid bonding statements and they try to balance the requirements of the 
phantom idea of work and promises of the liberating but elusive idea of play.  
I think that the most functional perspective while looking at the contemporary 
position of play is to stick to the notion of parergon as a frame. However, modern 
revolution shifted the attention from the frame as an ornament and supplement of the 
main body of work, to the frame as a „portable device‟, useful to define some objects 
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and situations as „art‟. With time, the symbolic „frame‟ has become the necessary and 
the only determinant of art. Any object or situation can become art; it is just a matter of 
context, or frame. From this perspective, play remains parergon, a frame, a 
metacommunicative activity: the border and the bond between different „realities‟, or 
„reality‟ and „fiction‟, the condition for representation. Play as a „frame‟ is at once 
limiting and liberating, as it applies a new set of rules on the framed reality, but at the 
same time allows for transgressing or suspending the „original‟ proper function of this 
reality, the well-established rules and conventions.  
Ergon, in this new configuration, emerges from the specific „reality‟ that is 
being framed. It can be seen as a „pretext‟ to enter this reality through the artistic 
process. It therefore changes from project to project; it does not „define‟ the concept of 
art. However, as a purpose of the particular project, an operation of the given reality, it 
is indispensable to the production of representation. It can be compared to the Derridean 
notion of the decentred structure, in which “the centre had no natural site, that it was not 
a fixed locus but a function, a sort of nonlocus in which an infinite number of sign-
substitutions came into play”.PF21FP  
When we look at play-parergon as a frame, a „context‟ set up by the artist, and 
when ergon becomes conceptualized as a „pretext‟ for the artistic intervention, the act 
of artistic representation, the art process, the synergy of „pretext‟ and „context‟, can, 
consequently, be referred to as a „text‟. It resonates quite well with Roland Barthes‟ 
description of the Text (From Work to Text, 1971).  
The Text (if only by its frequent „unreadability‟) decants the work (the work 
permitting) from its consumption and gathers it up as play, activity, production, 
practice. This means that the Text requires that one try to abolish (or at the very last 
diminish) the distance between writing and reading, in no way by intensifying the 
projection of the reader into the work but by joining them in a single signifying 
practice. PF22 
Writing and reading, working and playing, activities of artists and viewers coexist 
together in the text – one common „game session‟. The work (artwork) emerges in 
writing and reading, in „being played‟. 
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The act of framing, the playing with the „pretext‟ (ergon), cannot be mechanical 
and the frame cannot be seen as an authoritarian statement: „this is art‟. The frame of art 
modifies a chosen fragment of reality by framing it, but also this chosen reality 
influences the character of the frame. In other words, artists apply their perspective, 
intentions and ideas of the specific project to the selected place or situation, but also 
they research this „place‟, they get to know its rules and inhabitants. Their own 
viewpoint shapes the character of the artistic encounter, the act of framing, but it must 
be a mutual interaction. The character and form of the frame (of the artistic tactic, 
means and tools) depends on the structure, rules, needs, functions and narratives 
belonging to the „arena‟ chosen to be framed. The artistic frame can be a „relaxed‟ one, 
open for the unexpected, prepared to let things go, or it can be predefined and shaped by 
the clear authorial intention, the rules of the „game‟ invented by the artist.  
Play as a portable parergon and work as ergon, a rule-structure of the given 
„reality‟, collectively shape the contemporary experience of art. It can be, however, 
difficult to determine which one is the main body and which is a supplement within the 
process of representation. I think it is best to regard them as equal elements working 
and playing together.  
The redefined synergy of work and play still generates the situation of art, the 
artistic representation. However, the notion of representation in this framework needs to 
be redefined as well. 
 
Beyond representation? 
In the previous chapter I used the model of a Role-Playing Game to analyse 
recent participatory art, in terms of artists‟ and viewers‟ roles, their mutual 
relationships, and the location, scope and character of art activities and events. I think 
this model proved to be useful in the critical examination and helpful to generate 
questions about new roles adopted by the artists and new functions of art. I also think it 
showed that recent artistic activities carefully „veil‟ their actual identity, and their 
function can cause confusion. The „dialogical‟ art events are staged either as 
community-oriented creativity workshops (to work through some specific problems) or 
play-like open-ended situations – walks, trips, parades, community fairs (to create 
possibility of experience, encounter or exchange). The artists avoid naming them „art‟ 
or „representation‟ – instead of „artworks‟ we have „models‟, „platforms‟, „stations‟, 
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„zones‟ and „sites of interaction‟. The processes that occur during these events cannot 
be openly approached as art, because the intention behind them is to cause real life 
consequences and not the „theatrical‟ imitation of life. The artists – as animators or 
game masters – insist that they do not “own” the projects which emerge during the 
open-ended, democratic negotiation. They try to mask their authorial and professional 
positions by pretending not to be there or to be average players. It seems to me that the 
objection against representation is the main reason behind many of these masquerades 
and confusions in recent art.  
In her book Art beyond Representation (2004) Barbara Bolt proposes the non-
representational approach to artistic process, with the help of the notions of „handling‟ 
(Heidegger), materiality and performativity. She argues that “the representational mode 
of thought manifests itself in instrumentalist understandings of the work of art: that is, 
in thinking of the process of artistic production as one of mastery – of tools, of 
materials – under the guidance of a preconceived end.” PF23FP This notion of representation 
belongs to the traditional ergon of art – the aesthetic production executed according to 
the predetermined design, plan and intention. What Bolt proposes is the concentration 
on practice as an immediate experience of „here and now‟, with possible distractions 
from the main path – surprise and indetermination – the notions I identified with the 
traditional parergon of the creative process. Bolt opposes the old and new approaches 
according to the series of dichotomies: fixed/open-ended, rational/instinctive, 
predictable/surprising, and so on. As she writes: “In the flux of practice, we grope 
towards an understanding that is not representational. Acts and decisions occur in the 
heat of the moment and not as the result of rational logic.”PF24FP The creative act becomes 
then, first of all, a “performative act” PF25FP.  I would also add – a „proper performative act‟, 
as parallel to Austin‟s distinction between the performative utterances in „real‟ 
situations and the „parasitic‟, „non-serious‟ performative utterances in jokes or theatre – 
in the situations of representation. PF
26
FP Bolt‟s notion of performativity refers to the „real‟ 
hands on experience of a spontaneous physical immersion, not a mere enacting, but 
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„being‟ in the given situation. As I introduced in chapter 1, Bolt uses the notion of 
methexis as a matrix for non-representational art. She analyses it in the context of 
Indigenous Australian ritual practices. Methexis – as a productive (performative) 
participation, becomes an element spanning ritual, play and artistic practice as activities 
„beyond representation‟. “In this schema, the terms of the economy of representation 
shift. ... [M]eaning is produced as an embodied, situated event. Imaging produces real 
material effects.” PF27 
I have already expressed my reservations in reference to the „non-
representationalist‟ positions, in the analysis of Nigel Thrift‟s theory, and I agree with 
Derrida when he writes:  
We might say in another language that a criticism or a deconstruction of representation 
would remain feeble, vain, and irrelevant if it were to lead to some rehabilitation of 
immediacy, of original simplicity, of presence without repetition or delegation, if it 
were to induce the criticism of calculable objectivity, of criticism, of science, of 
technique, or of political representation. PF28FP  
As I have argued throughout this thesis, it is not possible or necessary to go beyond 
representation in the artistic practice, although this desire has always been one of the 
engines of change within culture and art. But still, no matter how immersive or life-like 
today‟s participatory art seems to be, I would approach it as a „reality show‟, a „guided 
tour to reality‟ or a „role-playing-game‟, rather than an unmediated experience. Even if 
we approach artistic process as methexis, it still belongs to (produces and is produced 
by) the broader frame of representation. What is more, I see the slogans of non-
representation as a mask, a veil, designed to conceal the art‟s frames, the participants‟ 
roles, the metaphors they embody, the artist‟s mastery and the authorial intention (even 
if it is only within the role of a game-master).   
Contrary to Bolt and Thrift, as proponents of play and performativity as tools of 
non-representation, I would argue that play as a philosophical concept is the condition 
for representation, and play as an empirical activity is a form of representation. In my 
view, the image of play as a means of non-representation comes from the one-sided 
view of play interpreted according to the set of prerational or primitivist characteristics 
as: direct, sensuous, irrational, unconscious, anti-intellectual, and so on. It overlooks 
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play as conceptual, rational, planned and repetitive. It also overlooks the non-erasable 
frame-parergon. 
I realize that my interpretation of representation is quite distant from its 
traditional, criticized notion. However, the changes within the relationship of ergon and 
parergon are interconnected with the changes in the function and meaning of 
representation. The new position of play as a portable frame, indispensable parergon, 
but also as an attractive external model for art activities, has transformed the concept of 
art‟s ergon including the notion of representation.   
 
Representation as a game session   
The approach to play as Derridean „undecidable‟, passé-partout and parergon, 
irreducible to one-sided descriptions, may be a way to arrive at a more constructive 
concept of representation than the traditional one driven by allergy between art and life, 
fiction and reality, subjectivity and objectivity, repetition and origin, convention and 
improvisation, etc. I propose, again, the view acknowledging the necessity of synergy – 
a productive coexistence of both sides of these dichotomies. I think representation is 
neither good nor bad, but it can be misused, misinterpreted or imposed by the dominant 
power.  
The model of play as bonding and separating different „realities‟, opens up the 
possibility for a flexible approach to representation as an experience and a symbolic act 
– one happening and possible only through the other. As a metaphor of this synergy I 
can employ the figure of the Roman god Janus, borrowed from Mikhail Bakhtin. In the 
unfinished text Toward a Philosophy of the Act (1919-24), he compares Thuman act or 
deed in art process to  
Ta two-faced Janus, ... gazing simultaneously into the cultural sphere and into lived life. 
Originally the numina or spirit inhabiting the doorway of a dwelling, the Roman god 
Janus, like Vesta (with whom he was often associated), was without gender or 
anthropomorphic form. As a kind of doorkeeper, Janus looked in – to the hearth and 
home – and he looked out – toward the larger world.  
T... As the spirit of the doorway, Janus might be thought of as the great and: art and life, 
theory and practice, historical roots and contemporary application. TPF29FP   
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T he doorway, threshold, the passage between two worlds, plays a similar role to the 
frame. It belongs to the inside and to the outside, and it is a channel of communication. 
I approach artistic representation, the process of art, as a two-way passage, a 
communicative frame, a meta-narration about the specific situation/act/activity/ 
experience.  
T he traditional notion of artistic representation has been conceptualized with 
help of a vocabulary describing the traditional ergon of art: work, production, 
Tpreconceived end, order and mastery T. I think that when we acknowledge the new role of 
play-parergon in contemporary art, all these terms can be redefined with the use of the 
metaphor of play. However, art has not become play. The ideas of purposefulness, 
means and ends and authorship are still vital to the practice and theory of art, even if 
being often carefully „veiled‟. I will try to inscribe these notions into the more play-
oriented model of representation. I think that the metaphor of the game session, 
developed in the previous chapter, can serve not only to analyse contemporary art 
practice, but also as a more universal tool to approach the notion of  representation as 
the possibility of synergy, the great and. I will address here three main elements of the 
redefined notion of representation: the initiator of the act, the participants in the act, and 
the way it happens.  
 
- TArtist/Game master  
TIn the traditional account artistic activity is initiated by the artist – author. He or 
she (but more often he) is the creator/producer of the aesthetic object that reflects/refers 
to/or transforms what is real/natural/original. The author is responsible for the meaning 
he creates. He intends a specific emotion or information to be inscribed within the 
work, and after the work is completed to be decoded by the viewer. The attempt to „go 
beyond representation‟ negates this function of the author and the „authority‟ as 
dangerous, totalitarian notions. The artist becomes a disinterested recipient-sender of 
the information, a „DJ‟ or a „post producer‟, one among other participants in the 
creative/post-productive activity, „being played‟ by the artistic game. His/her approach 
is open, the mode of creation is immersive, and the course of work is shaped by the 
flow of events.  
TIn my view, the artist is never an ultimate authority, or god-creator, neither is he 
an average participant. He or she can rather be compared to the game master (male or 
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female), someone at once inside and outside the game (the creative act), one among 
other players but performing a different function, with a larger dose of responsibility, 
although the tactic to make the game successful maybe the one of „letting go‟.  
T he artist as a game-master can have various predispositions – he/she can be an 
inventive creator of basic scenarios or plots to be followed, be a great playmate and 
play-leader full of empathy and able to inspire the others, a master of improvisation, 
unexpected twists of action, a charismatic story-teller, or a provocateur. All these 
options differ in terms of the degree of authorial intervention; they promise diverse 
structures of the „game‟, and depend on the artist‟s personality, skills, interests and the 
artistic tactic he or she adopts. The position of the artist can be also approached as a role 
he or she intends to perform in a specific project, including the „ Tmagician‟, „genius‟, 
„author‟ or „DJ‟, „independent researcher‟ and „animator‟. The artist can also try to keep 
his/her own position transparent, but I do not think it is possible, since each artistic act 
is inevitably marked by some sort of intention, preconception or tactic.  
TBakhtin saw the authorial interpretation as a form of exchange, a necessary 
dialogue. According to him, the Tartist „authors‟ the situation to the same degree as 
viewers/participants, and they „author‟ each other in the process of interaction. This 
process can be seen as authoritarian or as a possibility for negotiation, new insights and 
surprises, depending on the approach to the notion of „representation‟. For Bakhtin, the 
artist‟s task is “godlike” – “to define others in ways they cannot do for themselves”. PF30F P 
In contemporary community-oriented art, this task can be redefined as closer to the 
Socratic method of maieutics – as a service offered to the participants by the artist to 
help them to arrive at some insights that may lead to a change of position. In 
comparison to the Socratic strategy, the contemporary artistic game is much more open-
ended (or intended to be), however, in my view, the artists in most cases plan the 
options and the participant‟s moves in advance or at least have some ideas of where the 
whole process may lead to.  
The approach to an artist as a „game master‟ automatically discloses all possible 
variations of this function – from the authoritarian gestures to the empathy, letting go, 
or experiments with vertigo. It is clear from the beginning that the person named as the 
artist performs a „mastery‟ but within the frame that can be negotiated, and cannot be 
seen as the only possibility, or the best way to look at things. He or she is neither the 
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unquestionable „master‟ of the situation nor the average player who enters the game 
without the pressure of responsibility. The artist faces the attention directed towards 
him/her in the situation of doubt, conflict and evaluation. 
 
- TParticipants/Players 
T he chosen position of the artist structures, to some extent, the options which 
may be exercised by the viewers/participants. However, they should be seen neither in 
the traditional way as passive consumers, nor as creators of the situation or experience, 
independent from the artistic proposition, arrangement or invitation. The activity of 
participants (players) occurs in response to the initial move made by the artist (a plot or 
a setting proposed by the game master). If they accept the invitation to play – to enter 
the situation of art, of artistic representation, within the loose or more rule-bound 
frames – they can offer their own active contribution – to follow the script, negotiate it, 
modify or fill it with the specific content. What is more, as in ordinary games, active 
participants/players “will consistently explore what is permissible and what pushes at 
that boundary between rules and expectations, and player‟s own agency, within any 
given environment – no matter how structured that play is” TPF31FPT. The players are always 
unique personalities, and they also compose unique constellations as groups in 
„relational‟ art events. All forms of participation, in different locations and in different 
contexts can have different dynamics and meaning for the participants, and can be 
evaluated in different ways by spectators (critics, theorists, journalists, onlookers). It is 
almost impossible that the process or the product of interaction represents exactly the 
same value, experience, feeling or judgement to the diverse groups of people in 
different places and moments of time, no matter how authoritarian the initial plan was. 
The participants embody the initial plan and fill it with different meanings, transgress 
the singular point of view, and often surprise the artist-initiator.   
TWhat I find paradoxical, is that participatory art projects, proclaimed as non-
representational or going beyond the authorial subjective vision, are most often 
analysed in terms of the artist‟s intention. The viewers are „offered a possibility to 
occupy the space‟, „engage in the unexpected encounters‟, or „construct their own 
narratives‟, but rarely do the critical texts reveal anything more than these slogans. How 
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do viewers really occupy the space? What do they make out of it? How do they 
approach this experience? These are important aspects to address if the 
viewers/participants are to be seriously treated as contributors to the act of 
representation, and not just manageable and predetermined characters in the artist‟s 
play. The answers may be uncomfortable, difficult to deal with, and not fitting within 
the agenda of „re-stitching the relational fabric‟ or any other plan or scenario. The 
viewers can turn out to be spoil-sports, in many cases, and it is their right, as well as to 
join the play or to negotiate the rules.  
TSometimes the art action is designed for a specific group in terms of gender, 
age, geographical location, occupation, social status and so on. However, even then the 
participants are not obliged to become pawns in the artist‟s play, to represent the 
average member of a group as preconceived by the artist. They may not accept the 
proposition of the common creativity workshop in the initial form, designed to meet 
their specific needs, because these needs may be estimated incorrectly. They have right 
to ask the artist – “why are you here”, why do you want to do something here, what is 
your master plan? They can agree to take part in his or her play and possibly make it a 
common experience. There is a huge difference between being a spectator and being an 
active participant. To impose the active role in the art process, against someone‟s will, 
is the display of authoritarian control, the same as presupposing someone‟s passivity 
and obedience.  
TWhen the artist decides to enter the realm of human relations as a location of the 
„game world‟, he or she must be prepared to face the consequences. Local community 
members may turn out not to be enthusiastic players, or on the contrary, they may be 
too submissive to the artist‟s position as an authority, and a „real‟ master of the 
situation. To consider the viewers as voluntary players helps to acknowledge all their 
possible reactions, from the acceptance, through dialogue, to the negation, or 
indifference, and also, to avoid the didactic attitude on the part of the artist. If the artist 
claims to approach the viewers as partners or potential playmates he or she has to 
accept many different interpretations of the rules of the game and different approaches, 
including the „passive‟ reflexion. The artist may insist on following the „authorial‟ 
rules, enacting the preconceived general plan for action, or may open the process for the 
participants‟ invention and interpretation.   
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- T he artwork/Game session 
T he traditional „how‟ of artistic representation implies the authorial narrative in 
the form of aesthetic object or action, embedded within the net of cultural codes and 
conventions. The opposite, non-representational proposition focuses on the process, 
flow, performance and play – the activities taking place „here and now‟ that evoke 
spontaneous reactions instead of rational well-established solutions. The main 
expectation towards the art „beyond representation‟ is that it would „present‟, just „be‟ 
as any „real‟ phenomenon, instead of „represent‟.  
T he game session is basically a gathering, a meeting led by the game-master 
who introduces the players to the world of fiction. The social situation, the encounter 
and play take place at once on two planes – of the experience of being together, in a 
group, in someone‟s home or outdoors, and being somewhere else, in the game world; 
being oneself as a player and as a character in the game. All conversations and 
narrations occur in the game world – in between reality and fiction. This process can be 
compared to Bakhtin‟s formula of two steps of aesthetic vision: T  
They are not necessarily chronological, but interpenetrate each other. There is a 
moment of “living-into” that which is being experienced (projecting oneself, 
experiencing empathy); then a moment of objectification (separating from what one 
felt, returning to oneself) PF32FP  
 
TIn my view, in art practice, the performative „presence‟ always generates 
representation on some level, and the process of representation shapes this presence. 
Representation is both the experience of the fleeting, elusive moment, within the 
specific situation initiated by the artist and the metaphor. This metaphor carries forward 
the meaning of the experience in its future absence and creates specific forms of being 
in the given situation. The role in the game follows the flux of „events‟, occurs in 
interaction with other characters and shapes one‟s experience of the given moment.  
TRepresentation in the art process occurs on many levels (material, intellectual, 
emotional, interpersonal, etc.), it is not just an aesthetic monolith produced by the artist. 
It happens in effect of synergy of many different aspects including the artist‟s intention, 
plan or initial idea and specific means and actions that represent this approach and 
problems he or she wants to address. Representation can be an object or event; a 
                                                            
P
32
P Haynes D., Bakhtin and the Visual Arts, p. 53 
200 
 
specific material or performative entity that generates the intentional or accidental 
metaphors that go beyond the tangible substance of the „here and now‟; and also the 
viewers‟ contribution, their roles and interpretations; a story about the project produced 
by the participants and then reproduced in texts, discussions, academic papers and so 
on. Representation is then a polyphony or sometimes a cacophony of many different 
voices which is not necessarily rational, conventional and predeterminated, because it is 
impossible to control all moments of its becoming. However, it is different from the 
„unmediated‟ flow of events because of the overarching frame – „this is art‟– 
„something as something else‟, because of the adopted roles, shifted rules, and 
conceptual and aesthetic values going beyond the usual „performance‟ in the given 
situation. 
We produce and experience representation through the tangible, the material, 
and the performative. Within the frames of art, or a game session, immersion, flow, 
sensation, sudden insights, or “working hot”, are organically connected with 
representation. When we agree that the certain event is art or game, the rules of „reality‟ 
become complemented or challenged by the rules proposed by the artist/game master or 
negotiated by the participants/players. The usual rules, gestures, conversations, feelings, 
etc., are being framed. The non-representation is the attempt to strip art bare, to fix it as 
a self-referential sensuous act. Barbara Bolt writes that in performativity (as a form of 
non-representation) “the outside world enters the work” PF33FP. When the „outside world‟ 
gets into the „artist‟s hands‟ we inevitably end up with representation; it does not matter 
what processes the artist chooses to employ.  
  
I think that the model of play, the game-session, can liberate us from prejudice 
against representation as rigid, rational, traditional, authoritarian, and so on. Game is 
immersive and communicative, creative and repetitive, limiting and liberating. 
Representation in this sense is not only the product of experience, its imitation or 
interpretation; it also makes the „experience‟, which belongs to the fiction and reality. 
Representation can then be understood as trespassing, crossing, linking, but not 
necessarily in an “arboreal”PF34FP, totalizing, rigid and hierarchical way. It includes the 
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possibility of misinterpretation, misunderstanding and problems with communication, 
parallel or solitary play. As a fluid process, movement in-between, it makes possible 
surprise, vertigo, but also assimilation, mimicry and repetition.  
However, representation/game can be premeditated or authoritarian as well. It 
just depends who plays and with whom. A game does not guarantee the ultimate escape 
from the contest of power, which is inscribed in interhuman relations. Art process 
cannot suddenly become an ideal kibbutz, and it should not become one, if it is to 
resonate with (represent) the world.  
Play can be approached as a relational experience of togetherness, as a „dark‟ 
play testing the boundaries or as a competitive play seeking confrontation. The 
emergence of the art/play temporary community also entails the possibility of exclusion 
of those who do not fit into the game-world, or those who question its rules. The 
metaphor of the game helps to frame the notions of mastery, instrumentality, 
manipulation or provocation as belonging to the process – aspects we must be aware of, 
but not necessarily obliged to accept. 
 
The notion of representation as a game session exposes the temporal character 
of every art project that can be interpreted and updated in many different ways 
according to the situation, and to the participants‟ individual outlooks. Also, they can 
refuse to join the game, ignore it, question its rules, or appoint another game master, if 
it is possible. Play is voluntary and the same refers to art. Representation can then be 
seen as a safety barrier and a safe experiment. If, hypothetically, art becomes life – the 
non-representation – there would be no frame left that separates participants from the 
author‟s will and control and vice versa. There would also be no place for art that does 
not „smooth out the relational fabric‟, but rather tests the possibility of destruction, 
chaos or confrontation, because it would be really dangerous. The possibility of 
unmediated presence is only attractive when this presence provides excitement and 
creative stimulation but not the one that is violating, painful or intolerable. What is 
more, the separation from „reality‟, even by the almost transparent frame, makes art the 
domain marginal to „real life‟ occupations, and, at least potentially, detached and 
independent, and able to come up with fresh insights, non-functional solutions, or 
purposeless researches.   
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Play and aesthetics 
The new forms of recent art, and the proposed approach to representation as a 
game session, inevitably provoke questions concerning the adequate criteria of 
evaluation. What makes a successful/good/valuable art project? Should it be assessed in 
terms of ethics or aesthetics? According to Claire Bishop,  
The social turn in art has prompted an ethical turn in art criticism. This is manifest in a 
heightened attention to how a given collaboration is undertaken. In other words, artists 
are increasingly judged by their working process – the degree to which they supply 
good or bad models of collaboration ....PF35 
In her essay, Bishop mentions the Turkish artists‟ collective Oda Projesi, working with 
groups of adults and children in their immediate environments, who base their projects 
on the decisions “about where and with whom they collaborate”. The artists, 
interviewed by Bishop, referred to „aesthetic‟ as a “dangerous word”. PF36FP The „relational‟ 
artist Pierre Huyghe adds, “The question is less „what‟? than „to whom‟?” PF37FP It seems to 
me that the anti-representation agenda, the call to blur art and life, pushed the problem 
of „aesthetic‟ to the margins of art. However, I do not think that a productive or 
enjoyable „game session‟ or a community project lead by an artist automatically 
qualifies as art. The aesthetic value has to be inscribed within the products and 
processes of art, no matter in what form. As Bishop suggests, the elements of “respect 
for the other, recognition of difference, protection of fundamental liberties” should not 
exclude “discomfort and frustration – along with absurdity, eccentricity, doubt, or sheer 
pleasure”, which can be “crucial elements of work‟s aesthetic impact”. PF38FP However, the 
aesthetic questions in today‟s art form a complex body of issues, going beyond the 
scope of this research. How does the redefined position of play-parergon influence the 
generation of „aesthetic‟ experience? Should it be predeterminated by the artist, and to 
what extent? I have to leave these questions unanswered here. 
 
Conclusion 
The traditional – pre-modern ergon of Western art was to produce objects for 
aesthetic contemplation. These objects (paintings, sculptures, etc.), were artistic 
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representations of „things‟, and combined the material and visual form with the 
meaning intended by the author. The proper function of the viewer was to decode this 
meaning in the course of aesthetic experience evoked by the art object; to „consume‟ the 
product of artistic work. The artist (even if attributed with magical or sacred powers or 
the artistic genius) was primarily a maker, a „licensed interpreter‟ of common 
experience into the material form. However, the postmodern proponents of non-
representation have accused the traditional representation of being instrumental and 
authoritarian. 
In this chapter, drawing on the model of ergon-parergon, the analysis of play as 
a strategy in modern avant-gardes and the notion of the Role-Playing Game session as a 
tactic or an assimilated structure of recent participatory art, I proposed to reinterpret the 
contemporary position of play in the creative act, as well as the concept of artistic 
representation. In my view, play, from the „dangerous‟ supplement of pre-modern art 
has become an „attractive‟ supplement in the 20 Pth P century – a synonym for creativity, 
interdisciplinarity, open-endedness, flexibility and so on. The dissolution of the 
aesthetic object, an outcome of the goal-oriented, preconceived artistic production 
(work), has exposed the notion of play, the orientation on the process, with all its 
unexpected consequences, as the main interest of contemporary artists.  
However, I do not see play as the new ergon of art. I think that a much more 
useful approach is to refer to play as parergon, frame, but the one that determines what 
is being framed. In other words, parergon becomes not only the condition for 
representation, but it also produces representations by framing certain fragments of 
„reality‟ as art. Ergon, in this conception, is not attached to the frame. It rather emerges 
from the particular „reality‟ that is being framed, is a „pretext‟ of artistic intervention, so 
it changes with every art project. However, ergon and parergon, the proper function of 
a given „world‟ stimulating the function of the artwork, and the play of art as framing 
this „world‟, are still interrelated; they complement and shape each other. The artistic 
activity of „framing‟ cannot be mechanical – the artists have to respect the rules of the 
given reality and deal with the notion of ergon they try to challenge, transform, or 
question.  
Play, from the external strategy and tactic, has, perhaps, become art‟s 
methodology (structure of works), but not its main function or purpose. This function 
can be very work-like; it can be aimed at transforming interhuman relations, the 
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conditions of social exchange, ecological or political awareness, and so on. This still 
experimental and unsettled configuration of ergon and parergon can cause confusion, 
especially when the approach to artistic representation remains the traditional one. 
In order to avoid the problematic utopia of non-representation, I proposed to 
reinterpret the notion of representation according to the new, more decisive position of 
play-parergon. I analysed the role of the artist, participants and the character of their 
encounter, using the metaphor of the game session to transgress the traditional work-
based vocabulary describing representation. In my view, the frame of representation, 
the non-erasable one when we discuss art, is necessary for art‟s experimental, 
provocative and transgressive functions. It enables artistic activities to become 
playgrounds, game sessions and to test various ideas and identities without „real life‟ 
consequences. The representation as a game session is voluntary and temporary; its 
rules can be questioned or negotiated by viewers/participants, and the „mastery‟ of the 
artist can become a tactic open for the unexpected. It can be intentionally incompetent 
or challenging, depending on the anticipated function of the given project. What is 
more, I think that the approach to play as „undecidable‟, not just the „good‟ and safe 
family event, or the notion loaded with prerational, primitivist myths, enables an 
approach to artistic representation/game session as an aesthetic, not just a relational or 
dialogic experience. 
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Conclusion 
 
The main purpose of my thesis was to develop a perspective on play that could 
be effectively applied in the context of art. With the help of this redefined notion of 
play I then proceeded to address two further issues – the use of play as a rhetoric tool in 
the discourse of the artistic representation and as a creative strategy or tactic in 20 P
th
P and 
21P
st
P century art. 
Play turned out to be an elusive, ambivalent term, and according to Spariosu, 
subject to interpretations structured by rational or prerational rhetorics in Western 
thought. Prerational play appears as a vital, excessive “manifestation of ceaseless 
physical Becoming”, PF1FP freedom and chance. Rational play, in turn, is narrated as a non-
violent work-like activity, limited by rules and conventions, supporting sociability and 
communication. However, I argued that it is best to approach play as a concept based 
on contradictions rather than to reduce it to just one side of its characteristics, fitting 
into the predetermined outlook. This view proved to be helpful in my research because 
it enabled me to identify narratives and „persuasive discourses‟ behind the actual uses 
of play in art theory and practice, and to negotiate between different perspectives. 
Depending on the given rhetoric play has been located as dominant or marginal within 
its relationship with the „opposite‟ concepts like „reality‟, „game‟ and „work‟. I focused 
primarily on the notion of work, as the terms: „making‟, „production‟, „tools‟ and „work 
of art‟ belong to the traditional vocabulary of art and culture. I argued therefore that it is 
impossible to refer to play as a separate phenomenon in the context of social life, 
including art. I decided that it would be much more fruitful to look at the notion of play 
in connection with its traditional opposite: work. 
Consequently, in order to establish the most functional perspective on play 
within the concept of art, I took „work‟ into account as well. I argued that the traditional 
approach to artistic representation has been grounded within the concept of work as 
ergon – a „proper function‟ or activity. This classical notion, developed by Plato and 
Aristotle, connotes hierarchy, order, permanence, structure, stable identification, 
determination and purposefulness. It is the activity of the self-conscious homo faber, 
who, with the use of proper tools, creates the human-made world as imitation or 
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transformation of the natural world. Play, similarly to its role in social life (in Western 
culture influenced by the Protestant work ethic), acts as a supplement to the dominant 
ergon – it is a desirable but temporary relaxation. When excessive it can be dangerous 
or destructive for the dominant order. To contextualize the role of play in art I used the 
notion of parergon, applied originally by Kant to describe an ornament, a drapery or a 
frame that supplements the work of art. However, according to Derrida, the supplement 
is not simply external or marginal to the main body of work but in some sense its 
condition; there exists a structural link between them. Derrida highlights the essentiality 
of parergon to the constitution of the identity of ergon. Supplement is therefore 
threatening, dangerous, because it shows the incompleteness of the „main body‟ and 
exposes the fact that its identity is deficient or non-existing at all without the 
supplementation. Play-parergon emerges as, perhaps dangerous, but indispensable 
supplement of the artistic ergon, and consequently as an essential element of the 
concept of art. It plays with the functional and purposive ergon through the challenge, 
parody, experiment and subversion.  
The metaphor of parergon, which in Derrida evokes further connotations of 
passé-partout, master key and passport, pharmakon and pharmakos, exemplifies the 
characteristics of play that I find relevant in the context of art. Play as parergon can be 
read after Derrida as „undecidable‟ – as lock and key, locus and movement, here and 
there, inside and outside. Therefore, play cannot be reduced to just one interpretation 
according to the given rhetoric; it does not have a stable identity or a proper function. It 
is „prerational‟ and „rational‟ – it operates „in between‟ the opposite poles. In my view, 
this ability of play to be „something and something else‟, to link the disconnected 
elements, makes play-parergon a condition for creation of metaphors, and more broadly 
the trigger of representation. 
Instead of the metaphysical allergy between work and play (ergon and 
parergon) I suggested the necessity to consider art as a conceptual and performative 
synergy (working/playing together). This allows looking at work and play as 
indispensable and equal elements, and overcoming the rhetorics of supplementarity. 
However, when we approach art and aesthetics from the historical perspective it turns 
out that in the actual theory and practice the marginal position of play have been taken 
for granted. The artists either ignored the operation of play or, as in case of modern 
avant-gardes, tried to overturn the hierarchy with the use of play as an external strategy, 
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a remedy for traditional ergon of art and representation. What is more, in most cases, 
play has been used as rhetoric or creative tool to serve specific needs and to support 
specific outlooks. In my thesis I discussed the interpretations of play as either „rational‟ 
or „prerational‟ and the consequences of such decisions in art and aesthetics. 
 
I argued that these two poles of the concept of play proved to be supportive of 
two opposite models of the aesthetic experience, two approaches to the idea of artistic 
representation. The rational model (discussed in reference to Kant‟s theory) assumes the 
primacy of the subject (player) over the artistic process (play). Although disinterested 
and not productive of concepts, this „rational‟ play appears to be very work-like – it acts 
as an inner, reliable mechanism of art that allows for the harmonious collaboration of 
cognitive faculties of imagination and understanding. It guards the possibility of 
universal communication and prevents excessive freedom of imagination as personal 
nonsense. I argued that the „rational‟ play in Kant, similarly to work-ergon, acts as a 
leading principle of the traditional notion of representation. 
The „prerational‟ play, after Gadamer, can be seen as a metaphor for Being – an 
original experience/understanding in which things (beings) are revealed to the subject. 
Consequently, such play dominates the players/participants who are not in total control 
of their experience. Play is no longer a subjective negotiation of rules and modes of 
behaviour; it is rather the „mode of being of the work of art‟. Art, instead of 
representation becomes a manifestation, „presentation‟ of life, reality and natural 
powers. Unlike traditional representation this approach does not focus on artworks – 
regarded as detached and fixed objects – but on the processes that occur „in-between‟ 
artists, artworks and viewers. The „prerational‟ play of art entails the promise of non-
representation – the unmediated experience in the situation of art, beyond the subjective 
control.  
Since, in my view, these models reduce the potential of both play and the artistic 
representation, I discussed the alternative concepts coming from writings of Kant, 
Gadamer and Bakhtin. The Kantian notion of „the sublime‟, although subjective and 
rational, refers to the moment in which the rational subject encounters the 
overwhelming, „unpresentable‟ phenomenon. Like play, the sublime must be treated as 
a liminal experience occurring in between subject and object, reality and representation, 
safety and danger, familiar and unfamiliar. It tests one‟s cognitive powers and 
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transports the subject beyond the usual spheres of experience. However, everything 
happens in the safe „as if‟ (play-like) mode.  
The notion of the sublime also helps to demonstrate the limitations of the 
rational model of play and artistic representation. It exposes the existence of 
phenomena which simply are beyond human grasp or control and which we can only 
„play along with‟. I discussed it with the example of „the unconscious‟ as described by 
Freud and creatively interpreted by the Surrealists. The operation of the unconscious 
can be seen as a play of natural powers surpassing the subject „from within‟ and 
revealing the inescapable margin of indeterminacy in the act of representation. 
However, the conscious decision to play/to participate in the artistic activity imposes 
the frames of representation and transforms the meaningless into the meaningful. I 
argued, therefore, that the sublime is both a powerful sensation of the „external‟ (or 
internal – unknown, unfamiliar) power of play that exceeds the players (natural forces, 
chance, or unconsciousness) and the subjective will to control, to make sense, to 
represent. 
Communal celebrations – carnival and festival (as described by Gadamer and 
Bakhtin respectively) can be identified with the similar processes, which I named as the 
„embodied representation‟. They are occasions to enact and experience „directly‟ the 
„unpresentable‟ phenomena beyond the individual grasp. The spirit of „universal 
communion‟ enables the participants to experience the „heightened self-fulfilling 
moments‟ and to transgress the rules and roles of the everyday. However, I argued that 
despite the immersive character of the festive activities, the „magic circle‟ of fiction, of 
representation, is the condition for this meaningful „heightened‟ experience. 
The experiences of the sublime, carnival and festival oscillate in between the 
symbolic and experiential, self-conscious and immersive. In my view, these models, 
sharing characteristics with play, show the weak points of the traditional notion of 
representation, as well as the impossibility to go beyond representation in the 
experience of art.  
 
Nonetheless, in the artistic practice and art theory of the 20 P
th
P and 21P
st
P centuries, 
play, interpreted in most cases as prerational, has served as a tool to oppose the 
traditional ergon-like notion of representation. The Kantian idea of art as autonomous 
from reality, and as a manifestation of the subjective will to control, became a matter of 
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contestation in modern avant-garde movements. Artists reached for the concept of play, 
but specifically „prerational‟ play, to bring art back to life as a meaningful experience – 
not a traditionally interpreted „representation‟.  
I argued that the emergence of play as an external creative “strategy” was 
catalysed by the modern fascination with „primitive‟ art and the rhetorics of primitivism 
in particular. I discussed the primitivist approach as supported by the prerational 
outlooks and the metaphysical myths – of origin and of presence. Both play and the 
creative process in savage art were treated by modern avant-gardes as unmediated 
experience – unconscious, anti-intellectual, anti-rational and innocent. The primitivist 
myths located these two „pre-activities‟, the sources of untamed creativity, as more 
valuable than the traditional, rational, rule- and convention-bound representation. Due 
to his or her “strategic” encounter or even identification with the Other, (the savage 
artist, the child or the insane), the modern artist could have arrived at non-rational states 
of mind, productive of anti-intellectual, sensual art. This strategy was directed against 
„high‟ and academic art and the „proper function‟ of the artist and the viewer. The 
strategy of play and primitivist art acted as „Other of reason‟, as revolutionary, 
disruptive tools to infuse new life into social and cultural realms. Although I ascribed 
the emergence of the strategy of play to the rhetorics of primitivism, the actual practices 
that employed this strategy went beyond the inspiration with „primitive‟ objects of art. 
Instead, artists used directly different types of play in experimental forms, often quite 
distant from the traditional painting and drawing. 
In order to discuss the „why and how‟ of the strategy of play in modern avant-
gardes, I analysed a few types of human playgrounds that served as models for artists, 
from Dada to Fluxus, including cabaret, festival, excursion, parlour and language 
games, masquerades, play of chance and „little laboratory‟. The artistic activities that 
reminded of, or took the form of empirical play helped the artists to arrive at the state of 
creative „playfulness‟, as a possibility of transgression of the well-established roles and 
rules in the domain of art. Play became an attractive method to explore the margins of 
proper artistic production, to make the creative process exciting and unpredictable, and 
to interact with the public. To some extent, artists, especially Dadaists and Surrealists, 
consciously occupied roles of society‟s jesters (to “shock the middle class”) and they 
strengthened the stereotype of an artist as a playing child, and play as synonymous with 
irrationality, irresponsibility and frivolity. However, the equally provocative 
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masquerades and puns employed by Duchamp highlighted play not as an exotic and 
„primitive‟ supplement but a philosophical condition for the artistic act. He proved that 
play is not opposed to the rational mind but it can act as a conceptual tool to bring new 
unexpected insights into the creative process and communication with the viewer. John 
Cage introduced the Zen Buddhism inspired playful strategy of letting go. Chance, 
immersion, flow, oblivion, unknowing and non-functional research had become popular 
creative and cognitive tools. Some artists (e.g. Viennese Actionists, Abramović) 
departed to explore „dark‟, excessive and violent sides of play in the tradition inspired 
by Nietzsche, De Sade and Bataille. Such „play of art‟ must be seen as a constructive as 
well as a deconstructive force; it transgresses „the proper‟ and „the accepted‟, and enters 
the spheres of doubt, anxiety and ambiguity.  
 In the post-war art the strategy of play was mainly employed to foster 
communication, interaction and inter-human relations, rather than to shock and provoke 
(Cage, Kaprow, Fluxus). The viewers were invited to step into the world of 
Environments and Installations and to join artistic play – to become active playmates of 
the artist. Kaprow‟s Happenings, based on the model of children‟s play, were intended 
to eliminate the public, to blur the boundaries between the artist and the viewer, 
between art and life, experience and representation. Gradually, the strategy of play has 
become a widely-accepted element of the creative process. 
I argued that the organized around certain central values and loaded with the 
notion of power „strategy‟ of play has been replaced by the „tactic‟ (to use de Certeau‟s 
terms) of play in postmodern art. Tactic operates within the given structure to gradually 
transform it, but it does not follow the revolutionary agenda. Play as a tactic becomes 
an undercurrent of artistic and social network. I described the operation of the 
contemporary tactic of play with the use of metaphors coming from the world of games, 
namely the Role-Playing Games. I compared the participatory projects by Deller, Janin, 
WochenKlausur and the collaborative actions of the Finissage of Stadium X, among 
others, to the elements of the game. I analysed the artist‟s position as a game master, 
and the real life arena of the project, framed by the artist‟s intervention, as a game 
world. Consequently, I described the real or fictional characters enacted by the 
participants as roles (characters) within the game. This analogy allowed me to expose 
the game or play-like structure of many recent projects. The art work as a „game 
session‟ (similarly to TV reality show) arranges the possibility to „have an experience‟ 
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– in the form of symbolic reenactment of the past events, community workshop, guided 
tour, boat trip, training and so on. It helps to make interhuman connections, to look at 
things as if for the first time, as the Other or as a „true‟ self freed from the obligations of 
the everyday reality. The tactic of play allows therefore to occupy social „interstices‟ 
and to „make sense‟ or nonsense of the world through the methetic techniques of 
performance and role-play, in which the social processes operate „as real‟.    
This promise of unmediated experience that inspires many participatory projects 
subscribes to the prerational, primitivist view of play as an anti-intellectual 
performance. This notion of play serves as an element in Nigel Thrift‟s theory of non-
representation. I argued that play, immersive and embodied experience (a village fair, a 
community event, a reality-show or a role-playing game) nonetheless, in all cases, 
evokes representation. The experience of play/art is possible because play is a 
metacommunicative frame; it emerges from the immediate experience and shapes it – 
makes it different from itself. Play cannot, therefore, serve as a non-representational 
tool, because through the immediate, the embodied and the performative it evokes 
representation. 
In the final chapter I speculated on the contemporary position of play in the 
ergon-parergon model and the possibility to redefine the notion of representation with 
the use of the metaphor of game-session. I argued that the modern revolution brought 
about the disturbance of the traditional hierarchy work/play, ergon/parergon. In modern 
avant-gardes, play, from the „dangerous supplement‟ and a marginal notion has become 
an attractive artistic strategy – a provocative tool to tease the middle class and to 
revolutionize the artistic and social realm (Dada, Surrealism), an intellectual exercise 
and paradigm shifting (Duchamp, Fluxus), a tool to overcome metaphysical 
dichotomies (Surrealists, Cage), and a means of confrontation and catharsis (Vienna 
Actionists, Abramović). The analysis of the recent participatory and relational works 
proved that play, from the external strategy, has gradually become more of an internal 
tactic or a structural element of the works and a part of the essential vocabulary of art. I 
asked, therefore, whether we could locate play as a new ergon of art, a new central 
value, a new proper function. In my view such a perspective on play would annihilate 
play as „undecidable‟, as locus and movement. Hence, I proposed to stick to the notion 
of play as parergon – a frame. However, it is no longer a Kantian ornamental frame, 
merely enhancing and supplementing the main body of work (ergon). It is rather a 
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symbolic, conceptual frame as a „portable device‟, employed to define some objects and 
situations as „art‟. This metacommunicative artistic play (frame), a „context‟ creating a 
work of art, acts as a border and a bond between different „realities‟, or „reality‟ and 
„fiction‟. Play-parergon is then the condition for representation, and also it produces 
representations by framing certain fragments of „reality‟ as art. Consequently, the 
redefined ergon is not attached to the frame. It can be rather seen as a „pretext‟ for the 
artistic intervention emerging from the given reality, for example a specific problem to 
be addressed. A work of art, a „text‟, comes into being through the creative synergy of 
ergon and parergon – a pretext and a context – a given „world‟ that attracted the artist 
and a frame employed in the project. It seems to me then, that play, although it still can 
be used as an external provocative strategy or a more dialogue-oriented tactic, has 
become an internal „default‟ structure of many works.  
In order to overcome the prejudice against traditional representation, as well as 
the ideas of non-representation (that ignore the characteristics of play-parergon as a 
metacommunicative frame), I suggested approaching the notion of representation with 
help of the metaphor of a game-session. Representation conceptualised as a game 
session becomes a symbolic act and an experience – one happening and possible only 
through the other. This redefined notion of representation must be seen as a synergy of, 
and a two-way passage between art and life, fiction and reality, subjectivity and 
objectivity, repetition and origin, convention and improvisation. It allows diverse 
approaches and responses within a variety of contexts – improvisational, experimental, 
chance-driven or rule-bound, repetitive and predefined in advance. The role of the artist 
as a game master reveals the multilayered dynamics of this function – from the 
authoritarian gestures and mastery in the traditional sense to the empathy, letting go, 
and immersing within collaborative, communal activities. Representation as a game 
session is a very flexible and open-ended concept, and it embraces play as both 
„rational‟ and „prerational‟. Finally, I argued that the non-erasable frame of 
representation, established by play-parergon as „undecidable‟, is necessary for art‟s 
experimental, provocative, and transgressive functions. It makes art a subject of 
aesthetic, not only ethical considerations. 
 
Contemporary artists use participatory (methetic, role-playing) techniques in 
order to evoke „the experience‟, but also to generate meaning and knowledge. Art and 
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play are performed to „make sense‟ (or non-sense) of the real and unreal, past, presence 
and future. The operation of the element of play within the domain of art enables 
representation, double plane of action, brackets of fiction, „something as something 
else‟. The strategy or tactic of play enables representation through the immediate 
experience, presence, performance, “working hot”. Therefore, as I have argued 
throughout my dissertation, play as a philosophical notion is the condition for 
representation, and play as an actual activity (employed as an artistic strategy or tactic) 
is a form of representation, despite its performative, embodied character. The promise 
of play as a non-representational tool in 20 P
th 
Pand 21 P
st
P century art belongs to primitivist, 
prerational rhetorics and traditional Western metaphysics, which, since Plato, has 
praised „original‟ presence above representation.   
 
My research encountered problems and ideas much broader, complex and 
interdisciplinary that I initially assumed. However, my intention was not to arrive at 
ultimate answers of what play is and how it operates within the theory and practice of 
art. I rather wanted to come up with a methodological key to open the notion of play for 
further discussion, to negotiate between different uses of this concept, to contextualize 
it and to go beyond the popular or stereotypical views. I was interested in constructing a 
general map that would help to locate and examine play in more detail in further 
studies. I think that the ergon/parergon model fulfils this function and can help to 
redefine play as an indispensable element of the concept of art.  
Apart from this main proposition, this thesis has developed other concepts and 
approaches that contribute to the study of play as an aesthetic element. The distinction 
between the modern strategy of play and the postmodern tactic is a useful, although 
inevitably schematic, research tool. However, it clearly situates play as a postmodern 
method – not a revolutionary and external but a widely-accepted and assimilated artistic 
means. This shift proves that the traditional notion of representation needs to be 
supplemented with the concept of play (no longer a dangerous, but rather an attractive 
component). The proposed game-session model of artistic representation overcomes the 
fixity and rigid frames of the traditional approach, but also shows that it is not necessary 
(and not possible) to go beyond representation in the realm of art. The RPG metaphor 
itself also seems to be a useful tool to discuss functions, roles and activities of 
contemporary artists and viewers. Additionally, this thesis contributes to the studies on 
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primitivism in Western art. I inscribed this trend into the chain of developments which 
reached its contemporary manifestation in the participatory, process-oriented projects. I 
pointed out common prerational and metaphysical narratives that inspired the interest in 
„primitive‟ art and play, and the pursuits of non-art.  
 
For me, the moment of evaluation of this thesis came when I visited Mirosław 
Bałka‟s project (How it is) in Tate Modern in December 2009 and I was able to describe 
it with the vocabulary and concepts developed in the course of my study. Bałka‟s work 
is aimed to provide the viewers with „the experience‟, which at the same time triggers 
the processes of representation – the plush darkness, the walk into it, the blurred 
presence of other people – become meaningful. The whole experience is a mixture of 
the sublime, vertigo and dark play. It evokes anxiety and the aesthetic pleasure. It 
seduces those who entered to „play along‟, to move forward. One can sense the 
„unpresentable‟, picture “the ramp at the entrance to the Ghetto in Warsaw, or the trucks 
which took Jews away to the camps of Treblinka or Auschwitz”PF2FP, or simply immerse 
oneself in the child-like fear and curiosity. This work is a threshold, literally – as a 
passage from the light to the pitch black, and metaphorically – as a play in between 
experience and representation, safety and danger, oneself and the other, community and 
exclusion.  
 
 
 
21. Mirosław Bałka, How it is, Tate Modern, London, 2009 
                                                            
P
2
P http://www.tate.org.uk/modern/exhibitions/unilevermiroslawbalka/default.shtm, visited: 21.12.2009 
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However, I am aware that the ideas developed in this thesis generate further 
questions, especially from the field of practice. Ideally, I would like to continue this 
study as a more practical and specific application of ideas. I hope this research will also 
contribute to my own studio work – play.  
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